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1Preface
Man kann den Ausdruck Selbstdenken häufig
hören,  a l s  ob damit  e twas  Bedeutendes
gesagt w äre. In der tat kan n keiner für den
anderen denken , so wenig als essen un d
t r i n k e n ;  j e n e r  A u s d ruck i s t  d a h e r  e in
Pleonasmus. 
- Hegel -
I believe many people share my experience that writing about a theme is
the most efficient way to learn about that theme. It is also a very efficient
way to organize one’s own thoughts. At least in the case of philosophy
these two learning processes are not separate: one does not really ‘know’ a
theme unless one is able to think it in an organized fashion oneself. To me,
interpreting Hegel’s views on systematical philosophical themes have in
this sense proved to be an enormously fruitful method for developing my
own thinking. In this case, a lot came to me only during the quite rapid
process of writing this text and a clearer formulation of many ideas presen-
ted in it is yet to come. This text has done its job if it succeeds in being
interesting and provocative enough to arouse discussion and comments on
issues that are still far from being settled in the literature.
About the text. In translating Hegel into English I have consulted
Petry’s bilingual edition (see literature), but mostly used my own deliberati-
on for producing translations that are good enough for my purposes.
Translating always involves making compromises and one just has try to
find the best one for each purpose. I have usually reproduced Hegel’s
original in the footnotes so that the reader does not have to rely only on
the translations even if she does not happen to have a copy of Hegel’s text
at hand. I have also usually quoted more than just those sentences that I
explicitly analyze since quoting off the context is the way to produce hasty
interpretations that do not help anyone. Hegel’s texts have this feature in
common with the Bible: you can probably find support for any view from
it by quoting haphazardly from a suitable place and disregarding the con-
text. (By this I do not however want to suggest any other similarities as to
the approach to be taken towards Hegel’s texts and the Bible.)
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To help those who do not know the Encyclopedia Philosophy of
subjective spirit, and also those (for example myself) who know something
about it but find immensely hard even to remember its table of contents, I
have reproduced the table of contents in the end of my text as an appen-
dix. In my text I use three different terms of the parts of Hegel’s text. They
are: section (or main-section), subsection and chapter. Thus the text of the Phi-
losophy of subjective spirit contains three sections: ‘Anthropology’, ‘Pheno-
menology’ and ‘Psychology’. For example the ‘Phenomenology’-section
contains then three subsections: ‘Consciousness as such’, ‘Self-consciousness’
and ‘Reason’. Finally, for example ‘Consciousness as such’-subsection
contains three chapters: ‘Sensuous consciousness’, ‘Perception’ and ‘Understan-
ding’.
My thanks are due to all those who have provided me with support
and encouragement in my work so far. Some of those to whom I owe a
special gratitude I would like to mention here. -Without Susanna
Hartikainen I would never have even thought of studying philosophy.
Even though there are easier ways to get on with life than studying and
practizing philosophy, it seems to be the right one for me. -Jussi Kotkavirta
has been my teacher and wise friend from the very beginning of my stu-
dies, from whom I have probably learned most of what I understand of
philosophy. -Arto Laitinen is the other one who has been alongside me
almost from the beginning of my studies. Without Arto’s enthusiasm and
eagerness for discussions it would have been very hard or impossible to
remain motivated with studying philosophy which often can be quite a
lonely job. Arto has also been an enormous help by reading this texts
almost simultaneously as I wrote it. He was wise enough to propose only
those kind of corrections and clarifications that were possible in what ever
time there was and to abstain form pointing out the overall unfinishedness
of some of my formulations, of which I’m well aware anyhow. -Risto
Niemi-Pynttäri has been an important figure for me for many years, first as
an inspiring teacher and later as a dear friend and colleague. Risto’s passion
for life and thinking makes being and discussing with him always an excep-
tional pleasure. -Professor Eerik Lagerspetz has been unfailingly supportive
during the time that I have worked at the Department of Social Sciences
and Philosophy and has produced an atmosphere where one does not have
to feel ashamed of spending a lot of time on a subject that is certainly not
among the most fashionable ones in the Finnish context. -Professor Man-
fred Frank originally encouraged me to take up the theme that I deal with
in this text. My disagreements with him on the field of Hegel-interpretation
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are insignificant compared to what I have learned by reading his writings
and especially in intensive discussions with him during his visit to Jyväskylä
in August 1999. I hope to be able to develop the themes of reflection in
the near future further than what I managed to do in this text. -Contacts to
Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster are too important for me to
account for adequately. I have learned enormously in Michael Quante’s and
Christoph Halbig’s seminars on Hegel, McDowell and related issues. I am
moreover especially grateful to Christoph Halbig for his generous com-
ments on my work. -Without professor Olli Koistinen and the Finnish
academy it would have been much harder to concentrate on the work that
has been necessary for these first attempts to analyze the themes of self-
consciousness and inter-subjectivity in Hegel’s Encyclopedia. -Finally,
without Anne I would not have achieved anything.
1 This text is a slightly amended version of a licenciate-thesis which was successfully
defended 19.10. 2000 at the Faculty of Social Sc iences, University of Jyväskylä.
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Introduction1
This is a study on self-consciousness and intersubjectivity in Hegel’s late
encyclopedia philosophy of spirit from 1830. It is motivated by serious
disagreement or even confusion in the secondary literature about the role
or function of intersubjectivity in the constitution of a fully developed
individual human subjectivity according to late Hegel. My claim is, that the
sometimes bewildering differences in reading Hegel on this particular issue
are based mostly on lack of adequate attention to what Hegel in fact says in
his mature philosophy of subjective spirit. We nowadays have an extensive
literature on Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit from 1807, and a lot of this
literature deals extensively with questions of intersubjectivity and recogniti-
on in the constitution of subjectivity. However, the text which would seem
to be the most obvious place to look for Hegel’s account of the constituti-
on of human subjectivity – that is, his philosophy of subjective spirit – is
still comparatively rarely read and commented on. The number of mono-
graphs dedicated specifically to the mature philosophy of subjective spirit
can still be counted with one’s fingers.
Certainly one influential cause for this is the overall anti-metaphysical
climate in contemporary philosophy and the conviction that Hegel’s Ency-
clopedia for sure represents the kind of metaphysical philosophizing that
anyone who wants to be taken as a responsible thinker should be hostile to.
This anti-metaphysical attitude finds nowadays its support not only in
Anglo-American philosophy but also in Germany, among influential
thinkers such as Jürgen Habermas and Axel Honneth. It is however to be
expected (and I would add, to be hoped for) that certain motives and
developments in the philosophical arena will open new ears also to the
philosophically more ambitious side of Hegel represented by his mature
system – a side which I do not think should be characterized, as it still
often is, as a kind of hyper-rationalistic and hyper-metaphysical attempt to
grasp the world with pure thinking that is insensitive to sciences and
common sense. It should be seen as a much more down to earth attempt
to construct adequate conceptual means for grasping highly varied pheno-
mena of the natural, cultural, mental and logical world as an interconnected
whole, as an attempt that is perhaps most illustrative to characterize as
modern Aristotelianism. By Aristotelianism I do not mean any specific
INTRODUCTION
2 This is not to say  that there a re no imp ortant similaritie s in Aristo tle’s and H egel’s
‘results’.  For Hegel’s interpretation of Aristotle, see Weiss 1969, Greene 1979 and
Chiereghin 1991. Chieregh in’s article contains a short bibliography of relevant
literature (Chiereghin 1991, p. 19, foo tnote 30).
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doctrines proposed by Aristotle but more generally a certain attitude in
philosophy towards phenomena that are the topic of philosophy, that is
‘saving the phenomena’ in not trying to reduce them to some fundamental
level or ground wherefrom they would be deduced by some logically pure
procedure that is more or less independent from the phenomena themsel-
ves.
Thus, when Hegel praises Aristotle’s books on the soul and treatises
on its aspects and conditions as being “still by far the best or even sole
work of speculative interest on this general topic” (§ 378), I take the object
of his appreciation to be at least as much the general non-reductive and
synthetic approach of Aristotle towards what Hegel calls the subjective
spirit (or the aspect of it that Hegel calls the soul (Seele)) as the contents of
what Aristotle says.2 It is in this spirit, that I think Hegel should be also
read: as a thinker who did his best in trying to synthesize the most develo-
ped and promising scientific knowledge of his time and the most unbiased
experience of common sense in a picture of human being that would not
reduce any aspect of it to an illusion or mere effects of some underlying
but non-appearing ‘ground’. Against this, many will protest by insisting that
it is after all Hegel’s metaphysical logic that works as the final criterion in
Hegel’s presentation when it comes to the question of what is true and
false in empirical sciences or common sense. In the end, isn’t Hegel the
panlogist for whom phenomena are only a surface play of an eternal logical
order, the structure of which Hegel claims to have grasped in a purely a
priori manner? The best way to reduce these worries is to produce interpre-
tations and analyzes of Hegel’s Realphilosophie, that reveal its richness and
relevance to general philosophical discussions of the past and present.
What ever one finds out by reading the Realphilosophie, at least one should
be able to see quite easily that it is so thoroughly permeated by analyzes of
the most varied kind of phenomena, and so thoroughly informed by the
scientific and philosophical discussions of Hegel’s day that attempts to
track it all back to Hegel’s logic will at their best remain on an extremely
high level of generality and abstractness. 
In this spirit, Michael John Petry defends a strongly down to earth
reading of Hegel’s Realphilosophie in the introduction to his translation of
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the philosophy of subjective spirit by emphasizing the level of detailedness
and openness to sciences and common sense of Hegel’s exposition. He
also emphasizes “the process of constant revision and rethinking” (Petry I,
xcvii) that went on in Hegel’s lectures on subjective spirit during the
twenties. Petry’s extensive comments on the sources from where Hegel
draw his details (in the endnotes of Petry’s edition) are an impressive
testimony of how far from a purely logical deduction Hegel’s way of
proceeding really is. There is no doubt that Hegel had higher hopes than
most philosophers today on the possibilities of philosophy to organize and
synthesize the scattered and confused mass of scientific and everyday
experience into an ordered whole. But it is also probably true that no one
(except perhaps Aristotle) has made a more serious effort in trying to make
it actually work – and that means not just simplifying everything to simple
formulas, but really doing justice to the plurality and complexity of reality
with a conceptual apparatus that is adequate to it (that this apparatus itself
would turn out to be extremely complicated should become as no surprise
to anyone). And when one witnesses the way Hegel uses or ‘applies’ the
conceptual apparatus developed in his logic in his Realphilosophie, one soon
realizes that what is going on is at least as much patient handwork with the
infinite complexity of phenomena as it is an attempt to make reality fit
some purely logical structure. 
In the end, my thesis is not that the role of Hegel’s logic in his Real-
philosophie – and in this case in the philosophy of subjective spirit – should
be simply ignored, and certainly not that it has no role in it. The point is,
that if Hegel really is right in saying that the conceptual structures analyzed
in his logic are those instantiated in reality and our thinking, then we
should be able to operate with them more or less naturally by simply
analyzing phenomena. There is thus no separate ’method’ of logic forced
on the phenomena in Hegel’s theory, the acceptance of which is a precon-
dition for us accepting what is being said in his Realphilosophie. This is
Aristotelianism again: there is no transcendent realm of logical structures or
essences, but only a structured world.
Now, what do I mean by the strands in the philosophical arena that I
expect to open new ears to Hegel? First of all, the increasing interest in
Aristotle or an Aristotelian approach in contemporary philosophy of mind.
The general atmosphere for example among many of the writers who have
INTRODUCTION
3 Nussbaum/Rorty (ed.) 1992.
4 See the in this respect illuminating attempt by Samuel Guttenp lan to organize a ‘map
of mind’ out of a l ist of various phenomena his students (before studying any
philosophy of mind) have answered to be proof for the presence of ‘minds’ when
asked (Guttenp lan 1995). For K.V. Wilkes the whole category of the ‘mental’ seems be
an unhappy invention since it necessitates the artificial classification of the functions
of a perso n to eith er menta l or non-m ental. Acc ording to  her the way in w hich
Descartes was forced to dec ide between  these categories and ended up for example in
classifying the two functions of ‘seeing’ and ‘walking’ – which in Aristotle’s account are
closely interlocking – as ‘mental’ and ‘physical’ respectively, is illustrative of the
artificiality and unfruitfulness of mentalism (see Wilkes 1992 in Nussbaum and Rorty
(ed.) 1992.) Th e Aristotelian interlocking of broadly speaking ‘theoretical’ and
‘practical’ functions or world- and self-relations is a high ly characteristic f eature of also
Hege l’s philosophy  of subjective sp irit, as I intend to show in  this work. 
5 DeVries 1988, pp. 201-202. One could ask, whether positivism, reductionism or
eliminativism really is already a thing of the past in contemporary philosophy of mind.
Also to me it seem s that especially the lac k of attention to intersubjectivity in
DeVries’s in many ways f ine book still leaves open the question whether there is still
someth ing to learn from Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit. 
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contributed to a recent collection of articles on Aristotle’s De Anima3 seems
to be a dissatisfaction with a broadly speaking ‘mentalistic’ frame of ques-
tioning and arguing in philosophy of mind. It is a frustration to the unfruit-
fulness of trying to stick with a strict dualism between two categories, ‘the
mental’ and ‘the physical’ and the never-ending puzzlement on what is the
relation of the mysterious category of the mental to the supposedly
unmysterious category of the physical. After all, in trying to grasp the being
of the incredibly complex entity each of us is we inevitably come across
phenomena that are impossible to locate without reduction or simplificati-
on into one or the other side of the dualism.4 The spirit in many or most of
the articles could almost be caught by Hegel’s praise of the merits of
Aristotle in the passage I quoted earlier. Aristotle’s books on the soul give
a refreshingly different picture of human being, less dualist, less prone to
reduction – in one word, less dogmatic – than the mentalist one. I do not
try to pass a final judgement of whether Willem DeVries was right in
writing 1988 that it is in fact because: 
Hege l’s own primary  inspiration in philosophical psychology, Aristotle provided
so much of the  inspiration to those w ho battled positivism within the A nglo-
American tradition [...] [that] Hegel has littl e new to offe r us because [...] we have
finally caught him up”.5 
I do however have the feeling that if Aristotle provides a constant inspirati-
on for the reasons just stated, then Hegel surely should also. Most of the
INTRODUCTION
6  McDowell 1996.
7 Halbig 1999. See also Quante 1999.
8 Halbig does no t content him self with simply  exh ib i t ing  Hegel’s work fro m
(cont inued...)
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motives that give good reasons to be inspired by Aristotle’s De Anima are
also good reasons to be interested in Hegel’s philosophy of subjective
spirit. Compared to Aristotle Hegel of course also has the advantage of
having lived after Descartes, Locke, Hume and Kant, and thus having been
thoroughly acquainted with the general modern tendencies of philosophy,
part of which mentalism is. And further, it is not only the ontological
dualism between the mental and the physical, but also the epistemological
problematics of subjectivity and objectivity, starting from Descartes and
the empirists and permeating the post-kantian German idealism, that forms
the background for Hegel’s philosophizing and sets a large part of his
agenda. Thus his philosophy is much more informed by the specifically
modern ontological and epistemological dualisms than Aristotle’s ever
could be.
Secondly, John McDowell’s attempt to clear new ground for common
sense realism in epistemology in his Mind and World6 and his explicit,
although fragmentary references to Hegel as a paragon have already drawn
considerable attention from Hegelian circles and explicit comparisons
between McDowell and Hegel have already been made for example by
scholars in University of Münster. Christoph Halbig’s recent Dissertation7 is
an outstanding study of Hegel’s epistemology and philosophy of mind
from a McDowellian perspective. Although Halbig’s work in not limited in
showing similarities in McDowell’s and Hegel’s approaches, one of his
premises is that McDowell’s attempt to find a middle path between the
problems of, on the one hand the naturalistic ‘myth of the given’ and on
the other hand the impasse of the coherentist ‘frictionless spinning in a
void’, that is, to construe a picture of the subjects epistemic openness to
the world where the world itself imposes a normative restriction to the
subject beliefs, is a fruitful perspective also for understanding Hegel’s
epistemology in his mature Encyclopedia. According to Halbig also for
Hegel the world is directly given as conceptually structured in the subjects
intuition and thus it is able to operate as the decisive instance in deter-
mining the truth and falsity of beliefs about it. I find this kind of work of
vital importance in reintroducing Hegel in the central international discus-
sions of the philosophy today8 and my modest hope is to contribute to it
INTRODUCTION
8 (...continued)
contempo rary points of view, but also goes quite far in  showing its contemporary
relevance and also in doing important groundwork by analyzing Hegel ’s theory of truth
and Hegel’s views on issues concerning the possible modularity of mind.
9 Honneth 1995.
9
by going somewhat further on issues that are not extensively treated in
Halbig’s study.
These are thus examples of strands and discussions in contemporary
philosophy where there seem to be prospects for rehabilitation of a part of
Hegel’s philosophy that has traditionally found little response, that is, his
philosophy of subjective spirit as part of the encyclopedic system. It is to
be hoped for, that increasing acquaintance with this part of Hegel’s work
will also change the attitudes and interest from largely external discussions
and worries about his dubious metaphysics to unprejudiced communicati-
on with his texts. It might turn out that the philosophy of subjective spirit
still contains a considerable amount of unused, and to a large extent poorly
known, potential.
But back to intersubjectivity. What has to be said at least is that there
are wildly different interpretations of the role of intersubjectivity in Hegel’s
writings, and especially those of his later period. In his book The Struggle for
Recognition; The Moral and Political Grammar of Social Conflicts9 Axel Honneth
uses Hegel’s concept of recognition for constructing what he calls “a
formal conception of ethical life”. His aspiration is to account for the
necessary conditions of a fully developed practical identity (or self-relation)
that enables the individual to fully realize herself in the world in harmony
with others. These conditions are forms of recognition for the individuali-
ty, autonomy and particular traits and achievements of the individual, that
are realized in primary relationships, legal relations and communities of
solidarity respectively. These conditions for full individual flourishing are
to function as normative criteria for societies. Honneth’s claim is that these
forms of recognition are usefully analyzed by Hegel in his Jena lectures and
texts dated before the Phenomenology of Spirit from 1807, although Hegel’s
ideas need to be ‘naturalized’ by supporting them with findings in modern
social-psychology, sociology, political science and studies in the suppressi-
on of individual and cultural identities. Honneth’s book is an interesting
and fruitful gambit and has its undeniable merits, but what interests me
here, is the picture of Hegel’s development it draws. Namely, according to
Honneth all the interesting insights about intersubjectivity and recognition
INTRODUCTION
10 Ibidem, p. 61.
11 Habermas 1999, p. 149.
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Hegel had still in his earlier Jena-period are lost when Hegel starts to
develop a system of a “monologically self-developing spirit”10 starting from
the Jena Phenomenology of Spirit. In the Phenomenology of Spirit recognition is
reduced to a subordinate episode of the lordship and bondage in the
formation-process of this spirit .  For Honneth this downfall in
intersubjectivity has fatal consequences for Hegel’s later account of social
institutions in his philosophy of objective spirit. Honneth does not make
any explicit claims about Hegel’s later philosophy of subjective spirit in the
Encyclopedia philosophy of subjective spirit, but from Honneth’s premises
it is hard to imagine that there either we would find anything of interest
concerning intersubjectivity.
In this rough picture of Hegel’s development Honneth is largely in
agreement with Jürgen Habermas. Recently Habermas stated about Hegel:
The media of language, work and mutual recognition, which once testified to an
antimentalist turn [made by Hegel (H.I.)] either entirely disappear within th e
development of the system, or assume a modest role. Language is assimilated to
the expressivist model of a body which makes man ifest psychological impulses.
[.. .] Labour and the tool disappear entirely from a ‘phenomeno logy of spirit ’
which is reduced to a subdivision of the chapter on ‘Subjective Spirit’ (Encyclo-
pedia, §§ 413-39). [...] It is true that the struggle for recognition appears in the
Encyclopedia at the appropriate place. But the intersubjectivist structure of
reciprocal recognition is no longer relevant for the mentalistic account of self
and self-reflection, given that in the Logic Hegel unfolds the concept in accor-
dance with the  model of the ‘ego’, or of pure self-consciousness. Intersubjectivi-
ty is repressed from subjectivity, leaving no presence in the presentation of the
absolute idea.11
Whereas Habermas also finds the early Hegel as an ally in his own attempts
to overcome the subjectivist or ‘mentalist’ trend in modern philosophy by
focusing on the intersubjective structures of symbolic interaction of langu-
age and work, for him Hegel’s intersubjectivism is fatally harmed by the
tendency in his later philosophy of subordinating all the topics of Realphi-
losophie to an absolutist conception of the ‘pure’ or ‘absolute self-conscious-
ness’ unfolded in the logic. This downfall of intersubjective constitution of
the objective social world reflects – so Habermas – Hegel’s wish to dam
the revolutionary tendencies of his day with an absolutist conception of a
structure of state institutions, the authority of which is warranted by the
INTRODUCTION
12 See idem.
13 Hösle 1987.
14 Ibidem., p. 370.
15 Ibidem., p. 379.
16 Frank 1991.
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eternal logical structure of the absolute subject and not by changing and
unstable forms of intersubjective judgements of their validity.12
Habermas’s and Honneth’s interest is certainly not primarily in Hegel-
exegetics and their work does not include any detailed study on Hegel’s
encyclopedia philosophy of subjective spirit. However, also Vittorio Hösle
in his extensive two volume analysis of Hegel’s system13 shares the general
judgement about the repression of intersubjectivity in Hegel’s Encyclope-
dia. First of all Hösle thinks that intersubjectivity in all plays a minor role in
the argument of the philosophy of subjective spirit. :
[die] philosophische Thematisierung der Intersubjektivität in Hegels System
keine zentrale Stellung beansprucht [...] [weil sie] hinter der Bestimmung der
genauen Relation  von Subjektivität und Objektivität an Bedeutung weit zurück-
bleibt.14 
What is more important, Hösle claims that even if Hegel would have
decided to say more about intersubjective relations in the Encyclopedia, he
would have failed since his philosophy of subjective spirit lacks the concep-
tual means of grasping intersubjectivity adequately because of “die grund-
sätzliche Grenze seiner Philosophie – sein Unvermögen, kategorial
Subjekt-Subjekt-Relationen von Subjekt-Objekt-Relationen zu unterschei-
den”15. Thus also Hösle finds a serious intersubjective deficit in Hegel’s late
work, however not only because of the suspicious almighty absolute but
also because Hegel cannot really grasp the intersubjective or subject-
subject-relation adequately.
But there are very different points of view too. Manfred Frank holds
almost the opposite position in his judgement about intersubjectivity in
Hegel. In an article where he deals extensively with Habermas’s project of
overcoming the – for Habermas politically suspect – monological or
solipsist tendencies of modern subject-centered philosophy of
consciousness (Bewußtseinsphilosophie) with a comprehensive intersubjective
paradigm, Frank in fact reads Hegel as the forefather of Habermas’s alleged
paradigmshift.16 -And not only Hegel of the Jena period, but also Hegel in
his Phenomenology of Spirit and the late Encyclopedia philosophy of subjecti-
ve spirit. Broadly paraphrased, according to Frank Habermas does not
succeed in his attempt to exorcize all traces of what Habermas takes to be
INTRODUCTION
17 The classic one is ‘Fichtes ursprüngliche  Einsicht’ (Henrich 1966).
18 Another version of a reflection-theory is taking the reflective relation as subsisting
ab initio. For the problems of th is version, see Henrich 1970, p. 267-.
19 Frank 1991, p. 460. My portrayal of Franks article is highly condensed and does not
claim to account for it on anything but a very general level.  For a more detailed
account of Habermas’s, Henrich’s and Frank’s debate see in addition to Frank’s article
(cont inued...)
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the suspect myth of the pre- or non-social ground of subjectivity. This is
because all the explanatory resources Habermas uses for constructing a
picture of the emergence of subjectivity in intersubjective interaction in the
end implicitly presuppose already some form of self-relation of the subject
in the attempt to explain the emergence of the self-relation out of
intersubjective relations. This holds for George Herbert Mead’s social-
psychology as well as for Ernst Tugedhat’s propositional account of the ‘I-
consciousness’ – both of which are pivotal sources for Habermas. For
Frank both of these sources are versions of what he calls ‘the reflection-
theory of self-consciousness’. Frank refers here to Dieter Henrich who has
from the sixties on discussed the problems of the reflection-theory in
various texts,17 and also has had an extensive debate with Habermas on the
issue of subjectivity and intersubjectivity.
What is then a reflection-theory and what is the problem with it? In
very general terms, according to a reflection theory, self-consciousness is a
reflective relation of a subject to itself as an object. Now, if this relation is
supposed to emerge in an act or process of ‘reflecting’ where the subject
cognitively relates to itself as if attending to one object among others, what
has to be presupposed is that the subject has some means for identifying
something as itself.18 In other words, the subject has to have already some
kind of familiarity with itself in order to recognize itself so as to attain a
cognitive self-relation. That Habermas, following Mead and Tugendhat,
sees this reflection taking place in intersubjective encounters, as internaliza-
tion of the perspective of other subjects to oneself, does not alter the basic
structure of the problematics. Namely: I cannot internalize another’s
attitude or perspective to myself, if I am not already equipped with some
means of recognizing something as an attitude to myself. Or to use me-
taphorical language: in order to recognize something in the mirror of
others as an image of myself I have to be able to approximate what an
image of myself could look like. If I do not have this kind of familiarity
with myself the question arises: “wie soll denn ein Subjekt aus einem reflex
lernen, das dieses Reflex es selbst ist”19. This self-familiarity is however
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something that is denied by Habermas who wants to avoid any kind of
reference to a pre- or non-social core of subjectivity or self-consciousness
that would compromise his intersubjective ‘naturalization’ of subjectivity.
But from Frank’s and Henrich’s point of view this can only mean that
Habermas simply ignores or rejects the fact that his account presupposes
what it wants to avoid.20
For Frank, Hegel now is even as much as an “archetypical”21 exponent
of this kind of intersubjectivist version of the reflection-theory. Frank
refers to Dieter Henrich’s programmatic article ‘Selbstbewußtsein;
Kritische Einleitung in eine Theorie’22 where Henrich goes so far as to
claim that (in contrast to Fichte) Hegel “never freed himself from the
reflection theory of self-consciousness and so caused all subsequent
Hegelianism to remain dogmatic and unproductive in theory of conscious-
ness”23. Frank quotes Henrich going on: “Even though the thought that
reflection could take place only in the context of social interaction, he [i.e.
Hegel] never got free of the reflection model because his account of the
structure of reflection which results is in no way influenced by its social
origin”24. Henrich does not argue for his judgement of Hegel by referring
to Hegel’s texts, but Frank does. For Frank, it is the ‘self-consciousness’-
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subsection in both the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Encyclopedia phi-
losophy of subject ive spirit which shows that Henrich’s judgement is
justified. Frank does not give any detailed analysis of Hegel’s text either,
but reads Hegel’s formulations of self-consciousness being “für ein Selbst-
bewußtsein” and being mediated with itself “durch ein anderes
Bewußtsein” as proof for the claim that for Hegel self-consciousness is “in
der tat – wie bei Mead [und Habermas, H.I.] Resultat vorgängiger
Reflexion in einem sozialen Feld”.25 Frank seems to hesitate on the questi-
on of whether Hegel does in fact think that the process of reflection
presupposes some form of pre-reflective self-familiarity. On the one hand
he writes that according to Hegel “das Selbst nicht prä-reflective, also nicht
vor der Reflexion in fremden Subjekten mit sich bekannt wird”26; on the
other hand he writes that it is a lack in the “unmittelbaren Gewißheit seiner
selbst”27 that the subjects are able to overcome in the reflective process of
mutual recognition. According to Frank, Hegel however does not say
anything about the epistemic status of this ‘Gewißheit’ and what Hegel
means by it, remains according to him unclear.
Be this last issue as it may, Frank’s picture of intersubjectivity in He-
gel’s philosophy after the early Jena period is thus very different from that
of Honneth, Habermas or Hösle. Where Habermas (along with Honneth
and Hösle) sees the problem of Hegel’s later work in the repression of
intersubjectivity, Frank (along with Henrich) sees Hegel relying there too
much on intersubjectivity. For Frank, both Habermas and Hegel reduce
self-consciousness problematically to intersubjectivity, and deny – or at
least fail to give an adequate account of – the inevitably pre-social core of
self-conscious subjectivity.
It seems thus that both of these opposite camps accuse Hegel of some
form of reduction. For Honneth and Habermas, Hegel’s philosophy from
the Phenomenology of Spirit on reduces the – for them all important – fact of
the intersubjective origin and constitution of subjectivity to a minor pro-
cess in the eternal structure of the self-developing absolute spirit or idea.
For Hösle Hegel’s account of intersubjectivity is seriously compromized
because he ends up in reducing subject-subject-relations to subject-object-
relations. On the other hand for Frank and Henrich Hegel is guilty of
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reducing subjecivity or self-consciousness problematically to intersubjecti-
vity. And from their point of view Habermas (and obviously Honneth too)
looks like just another Hegelian whose theory of self-consciousness is,
precisely because of this intersubjectivist reduction, hopelessly “dogmatic
and unproductive”.
Konrad Cramer however draws a very different picture of Hegel’s
conception of self-consciousness from that of Frank and Henrich. In his
article ‘Bewußtsein und Selbstbewußtsein; Vorschläge zur Rekonstruktion
der systematischen Bedeutung einer Behauptung Hegels in § 424 der
Berliner Encyclopädie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften’28 originally
written already in 1973 Cramer argues that Hegel is precisely an
“entschiedener Kritiker”29 of the reflection-theory of self-consciousness.
Cramer does not deal explicitly with the intersubjectivity-issue, but offers
a reading of Hegel’s paragraph 424 in the Encyclopedia philosophy of
subjective spirit (that is, of a passage in Hegel’s text that starts the ‘Self-
conscousness’-subsection), a reading according to which Hegel in this
paragraph refutes the reflection-theory. It is worth reproducing the whole
of this paragraph here:
Die W ahrhe it des Bewußtseins  ist das Selbstbewußtsein, und dieses der Grund von
jenem, so daß in der Existenz alles Bewußtsein eines anderen Gegenstandes
Selbstbewußtsein ist; ich weiß von dem Gegenstande als dem me inigen (es ist
meine Vorstellung), ich weiß daher darin von mir. – Der Ausdruck vom Selb st-
bewußtsein ist Ich=Ich; – abstrakte Freiheit , reine Idealität. – So ist es ohne
Realität; den n es selbst, da s Gegenstand seiner ist, ist nicht ein solcher, da kein
Unterschied desselben  und seiner vorhanden  ist.30
According to Cramer this paragraph is a critical consideration of a certain
version of the reflection-theory of self-consciousness that Hegel finds for
internal reasons inconsistent and which he himself will therefore reject.
That is, Hegel only uses here the Fichtean formula I=I for exhibiting a
problem in the reflection-theory of self-consciousness, and not for exhibi-
ting his own views. Hegel is not – so Cramer – criticizing the reflection-
theory for the circularity-problem (nor the possible problem of infinite
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regress) that stages Frank’s and Henrich’s critique of the different versions
of reflection-theories, but for another reason. The deeper problem of the
version of the reflection-theory that Hegel according to Cramer criticizes
here is the fact that in its hands self-consciousness does not retain the
necessary element for it being consciousness. Why is this? According to the
theory that Cramer claims Hegel to be criticizing here “the truth of cons-
ciousness is self-consciousness”, because consciousness of an object
implies that the object is given as distinguished from the consciousness of
it. This means that for there to be consciousness of an object there has to
be also “so etwas wie eine ihrerseits als ‘bewußt’ zu qualifierende
Beziehung auf mich selber”31, this ‘myself’ meaning consciousness (of an
object). To be consciousness of an object as distinct from the conscious-
ness of it, consciousness has to be consciousness both of the object and of
the consciousness of the object. Hence consciousness is consciousness of
the object as distinguished from itself, only if it is also consciousness of
itself as distinct from the object. Without this, consciousness would not be
consciousness of an object as distinguished from itself, and hence not
consciousness at all. Thus, according to Cramer, Hegel is not in fact consi-
dering here the version of the reflection-theory according to which self-
consciousness is produced through an act of consciousness turning to
itself, and so taking itself as an object, but a more radical version according
to which self-consciousness is a necessary structural feature of conscious-
ness as such.32 For Cramer this necessary self-relatedness of consciousness
in fact follows from premises that Hegel has presented in the ‘Conscious-
ness as such’-subsection preceding the ‘Self-consciousness’-subsection. Still
according to Cramer Hegel wants here only to point to a problem, the
solution of which presupposes taking into account the practical side of any
human object-relation, that is, the structures of ‘drive’ and ‘desire’.33
But why does even this radical reflectivist conception of self-cons-
ciousness fail? Why does Hegel say in the last sentence of § 424 that self-
consciousness is “without reality”? According to Cramer, because the
object of the ‘second order consciousness’ implied in consciousness is not
distinguished from the consciousness of it. The second order conscious-
ness is simply a relation to a relation, and its object is thus not anything
given as distinguished from the consciousness of it. Hence self-conscious-
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ness is “without reality”. It has no object that would fulfill the necessary
condition of objecthood, that is, of being given as distinguished or diffe-
rent from the consciousness of it. According to Cramer, this is for Hegel
simply a “Paradigma eines Ungedankens”34
Although I will argue in the main-text of this work that Cramer’s
interpretation is in fact totally misled as an interpretation of Hegel’s text, its
merit is to point to the fact that a purely formal account of self-conscious-
ness which doesn’t take seriously also the practical aspect of consciousness,
is inadequate. Cramer’s thesis is that the function of § 424 is to show the
necessity of a more contentful account of self-consciousness and its object,
an account which Hegel starts to develop in the following paragraphs of
the ‘self-consciousness’-subsection. There Hegel according to Cramer
leaves behind the “Reflexiontheorie des Selbstbewußtsein und die in ihr
sedimentierte cartesianische Voraussetzung der Selbstevidenz des cogito
me cogitare” and replaces this empty abstraction with the “Evidenz des
Selbst in der Bestimmtheit des ‘Triebes’ und der ‘Begierde’”.35 Unfor-
tunately this is however where Cramer’s article ends and the themes of
practical intentionality of ‘drive’ and ‘desire’ are not developed any further.
Also the question remains whether this analysis really effaces the suspicion
that in accounting for the intersubjective relation of recognition between
two subjectivities (following the paragraphs dealing with desire) Hegel still
falls into the trap of the reflection-model. This is after all Frank’s and
Henrich’s precise claim.
Also Franz Hespe in his article ‘System und Funktion der Philosophie
des Subjektiven Geistes’36 also defends Hegel against (Henrich’s) ac-
cusations of Hegel being a reflection-theorist. His argument is that “Selbst-
bewußtsein bezeichnet bei Hegel [...] nicht [...] einer empirischen Reflexion
des Subjekts auf sich”37 but is 
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vielmehr die nichtempirische – im kantischen Sprachgebrauch tranzendentale –
Bedingung allen Wahrnehmens, Denkens, Tun und Handelns.38 
This formulation of a ‘transcendental condition’ at first sight resembles the
radical version of the reflection-theory – in which self-consciousness is a
structural feature, that is in a certain sense ‘transcendental condition’ of any
intentional relation – which Hegel according to Cramer criticizes in § 424.
Hespe however goes on to state the (hardly disputable) fact that in Hegel’s
account intersubjectivity plays in fact an essential role in the formation of
fully developed self-consciousness. He writes: 
Selbst bewußtsein  ist seinem  Begriffe n ach auf Be ziehung  zu andere m
Bewußtsein an gewiesen; ist dah er seinem Begriffe n ach intersubjektiv und
erzeugt Intersubjektivität nicht erst durch Aktion und Reaktion zweier Subjek-
te.39
Thus it seems that Hespe isn’t speaking of a transcendental condition of all
object-consciousness in the sense that Hegel according to Cramer criticizes
in § 424, but of something essentially involving intersubjectivity. Thirdly
Hespe emphasizes the essential practicality of self-consciousness:
Selbstbewußtsein  erweist sich wesentlich im praktischen Bewußtsein (Begierde,
Kampf um Anerkennung ) und dieses damit als Voraussetzung des theoretischen
Bewußtseins selbst, indem erst im praktischen Bewußtsein  das Selbstbewußtsein
sich auch für das theoretisch e Bewußtsein ko nstitutive Bedeutung des S elbst-
bezug  im Bezug auf  anderes aufdeckt[emphasis, H.I .].40
Here Hespe agrees with Cramer in emphasizing that self-consciousness for
Hegel involves an essentially practical moment. On the whole, Hespe holds
the opposite view from that of Hösle in claiming that intersubjectivity in
Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit is a condition for subject-object-
relations – and not reduced to them as Hösle claims. But aren’t there
serious problems lurking in these characterizations? It seems that intersub-
jectivity plays here an extremely central role – being a transcendental
condition even for intentionality or consciousness as such. According to
Hespe’s formulations a subject could not have a relation to an object
without an intersubject ively constituted self-consciousness. In the last quotation
Hespe seems to attribute to the act or “struggle of recognition” a role in
the formation of this intersubjective self-consciousness preceding cons-
ciousness.
From a Frankian/Henrichian point of view, a question arises how is
then the struggle or act of recognition to be understood if not some kind
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of an “empirical reflection of a subject to itself”41 through another subject.
This possibility seems to be ruled out by Hespe’s strong claim that there
are no intentional relations before intersubjectively constituted self-cons-
ciousness. Namely if this is so, then before intersubjectivity there are no
subjects capable of consciously relating to each other and through each
others to themselves. We cannot get even get as far as to ask how would a
subject recognize an object as itself in the reflection through another
subject, because there would be no objects whatsoever for this subject (and
correspondingly, no subject with intentional relations).
But if this reading of Hegel is right, then he seems to be guilty of a
very serious version of the reduction attributed to him by Frank and
Henrich: intersubjectivity is so deeply a ‘transcendental ground’ of empiri-
cal subjectivity that nothing in that subjectivity can explain the existence of
it. It is essential for full human being in the world, but cannot be brought
about with the means that humans have.
However, even if Hespe’s article does not explicitly answer to these –
from the perspective of Frank’s and Henrich’s interests quite obvious –
questions, it points to a theme that might provide means for answering
them. That is the theme of desire (to which Hespe in passing points to in p.
513), which also according to Cramer is of vital importance in understan-
ding Hegel’s account of consciousness and self-consciousness. Whether it
will offer something capable of providing an understanding of an inten-
tional relation to the world and others subjects before an intersubjectively
mediated level of subjectivity, will be discussed in the main text of my
work. My point will be that Hegel attributes already to the pre-social level
of subjectivity that he calls desire, a complex structure of intentionality that
is fully adequate to enable subjects to encounter each other and arise on the
level of intersubjecively mediated subjectivity. An essential point to note in
this respect is that intentionality involves normativity, that is, criteria of
correctness of the content putatively given in the intentional relation.
A useful contemporary context of discussion for the analysis of
Hegel’s text on this issue is provided by John McDowell and Robert
Brandom who both refer to Hegel as a pioneer on issues that are important
to themselves. In his book Mind and World42 and in several articles John
McDowell has tried to show that many or most contemporary standpoints
in epistemology are based on the false assumption that primary givens in
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intuition are not conceptually structured, that the Sellarsian ‘space of rea-
son’ or ‘space of concepts’43 has an outer boundary behind which the world
lies. According to Mind and World this dualistic premiss leads to oscillation
between two options: either it is supposed that perceptual input in intuiti-
on, even though not conceptually structured, can function as evidence; or
then the impotence of this position (purely causal, non-conceptual ‘im-
pacts’ from a world outside the space of reasons could at their best provide
“exculpations”, not “justifications” for beliefs44) is taken into account and
a coherentist extreme position is adopted. This position holds that no
experience or intuition could count as evidence for a belief, precisely
because being outside the space of reasons, the world can only provide
causal impacts on our senses which do not justify anything. Thus Donald
Davidson writes: “nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except
another belief”45. This position however has the absurd consequence that
it makes the spontaneous conceptual activity, that is, reasoning or reason
giving totally “frictionless”46 by rational constraint from the world. McDo-
well’s wish is to save a “minimal empiricism” according to which “the
relation between mind and world is normative” in the sense that “thinking
that aims to judgement, or at least the fixation of belief, is answerable to
the world – to how things are”47 and not solely to a sphere of other beliefs
or judgements unconstrained by the world. This necessitates thinking that
the space of reasons is not limited only to minds but also includes the
world given in intuitions. 
According to McDowell Kant almost got it right in thinking that the
same conceptual capacities that are operative in spontaneous thinking are
effective also in intuition. However Kant compromises this insight by what
McDowell calls his “transcendental framework”48, that is, his dualism
between the world of appearance and the world or thing ‘in itself’. By
doing this, he in the end establishes an outer limit to the sphere of reasons
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and ends up talking of the mysterious causal impacts by the thing itself on
our senses – hence committing himself to a position which is deeply
unstabile. McDowell thinks that without the dualistic transcendental
framework Kant’s philosophy would provide the correct picture – and this
is where Hegel comes on McDowell’s scene: 
It is central to [Hegel’s] absolute idealism to reject the idea that the conceptual
has an outer boundary, [...]. This expresses exactly the idea I have been using, in
which the conceptual is unbounded; there is nothing  outside it.49 
One may ask, does not McDowell’s own dualism between the ‘second’ and
‘first nature’ (the latter being apparently outside the space of reasons) in the
end however re-establish a version of the positions he criticizes. Neverthe-
less, for McDowell the merit of Hegel’s absolute idealism is precisely to
have formulated an epistemological picture which McDowell himself
endorses: a picture where the world as such is revealed as conceptually
structured for the intuiting and thinking subject and thus can function as a
normative instance in deciding whether beliefs about it are correct or false.
Robert Brandom has however criticized McDowell for leaving out, or
at least downplaying, an important aspect in the constitution of the
normativity of space of reasons. That is its “essentially social articulation”50.
In Brandom’s picture, the world alone is not enough for providing concep-
tual practices their specific normative character. According to him, the
phrase ‘space of reasons’ is to be understood only “as an abstraction from
concrete practices of giving and asking for reasons”51. For Brandom, the
content of any concept is determined by its possible correct use in judge-
ments and inferences, in linguistic activities that are socially administered.
In using concepts in communication one (implicitly or explicitly) commits
herself to a claim of using them correctly – this including all the inferences
that her judgements allow. One of Brandom’s examples52 is a twenty
month old child toddling around and uttering the sentence “the house is
on fire” over and again in a play-like fashion. Unlike his seven year old
sister, this child is not yet able to master the inferential connections of this
sentence and the concepts it involves. “He does not know what follows
from it, what would be evidence for it”53 and thus cannot yet be accounted
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responsible and capable of committing himself to a claim of using the
sentence correctly. In other words: “He does not know his way around the
space of reasons well enough”.54
Things are different with adults (and presumably already with seven
year olds). In using concepts adults subordinate themselves under the
authority of other subjects as to whether their use of concepts is correct.
Thus the normative force imposed on conceptual activities derives not only
from the world but also from others subjects. No one alone can judge
whether her conceptualizations follow the inferential articulation of the
space of concepts. In his article ‘Some Pragmatic Themes in Hegel’s
Idealism: Negotiation and Administration in Hegel’s Account of the
Structure and Content of Conceptual Norms’55 Brandom pictures Hegel as
the one philosopher who has clearly articulated this view. For Brandom the
idea behind Hegel’s concept of recognition is the following: the existence
of socially administered conceptual practices presupposes that subjects
recognize each other reciprocally as responsible users of concepts and judges
as to the correct applications of concepts. Thus by recognition Hegel means
the essentially intersubjective institution and sustainment of the sphere of
conceptual normativity, that is the space of reasons. This sphere also is
necessary for (at least full-fledged) self-consciousness: “Hegel thinks of
Spirit – the realm of the normative – as produced and sustained by the
processes of mutual recognition, which simultaneously institute self-cons-
cious selves and their communities”.56
We may ask however, whether Brandom’s strong emphasis on the
social source of the normative authority in conceptual practices saves
McDowell’s intuition of the world as the source of authority in questions
of the correctness of beliefs or judgements. After all, isn’t Brandom at least
very close to adopting the ‘frictionless’ picture in which the truth of con-
ceptually structured beliefs rely only on other beliefs, a picture where only
the never-ending negotiation procedure between concept-users supplies
authority for questions of truth?
Is the world, which is revealed in intuition, itself conceptually structu-
red or isn’t it? Brandom seems to be answering to this kind of worry in
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distinguishing between “two flavours of judgements”57: immediate and
mediate. By immediate judgements he means those paradigmatically taking
place in perception, judgements that are made already by “desiring ani-
mals”. “Immediate judgements are ones that [even] a properly trained and
tuned animal who has mastered the responsive use of the relevant concepts
will make automatically” in perceiving its environment and immediately
“treating something as food, for instance”58. Brandom writes further:
These noninferential applications of concepts (=  immediate  judgements) are
wrung from or elicited by the particulars to which the concepts are on that occasi-
on applied. By contrast, responsibility for (= authority over) inferentially elicited
applicatio ns of con cepts (= m ediate judgements) is v ested in the conce pts or
universals, whose inferential relations underwrite the judgement that is the conclu-
sion. 
Immediate judgements express a dimension along which particulars exert an
authority over the universals or concepts that apply to them. Mediate judgements
express a dimension along  which universals or concepts exert an authority over
the particulars to which they apply. The characterized individuals – particulars as
falling und er universa ls – that are p resented in  judgements (= app lications o f
concepts) emerge as the product of negotiation between the two reciprocal dimen-
sions of authority (eac h with its d ual, correlative sort of responsibility). This is
the feature of concept use and development – the process of experience that is
for this reason intelligible at o nce as the applica tion and as the institution of
conceptual norms – that is modelled by reciprocal recognition.59
Hence there are two directions of authority: one from the side of the
socially instituted realm of universals and another from the side of the
world of particulars. On the one hand, applying concepts is bound by the
inferential relations between other concepts, the ‘space’ of which forms the
system of concepts of a given community. On the other hand, it is the
particulars themselves that decide which concepts they allow themselves to
be subsumed under, and so in the end concepts do have a hold in the
world. This of course does not answer the question of what it is in those
particulars that determines under which concepts they are to be subsumed
under. Are particulars in the world somehow ‘conceptually earmarked’? If
they are not, then they cannot provide reasons for applying one concept
and not another in a given token of intuition. Thus, in order to make sense
of the ‘negotiation’ between these two sources of authority, Brandom
perhaps should give a stronger role to that intuition which McDowell
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claims to be Hegel’s: that the world given in intuition really is conceptually
structured. Yet, in talking about desiring animals already capable of judging
something as food, Brandom seems to point to a somehow ‘passive’
conceptual capacity that is directly responsive to states of affairs in the
world. Obviously we have to assume that animals cannot subsume somet-
hing under the universal of ‘food for me’ without the world itself in the
end deciding whether the subsumption is correct. An animal or species of
animals cannot successfully ‘treat’ something as food for it if this somet-
hing happens to be uneatable for it. -And the classes of eatable and uneata-
ble clearly are something belonging to the structure of the world and not
just to the subjective conceptualizations of this animal or animal species.
In the end Brandom remains undecided between two, according to
him, contradictory claims, both of which he takes Hegel to be endorsing:60
1. The space of reasons, that is, the space of inferential relations which
determine the content of concepts, is a social achievement and is socially
administered by subjects recognizing each others as competent administers.
2. The spirit (that is, more or less, the space of reasons) has no other; there
is nothing outside it.
Brandom writes: “of course these claims are jointly incompatible”61. It
is as if Brandom were pondering here whether the strong emphasis on the
social nature of the space of reasons or concepts can be combined with the
Hegelian idea that this space really has no outer limit, that it is also ‘out
there in the world’ independently of socially constituted ways of carving
the world. Brandom’s intersubjective account of the space of reasons in the
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(ibidem, p. 179), which he also claims to be Hegel’s idea, of course does not do much
to answer this question in the end.
63 Hespe 1991, p. 516.
64 Idem.
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end remains rather quietist on the question of whether what is socially
constituted, can consistently be claimed to be anything else than a particu-
lar way of carving the world by a particular historical community. Perhaps
the mediate judgements are ‘too mediate’ so as to lose the firm contact
with the world that the immediate ones possess (however that contact
might be explainable).62 
Now, even with the risk of twisting Brandom’s thoughts nearly unre-
cognizable, I want to suggest that his dilemma is the same as that implied
in Hespe’s text. On the one hand conceptual activities seem to be strongly
social and thus presupposing mutual recognition for the authority of other
subject’s judgements about correct conceptualization. And this seems to
imply that relations to the world and oneself are mediated by socially
constructed concepts. That is to say, an intentional relation with conceptual
content presupposes sociality, and thus sociality or intersubjectivity provi-
des some form of a “transcendental condition”, to borrow Hespe’s words,
for intentionality in any contentful meaning. Yet on the other hand, already
a purely desiring relation to the world obviously involves ways of, and
criteria of correctness for, conceptualizing – that is: intentionality with
conceptual content.
According to Hespe, the function of the ‘phenomenology’-section of
Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit is to show the necessity of overco-
ming a purely individual level of subjectivity, that is “den übergang zum
individuell/allgemeinen Bezug des Subjekts auf die Außenwelt zu
vollziehen”, to become a subject “dessen Gedanken nicht bloß seine
ureigen, sondern allgemeine, mitteilbare und wahrheitsfähige sind”.63
Without the attainment of this universal, or intersubjective level, the
subject “bliebe [...] bei der monadischen Individualität, die sich weder von
der Außenwelt unterscheidet, noch Selbstbewußtsein hat”64. It is clear from
Hespe’s text that the overcoming of purely ‘monadic individuality’ in
Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit happens in recognition. 
At least two points are conspicuous in Hespe’s formulations. First,
that a socially mediated, “universal” level a subjectivity is a necessary
condition for “Wahrheitsfähigkeit” of thoughts or thought-contents. And
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secondly, that it is even a necessary condition for the subject’s capability of
differentiating itself from the “outer world”. But if this is true, does this
mean that in Hegel’s account a desiring animal (presupposing that they do
not have a social ly mediated consciousness)  cannot have any
‘wahrheitsfähig’ thoughts or representations about its environment? And
furthermore, does this mean, that a desiring animal is not even capable of
differentiating itself from its environment? This surely would be an exagge-
rated position, if one only thinks about Brandom’s depiction of a desiring
animal capable of ‘treating something as food”. Surely an animal can not
only be mistaken in for instance taking as food for it something that proves
to be poisonous for it, but also know when it has made a mistake – surely
its conceptualizations or ‘thoughts’ are ‘wahrheitsfähig’ in this simple sense.
And surely a healthy animal can differentiate between itself and that which
it takes to be food for it – whether this means not taking as food its own
body, or its sensat ions of near lying food. This is simply to say that an
animal has intentional relations to the world and to itself as part of the
world that are normatively enforced by the world itself.
*  *  *  *  *
This rather confusing set of points of views to Hegel and themes connec-
ted to Hegel sets the task for my reading of Hegel’s final account of the
subjective spirit (from now on PSS) in his Encyclopedia philosophy of
subjective spirit from 1830. What does Hegel in this text mean by self-
consciousness? What is its relation to intersubjectivity? And how are self-
consciousness and intersubjectivity related to contentfull intentionality? My
thesis is that intentionality as such with conceptual content and answerable
to the world itself does not yet according to Hegel presuppose intersubjec-
tivity, although full-fledged intentional relations to the world and oneself as
part of the world certainly are socially mediated.
In the first chapter I will try to answer some important questions
concerning the architectonics of Hegel’s Philosophy of subjective spirit
that I think are essential in understanding what is in fact going on in this
complicated text. In the second chapter I will start by analyzing the para-
graph 424 and offer a different reading of it from that of Konrad Cramer.
The outcome will be a precision of what Hegel in that paragraph means by
self-consciousness. That meaning of self-consciousness, which I will call
self-consciousness1, will be in the chapters following distinguished from
other meanings of self-consciousness in Hegel’s text. I will argue that ‘self-
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consciousness’ in PSS mostly means something completely different than
what is usually meant by ‘self-consciousness’. Thus what I will call self-
consciousness1, 2 and 3 are not explicitly reflective self-relations at all. The
more ordinary meaning of self-consciousness as consciousness of oneself
as distinct from what ever else one can be conscious of, is present in He-
gel’s text mostly only implicitly. For understanding all the phenomena or
structures which Hegel discusses under the term ‘self-consciousness’, it is
essential to take into account the fact that consciousness is always cons-
ciousness of some content and also that it necessarily involves normativity.
Only by distinguishing between these different meanings of self-conscious-
ness, and by taking into account the content and normativity of conscious-
ness, it is possible to consider whether the views, presented below, about
Hegel’s account of self-consciousness, intersubjectivity and intentionality
hit their target. In my conclusion I will return to these views and try to sort
out what is true and what is false in them.
65 Hege l writes: “Alles ist in der Empfindung und, wenn man will, alles, was im geistigen
Bewußtsein  und in der Vernunft hervortritt, hat seine Quelle und Ursprung in derselben;
denn Quelle und Ursprung heißt nichts anderes als die erste, unmittelbarste Weise, in
der etwas erscheint.” 
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1. On the architectonics of the Philosophy of 
subjective spirit
There are several difficult questions concerning the architectonics of PSS
which makes reading this text a complicated task. The general question is,
what is the relation between the progressions of the three main-sections,
Anthropology, Phenomenology and Psychology and what kind of connec-
tions are there between the progressions of subsections and chapters of
these main-sections. First point to bear in mind is that the progression of
these sections does not follow the temporal ontogenesis of an individual
subject. The stages of the presentation do not exist separately in time, but
are according to Hegel, only “Momente, Zustände, Bestimmungen” (§ 380)
of an organic whole. Thus Hegel makes throughout his text references to
stages that in the expositional order follow only much later. To take just
one example, in the Anthropology Hegel already discusses what he calls
’inner sensations’ (innere Empfindungen) (see §§ 399-402), that is, practically
motivating sensations or feelings, part of which presuppose for their
content later stages of the progression. The point here is that any ‘spiritual’
content can be present in the soul on level of sensation (Empfindung).65 This
points to the fact, that ‘Anthropology’, ‘Phenomenology’ and ‘Psychology’
cannot be read in any simple way as three consecutive phases in a single
progression, but rather as analyzing one and the same topic from different
perspectives. In the end, ‘soul’, ‘consciousness’ and ‘spirit’ are moments of
a concrete individual person.
Even if it is not easy to discern in an entirely unequivocal way, what is
the difference between these perspectives, some differentiating features can
be pointed out. As I said, the soul has ‘sensation’ (or ‘feeling’ (Gefühl)) as its
characteristic mode of givenness for in principle any content. Now, also
consciousness (Bewußtsein) has its own mode of givennes for contents. This
mode Hegel calls variably ‘Objekt’, ‘Gegenstand’ or ‘Vorstellung’. As I will
try to show in the next chapter, ‘Objekt’ and ‘Gegenstand’ are not for
Hegel names for one and the same concept and since there is no easy way
to reproduce the vocabular difference in English, where ever this distincti-
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on has to be emphasized, I will leave Gegenstand untranslated even if this
practice sometimes leads to very bad style. Also, where ever it is important
to emphasize the connection between Gegen-stand and Vor-stellung, I will
leave also Vorstellung untranslated. In many cases ‘representation’ is
however a good enough translation for Vorstellung.
Now, whereas sensation or feeling as the mode of givenness peculiar
to the soul is not yet intentional, gegenständlichkeit or Vorstellung as the
mode of givenness peculiar to consciousness is an intentional mode of
givenness. Thus a Gegenstand or Vorstellung is an intentional correlate of
a conscious subject. This correlate can be either presently given in the outer
senses, or then it can be merely imagined. This Hegel says in Zusatz to §
418 by pointing out that an object or Gegenstand can be either “[...] an
outer or an inner [...]”, meaning that it can be given in a present intuition or
in a ‘mere’ representation.
Like sensation, also gegenständlichkeit can be a mode of givenness in
principle for any kind of content – anything can be given as an object, i.e.
as representation. However, in this regard, there are differences between
the levels Hegel discusses in different chapters of the ‘Phenomenology’.
Thus in § 418 Z Hegel points to the inadequacy of the ‘sensuous conscious-
ness’ for “the for itself universal content of right, ethical and religious”. The
more precise logical forms of givenness analyzed in ‘Sensuous conscious-
ness’ are not developed or rich enough for containing anything other than
merely sensually given Gegenstände. Still, the point is that even these
contents can be given for consciousness as a whole, as they can be given in
the soul. 
In § 401 in the ‘Anthropology’ Hegel compares sensation and Gegen-
ständlickeit as forms of givenness of normatively loaded contents and says
that whereas feeling as the form for these universal contents does not
justify them (“Sensation and the heart are not the forms through which
something like the religious, ethical, true, just etc is justified”, § 401) the
givenness of the contents for consciousness in the gegenständlich form,
apart from not justifying them, also does not motivate. Hegel refers to the
common sense thought that it is not enough that “Principles, religion etc.
are only in the head”. This is so because ‘being in the head’ means being
“in consciousness” and thus “gegenständlich” as “distant from the concre-
te subjectivity” (§ 401). This again points to the facts, that despite their
differences, both sensation peculiar to the soul and Gegenständlichkeit or
Vorstellung peculiar to consciousness are modes of givenness for in princi-
ple any content.
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66 See Halbig 1999, pp. 71-84.
67 McDo well 1996 , p. 12. As far a s I know, Mc Dowell do es not call the pa ssive
operation of conceptual capacities in sensitivity or intuition ‘judging’. Yet, saying that
the world is revealed to the subject as conceptually structured is saying that it is as well
judgementally (and inferentially) articulated. This means that the concep tual activity at
work in in tuition is ‘judging’ (and inferring).
68 Halbig 1999, p.77.
69 See §§ 462-464.
70 Because any content can be given also  on the mode of givennes peculiar to the soul,
passive thinking can also in form the contents of the soul.
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But what about ‘spirit’ discussed in the ‘Psychology’? Does ‘spirit’
possess a peculiar mode of givenness of its own which is not reducible to
those of the soul or consciousness? My suggestion is that ‘thinking’ analy-
zed at the end of the subsection of ‘Theoretical spirit’ should be considered
as a third mode of givenness. However, here we have to make the proviso
that characterizing thinking simply as a mode of givenness is inadequate,
since thinking is also activity. Christoph Halbig has, I think convincingly,
shown that by subjective thinking Hegel means two different things. First,
the general activity of processing the given, as it were passively, and secon-
dly the active thinking that spontaneously operates with thought-contents.66
This differentiation can be taken to be more or less the same as that which
McDowell points to in his Mind and World by “the passive operation of
conceptual capacities in sensation” and their “active exercise in [spon-
taneous] judgements”.67 Whereas sensation and representation as such are
forms of ‘being in’ (the soul) and ‘being for’ (the consciousness), active or
spontaneous (or as Halbig says “explicit”68) thinking is a mode where
contents are being actively reflected. Because there are no other means for
reflecting thought-contents, than other thought-contents, this comes close
to saying that active thinking is a mode of givenness of thoughts for each
other, a mode that is however at the same time an activity. Important here
is that according to Hegel active thinking operates with arbitrary signs.
Thus the mode of givenness peculiar to active thinking seems to be neces-
sarily mediated by signs.69
What is more important for my purposes however, is the passive form
of thinking, that is, thinking that is operative in processing the given for
consciousness.70 I think that a useful way of characterizing the relation of
‘Phenomenology’ and ‘Psychology’ is to say that in the ‘Phenomenology’
Hegel develops only very general features of the intentional relation of
consciousness to the world. On the other hand the psychological processes
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71 "Da Ich für sich nur als formelle Identität ist, so ist die dialektische Bewegung des
Begriffs, die Fortbest immung des Bewußtseins, ihm nicht als seine Tätigkeit, sondern
sie ist an sich und für dasselbe Veränderung des Objekts.”
72 "Die Psychologie betrachtet deshalb die Vermögen oder allgemeinen Tätigkeitsweisen
des Geistes als solchen, Anschauen, Vortstellen, Erinnern usf., Begierden usf., teils ohne
den Inhalt, der nach Erscheinung sich im empirischen Vorstellen, auch im Denken w ie
in der Begierde und im Wil len f indet,  te i l s  ohne d ie Formen, in der Se ele als
Naturbestimmung, in dem Bewußtsein selbst als ein fur sich vorhandener Gegenstand
desselben zu sein .”
73  That Psychology explicitly analyzes psychological processes necessary for the
constitution of givenness does not imply that the subject under analysis in ‘Psychology’
were itself already on a level where it could understand the  truth of itself, as Iring
Fetscher suggests (Fetscher 1970, p. 137). As I see it, to say this is to confuse the level
of subjective sp irit as a topic of analysis and the level of absolute spirit or philosophy,
which is the level ‘from’ where subjective spirit is being analyzed.
74 Cf. Hösle 1987, p. 347.
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involved in the production of intentional content for consciousness are
analyzed in ‘Psychology’. In paragraph 415 in beginning of the ‘Phenomenolo-
gy’ Hegel points out that “the development of consciousness is for the
consiousness not its own activity, but is [...] for consciousness alteration of
its object”.71 Furthermore it seems that it is mostly only this ’alteration of
the object’, that is, different organizational levels of what is given for
consciousness that is discussed in the ‘Phenomenology’. On the other hand
according to the first paragraph of ‘Psychology’ “Psychology [...] examines
the faculties and general modes of activity of spirit as such”. This it does
on the one hand without the content [...] that is found in empirical representati-
on, also in thinking as well as in desiring and willing, on the other hand without
the forms of being in soul as natural determinations [and] in consciousness as an
[...] object at hand.”§ 440)72
Thus whereas the discussion in ‘Phenomenology’ is abstracted from the
fact that givenness and constitution of objects for consciousness presup-
poses subjective processes of passive thinking and hence analyzes only
different levels of givenness for consciousness, the discussion in Psycholo-
gy is abstracted from the results of these psychological processes, that is (in
the case of ‘Phenomenology’) objects for consciousness.73 That is, whereas
the level Hegel calls consciousness only has representations, the level he calls
spirit represents, that is, produces representations. Using this distinction as an
interpretative key at least removes the mysteriousness of the fact that Hegel
at first sight seems to discuss same themes twice, first in ‘Phenomenology’
and then in ‘Psychology’.74
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75 Hösle 1987, p. 371.
76 A wild guess is that Hösle is trying to read the ‘method’ which Hegel outlines in the
introduction of the Phenomenology of Spirit into the Encyclopedia.
77 Fetscher 1970, pp. 105-106.
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Three more specific questions are especially pressing for what I will
say later on. First, the question of how the relation of the ’Consciousness
as such’-subsection and the ’Self-consciousness’-subsection in the Pheno-
menology should be understood. As in the case of the main sections, also
here we should not be too hasty in reading these two subsections as simply
two successive stages of a single progression. This simple way reading has
led for example Vittorio Hösle to the puzzlement of how something as
simple as ’Desire’ (which is the topic of first chapter of ’Self-conscious-
ness’) can be the next stage after ’Understanding’ (which is the topic of the
last chapter of ’Consciousness as such’) which is after all already a quite
complicated level of givenness for the subject.75 This question seems to
presuppose that in all cases a previous level is, or should be, sublated
(aufgehoben) into the next one and so any level contains all the developmen-
tal moments reached in the previous one.76
Here I think Iring Fetscher77 has a more correct intuition when she
suggests that the progressions of ’Consciousness as such’ and ’Self-
consciousness’-subsection should be understood rather as parallel. If this is
right, as I think it is, then Hösle’s problem does not arise: ‘Understanding’
is not a transition to ‘Desire’ because ‘Consciousness as such’ and ‘Self-
consciousness’ are not two consecutive but parallel developments. 
My suggestion is that ‘Consciousness as such’ and ‘Self-consciousness’
should actually be read as parallel, or more precisely, as mutually comple-
mentary points of view to one and the same development. Doing this is
not an easy task, but I hope to be able to show that it has a point. To put
it roughly: whereas Hegel in ‘Consciousness as such’ develops the ‘theoreti-
cal’ aspect of intentionality, in ‘Self-consciousness’ he develops its practical
aspect. That is, whereas in ‘Consciousness as such’ the Gegenstand or
object of consciousness has only practically neutral predicates, in ‘Self-
consciousness’ the Gegenstand or object has practically motivating predica-
tes. In both cases the development goes from a singular perspective to a
universal one, and the development of the intentional correlate of cons-
ciousness from something that can be already for a singular consciousness to
something that can be only for a consciousness that has transcended singula-
rity.
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Terminologically this progress is reflected by transition from calling
the intentional correlate of consciousness ‘merely’ ‘Gegenstand’ to calling
the intentional correlate ‘Object’. Hence the singular or immediate cons-
ciousness analyzed on the one hand in ‘Sensuous consciousness’ and on
the other hand in ‘Desire’ is related to ‘mere Gegenstände’, whereas the
mediated consciousness is related to ‘Objekte’ or ‘freie Objekte’. This
theme I will discuss more explicitly in chapter 3.
The second more specific question which nevertheless is related to the
previous one, is how we should understand the role of intersubjectivity in
the ‘Phenomenology’-section. Namely 1) if the developments of ‘Conscious-
ness as such’ and ‘Self-consciousness’ are somehow parallel, and 2) since
intersubjectivity is explicitly introduced in ’Recognitive self-consciousness’
in the ’Self-consciousness’-subsection, does this mean that intersubjectivity
is also, if not explicitly then at least implicitly introduced somewhere along
the way of the development of ‘Consciousness as such’? I think that an
affirmative answer is plausible. 
It seems that both ‘Desire’ and ‘Sensuous consciousness’ are ‘singular’
precisely in the sense of not being mediated by other perspectives. They
are, as it were, aspects of a purely first person perspective. Whereas in
‘Sensuous consciousness’ Hegel analyzes the theoretical aspect of a purely
individual point of view, in ‘Desire’ he analyses its practical aspect. Alt-
hough a very precise correspondence between the next stages of ‘Conscious-
ness as such’ and ‘Self-consciousness’ is not easy to discern, yet there is
some plausibility in saying that what happens in ‘Recognitive self-conscious-
ness’, happens also in ‘Perception’. In both cases the individual point of
view is being transcended and consciousness becomes able to have as its
intentional correlates objects that a purely individual point of view cannot
have. In both cases consciousness becomes intersubjectively mediated and
hence we may say that there are not two transcendings of the individual
perspective but only two aspects of one transcending, the practical and the
theoretical. 
Why would this be plausible in the case of ‘Consciousness as such’?
Because for ‘sensuous consciousness’ the categorial determinations of
Gegenständlichkeit (see § 418) seem to be those that are present already in
a purely singular  perspective to the world. Further, in ‘Perception’
(Wahrnehmung) the object is that which is according to Hegel present for
our “everyday consciousness and more or less for the sciences” (§ 420).
This certainly implies transcending the pure first person perspective and
being on the level of ‘objectivity’ in the sense of ‘allgemeingültigkeit’. Here
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78 See for example the “habit of satisfaction” in § 410 which connects closely with the
sublimation of the singular desire in social mediation treated in the ‘Recognitive self-
consciousness’. The habit of “looking”, discussed by Hegel in the same paragraph is of
direct relevance for Psycho logy and  would be worth a  closer look from the point of
v i ew  o f i ts poss ib le  in te r sub jec t ive  med ia t ion .  The  re l a t ion  of  hab i t  and
intersub jectivity will be discussed by the author in forthcoming works.
79 See Hösle 1987, p. 372 f f. and Hespe 1991, p. 515 , note 59. 
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objects are taken as what they are, even if not from anyone’s perspective, yet
from an intersubjectively shared perspective. It is quite natural to think that
the encounter with another perspective in the ‘Recognitive self-conscious-
ness’ is relevant for the transition from ‘sensuous consciousness’ to ‘percepti-
on’. Terminologically this transition is, as already mentioned, reflected in
the way that ‘sensuous consciousness’ only has ‘Gegenstände’ (§§ 418-419),
‘Wahrnehmung’ has ‘Objekte’ (§ 421).
This however does not as such answer to the question of how the
introduction of intersubjectivity in ‘Phenomenology’ (explicitly in the ‘Self-
consciousness’-chapter and more implicitly in the ‘Consciousness as such’-
chapter) relates to ‘Anthropology’ and ‘Psychology’. I will pass over this
question in relation to ‘Anthropology’ by just noting that much of the
discussion already in the first sub-section ‘Natural soul’ concerns explicitly
social, or intersubjectivity-involving, determinations. This is evidently true
also in many other places in the ‘Anthropology’.78 The question of the role
of intersubjectivity in ‘Psychology’ as a whole is more difficult. There is a
great temptation to defend Hegel against Vittorio Hösle’s accusations
according to which Hegel ignores or at least downplays intersubjectivity in
the ‘Psychology’ by saying, as Franz Hespe does, that the whole discussion
of ‘Psychology’ deals with a level of individual subjectivity that is already
intersubjectively mediated.79 
On a general level, at least the simple fact that ‘Phenomenology’ and
‘Psychology’ are in Hegel’s Darstellung two consecutive sections, does not
as such yet provide an answer to this question. Hegel’s way of proceeding
in PSS is clearly more complicated than some kind of simple Aufhebung of
any previous level of discussion into the next ones. So the question will
have to be answered in a more complicated way, what ever it will turn out
to be. In a way Hösle is certainly right. Namely, Hegel says explicitly in the
‘Psychology’ scarcely nothing about relations to other subjects. Therefore
Hespe’s way of suggesting that the subject that is discussed in ‘Psychology’
is implicitly socially mediated would be a handy answer: Hegel does not
have to discuss explicitly subject’s relation to other subjects in ‘Psychology’,
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80 Hespe  writes: “D as ‘allgemeine Selbstbewußtsein’  ist  das vergesel lschaftete
Selbstbewußtsein, daß im folgenden sowohl den theoretischen wie den prak tischen
Geist begründet. Die theoretische und praktische aneignung der Natur, schießlich das
Setzen von Zwecken in d er Natur ist nicht d urch das m onadische Selbst möglich,
sondern nur von einem Selb st, das sich als Teil des allgemeinen Selbst weiß.” (Hespe
1991, p. 515) In footnote 59 (ibidem.) he comments Hösle: “Es trifft also keineswegs
zu, wie Hösle ((1987) 372 u.ö) behauptet, daß Hegel die Einsich t in die Notwendigkeit
intersubjektiver Beziehung en nach ihrer Ein führung im weite ren Fortgang sogleich
wieder zurücknehme; denn Hegel th ematisiert Intersubjektivität nicht als reaktion
zweier Subjekte (nach dem Modell der sog. Ego-alter Dyade), sondern als Vollzug der
e inen  und  e inzi gen  Ve rnunf t im  e inze lnen  Sub jek t ,  s o  d aß  a l le  wei tere n
Entwicklungsstufen des Geiste s qua Formen des al lgemein Selbstbewußtseins eo ipso
intersubjektiv sind.” I’m claiming that the levels analyzed in the ‘Spirit’-subsection are
not ‘forms’ of universal self-consciousness (which is a form of consciousness) any
more than forms of any  other form of  consciousness.
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since the subject being discussed is as such already intersubjectively me-
diated.80
But if we follow the interpretative clue about the relation of ‘Pheno-
menology’ and ‘Psychology’ I have suggested, then there is a problem.
Namely if the psychological functions of ‘representation’ or ‘passive thin-
king’ discussed in ‘Psychology’ really are responsible for there being a
structured world of objects for consciousness, and since Hegel discusses
also a ‘pre-intersubjective’ form of consciousness, then the functions
cannot be effective only on the level of intersubjectively mediated cons-
ciousness. Even the form of consciousness analyzed in ‘sensuous conscious-
ness’ and ‘desire’ is intentionally related to a structured world of Gegens-
tände or Vorstellungen. If Hegel really would not say anything about the
function of Vorstellung of a purely singular subjectivity, then Hespe would
have a point in saying that according to Hegel intersubjectivity is a necessa-
ry condition for intentionality as such (see my introduction). But this
reading simply does not get Hegel’s text right.Already in discussing the
‘sensuous consciousness’ Hegel talks about the logical determinations of
Gegenstände for it as ‘thought-determinations’ (§ 418-419). The point
there simply is, that even for grasping the simple categorial relations given
on the singular point of view, the subject has to be passively thinking (i.e.
representing) according to these categories. 
It would be a topic for another study to try to discern, which psycho-
logical functions discussed by Hegel are necessarily intersubjectively me-
diated and which are not. Hegel’s point is clearly that any level or function
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81 For a discussion on Hegel and the modularity-issue see Halbig 1999, pp. 53-69.
82 See § 400, § 401 Z, § 411 Z.
83 § 361 Z: “Man, as the universa l thinking animal[...]”; § 468 Z: “[...] the animal [...] is
incapable of having will, because it does not think [...]”.
36
of spirit can be affected by the most developed ones,81 but this yet does not
imply that there could not be any kind of functioning of the lower func-
tions without the higher ones. Thus, even if at least language (§ 457 Z ff.)
obviously presupposes intersubjectivity and therefore also active thinking
– by being according to Hegel a linguistic activity – does, this does not
imply that there were no passive thinking whatsoever without intersubjecti-
vity and language.
Thirdly, the question of the relation of PSS to the discussion on
animals in the end of the philosophy of nature is relevant for any work that
touches the theme of ‘desire’ in PSS. On the whole, the fact that desire is
discussed both in the philosophy of nature and PSS suggests that for Hegel
the boundary between ‘nature’ and ‘spirit’ is far from absolute. Another
immediately striking evidence for this is the fact that Hegel in many places
in the ‘Anthropology’ points to the commonness of the modes of
givenness and functions of the soul in humans and (other) animals. Not
only do animals and humans share ‘outer sensations’ (i.e. sensations of the
outer senses), they even share to some extent the ‘inner sensations’, that is,
motivating feelings which direct the practical orientation of an organism in
relation to its outer world.82
In discussing the difference between man and animals Hegel points in
the traditional way to thinking as the differentia of humans.83 Yet, even
here the divide is not necessarily clear-cut. That is, if we hold on to the
distinction between the two modes of subjective thinking: 1) the active, or
spontaneous thinking and 2) passive thinking (i.e. representation) which is
the preconscious activity responsible for there being a structured world of
objects for consciousness; then it is plausible to suggest that it is in fact only
the spontaneous thinking that other animals lack according to Hegel, and not
the passive one. Clearly Hegel thinks that an animal is in intentional rela-
tions to outer world which for the animal is distinct from it. 
There are at least two possible explanations why Hegel thinks that
animals do not think actively. One is his theory of the connection of active
thinking and language. According to Hegel, active thinking requires langu-
age based on purely arbitrary signs with which active thinking can fluently
and efficiently operate without the corresponding representations having to
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84 See especially § 459 and DeVries 1988, pp. 149-153.  Because the connection
between signs and their meanings is more or less contingen t, the meanings of signs
“have to be learned” (§ 457 Z). That is, the meanings of signs are only sociall y
instituted, unlike the meanings of ‘symbols’ which are based on natural associations.
Hence, thinking through signs presupposes sociality.
85 Appeal to ‘freedom’ as the  differen tia speci fica of humans does not offer any simple
solutions, since any action is according to Hegel motivated. The difference between
animals and humans is only on the generality of motivations. Where an an imal has a
drive (Trieb) for nourishment, man can have a drive for justice or the good. See § 225,
§§ 359-360, § 443 Z, 473 Z.
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‘come to mind’.84 If every word would bring the corresponding representa-
tion into consciousness, active thinking would be (at least) hopelessly
uneconomical and slow. This is why a language that would be dependent
on ‘natural symbols’ – such as onomatopoetic words or iconic visual
symbols – would be inadequate for efficient spontaneous thinking, since
(this I take to be Hegel’s idea) natural symbols would too easily awake the
corresponding representation and slow up the process. Now, evidently
Hegel thinks, that animals lack purely arbitrary signs and therefore are
unable to spontaneous thinking. 
Another explanation could be that active thinking is by definition
reflective and this at least in some sense presupposes transcending the given
perspective, as it were, capability of distancing from one’s own perspective
so as to ‘reflect’ it. It is at least very natural to suppose that this requires
intersubjectivity – that the recognition of the possible validity of other
perspectives is somehow a presupposition for actively reflecting beliefs,
conceptions, ends etc held by oneself. It may be then, that animals are not
reflective in this sense according to Hegel.85
Be that as it may, this does not imply that animals did not have passive
thinking that produces Vorstellungen for them, that is, logically structured
correlates of intentions. In fact, in talking about the mental functions
responsible for the semantics and syntax of language Hegel points out
‘understanding’ as the one responsible for syntax. What is interesting is that
he in this connection calls understanding a “logical instinct’ (logische Ins-
tinkt). Should this equation be bypassed just as loosely metaphorical talk by
Hegel? I don’t see any reason for that. Only if we insist categorically on the
strict separation between animals and humans, do we have a reason to
bypass it straightaway. I however suggest that Hegel really is saying that the
capability to grasp logical connections (in language and in reality) is, not
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86 “Das Formelle der Sprache  [...] ist das Werk  des Verstandes, der seine Kategorien
in sie einb ildet; dieser logiche Instinkt bringt das Grammatische hervor” (§ 459)
[emphasis H.I.]. That Hegel equals this logical instinct with ‘understanding’ poses for
my interpretation a problem. That is: in the ‘Phenomenology’-section ‘understanding’
is the last form of consciousness in the ‘Consciousness as such’-subsection, and hence
seems to be already a f orm of conscio usness for which the  logical structure of the
world is no more purely ‘first personal’ as it is for ‘sensuous consciousness’. I am
however saying that already animals with (supposedly) purely ‘first personal’ world-
relation s have th is ‘logical  instinc t’, i.e. ‘underst anding ’. There is howev er no
inconsistency , since the psychological function of  ‘understanding’ (analyzed as such in
§ 467 in the ‘Psychology’) is at work in constructing the giv en for a ll levels o f
consciousness, that is, not only for the form  of consciousness th at Hegel call s
‘understanding’ in the ‘Phenomenology’ but already for ‘sensuous consc iousness’ and
‘perception’. This is only to restate that the psychological functions have to be able  to
function independently of intersubjectivity. In other words: even if the understandable
world in the fully developed level of intersubjectively mediated intentionality of
‘understanding’ is not purely first personally structured, there is also a first personal
understandable world brought about by the activity of understanding.
87 Here I think McDowell’s verdict  (based on Gadamer’s – and originally He idegger’s
– reflectio ns on the ‘als’-structure) that animals are not members of the space of
reasons is much too  simple (see McDowell 1996, pp. 114-126). Recently Alasdair
MacIntyre has crit icized McDowell’s, Gadamer’s and Heidegger’s views on animals (in
MacIntyre 1999;see especially p . 43 ff.). Studies of developed animals, such as dolphins
and chimpanzees, referred by  MacIntyre, in fact sugg est that developed an imals can
have even some capability of weighing, not only between different means of achieving
positively given ends o r ‘goods’, but also between different short term ends. Does this
mean that th ey are capable o f some level of spontaneous thinking? I believe that
intersubjective mediation  of points of view s is the key for understanding th e
appearance of spontaneous thinking  – and that the degree of spontaneity goes hand in
hand with the degree of transcending the singularity through intersubjectivity. On this
theory the differen ces between  animals or animal species in this respect would thus
correlate with their sociality. However, since Hegel seems not to have fo llowed this
line, in this text I simply equate ‘animality’ with singularity as an interpretation of
Hegel’s text.
88 Petry III, p. 371, note 45, 6.
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only pre-linguistic, but also in general a natural, ‘instinctual’ capability.86
This is then to say, that at least some form of openness to the ‘space of
reasons’ – that is, to conceptual, judgemental and inferential structures of
reality, is common to all ‘instinctual’ animals.87 
For example Michael John Petry emphasizes that Hegel’s discussion
on ‘desire’ in the ‘Phenomenology’ “is not to be confused with the animal’s
instinctive drive to satisfy needs [analyzed in the philosophy of nature]”88.
Petry’s reason for saying this is that “[t]he exposition of ‘desire’ [in the
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89 Idem.
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‘Phenomenology’] is [...] determined solely by the dialectical structuring of
consciousness”89. One point to note here is that Petry – perhaps – thinks
of ‘instinct’ as something obviously much too primitive for humans, and
hence takes pointing pejoratively to the ‘merely instinctual’ behavior of
animals as a good way of emphasizing the difference between the discus-
sions of desire in the philosophy of nature and that in PSS. 
Anyway, another point is that it is certainly true that ‘desire’ is discus-
sed in the ‘Phenomenology’ only from the very abstract point of view of
developing the “dialectical structuring of consciousness”. However, this is
not to say that the discussion of ‘drive’ in the philosophy of nature did not
relate in any way to the discussion of it in the ‘Phenomenology’. 
On the contrary, I would even say that the beginning of ‘Phenomenolo-
gy’, that is, both the ‘Desire’-chapter and the ‘Sensuous consciousness’-
chapter, are straightforwardly continuation to the discussion of animal
intentionality in the philosophy of nature. ‘Anthropology’-section between
the philosophy of nature and the ‘Phenomenology’-section does not in any
way develop the theme of intentionality any further from the level on
which it is left in the end of the philosophy of nature. I cannot see that
‘sensuous consciousness’ and ‘desire’ were in any way ‘higher than animal’
levels. There are good reasons then to presume, that in the beginning of
the ‘Phenomenology’ Hegel returns to the discussion of animal
intentionality started in the philosophy of nature, and interrupted by ‘Anthro-
pology’, in order to lead it through the universalization of consciousness to
a level that is not anymore ‘purely animal’.
But claiming that 1) ‘consciousness’ – on the immediate levels of ‘sensuous
consciousness’ and ‘desire’ – is nothing more than the animal consciousness already
analyzed in the philosophy of nature; and that 2) Gegenständlichkeit or Vorstellung as
the mode of givenness peculiar to consciousness presupposes the active processes of produ-
cing representations, processes that are analyzed in the ‘Psychology’; together lead to
the conclusion that 3) the processes analyzed in ‘Psychology’ are processes that are
effective not only on the human level, but also on the animal level analyzed in the
philosophy of nature. 
So be it then. I cannot see that this conclusion would be somehow
irreconcilable with Hegel’s motives in the Encyclopedia. Again, only if we
want to keep the account of animals in the philosophy of nature and the
account of subjective spirit strictly separate we have a reason to reject this
conclusion. I do not however see any reasons internal to Hegel’s system for
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keeping them strictly separate and so propose that we do take this conclusi-
on seriously. The discussion in ‘Psychology’ does develop themes that are
relevant also for the discussion on animals.
90 English does not catch the etymological connection  between ‘W issen’ and
‘Bewußtsein’ wh ich have to be  translated as ‘know ledge/knowing’ and ‘consciousness’
respectively. Bewußtsein means roughly ‘being in the state of Wissen’; that is, ‘to be
consc ious of something’ equa ls to ‘to know of something’. ‘Wissen’ moreover has to
be separated from ‘Erkenntnis’ which  Petry translates as ‘cognition’.
91 “Darin, d. h. in dieser Beziehung auf den  Gegenstand[...]” (ibid, 217).
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2. Singular consciousness of the world: s e l f- c o n s c io u s n e s s 1
The paragraph 424 of PSS analyzed by Cramer provides a good starting
point also for my purposes. The text thus goes:
Die Wahrheit des Bewußtseins ist das Selbstbewußtsein, und dieses der Grund von
jenem, so  daß in de r Existenz alle s Bewußtsein eines anderen Gegenstandes
Selbstbewußtsein  ist; ich weiß von de m Gegenstan de als dem meinigen (es ist
meine Vorstellung), ich weiß daher darin von mir. – Der Ausdruck vom Selbst-
bewußtsein ist Ich=Ich; – abstrakte Freiheit , reine Idealität. – So ist es ohne
Realität; den n es selbst, da s Gegenstand seiner ist, ist nicht ein solcher, da kein
Unterschied desselben  und seiner vorhanden  ist.
Cramer interprets Hegel here formulating a position according to which
knowing “von dem Gegenstande”, implies knowing also of oneself,
‘oneself’ meaning consciousness.90 This is to say that there is no conscious-
ness of something as different from the consciousness if there is not also
consciousness of this consciousness of the Gegenstand as different from
the consciousness of the Gegenstand. As I said in the introduction, this is
according to Cramer a theory which Hegel presents only to refute it in the
last sentence of the paragraph. 
I do not however think that this is at all what happens in this para-
graph. Namely, Cramer’s reading relies on a certain interpretation of the
word “darin”. For Cramer “darin” points to the relation of consciousness
to the object and not to the object itself.91 Thus, according to Cramer,
Hegel says that I know of myself in (or ‘within’) consciousness of, or the
conscious relation to, the Gegenstand, and not in the Gegenstand itself.
This is to say that there are two consciousnesses, both of which exist at the
same time (“zugleich”, Cramer 1979, 217). 
Yet, it is easy to see that the claim according to which “darin” pointed
to consciousness, that is, to the relation to the object, is without textual
evidence. Hegel simply says that “Ich weiß von dem Gegenstande [...] Ich
weiß [...] darin von mir”. Where else would “darin” refer if not to the
“Gegenstand”? Hence, I know of myself in the Gegenstand itself and not
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92 Again, the suspicion arises, that the method of the Phenomenology of Spirit is being
mixed with that of the Encyclopedia.
93 Adrian Peperzak offers (without referring to Cramer) a similar kind of theory
containing first- and second order co nsciousnesses as an interpretation for the
statemen t “all consciousness is se lf-consc iousness” than Cramer does, but contra
Cramer fin ds this theory to be Hegel’s own and not something criticized by Hegel! See
Peperzak 1990, pp. 294-296.
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in  the  consc iousness  of the Gegenstand.  There are not  two
consciousnesses, but only one consciousness which is at the same time
consciousness of the Gegenstand and consciousness of oneself.
One could slightly reformulate Cramer’s reading and say that “within
it” refers in fact to “representation” (“Vorstellung”). But this changes
nothing because the object simply equals to the representation: “Ich weiß
von dem Gegenstande [...] (es ist meine Vorstellung) [emphasis. H.I.]”. So
we have to admit that Hegel really is saying that knowing of a Gegenstand
(a Gegenstand which is a Vorstellung) equals to knowing of oneself and
conclude that Cramer’s interpretation is misguided from the very begin-
ning. Hegel does not speak here of any kind of second order reflective
relation involved in a conscious relation to a Gegenstand. If this is so, then
at least Hegel is not criticizing here the kind of theory Cramer reads him to
be formulating in this paragraph. In fact, I think there are strong grounds
to doubt Cramer’s claim that Hegel is in general formulating here a theory
only to reject it. As far as I can see, this is not his procedure anywhere else in
PSS. Why would it be here?92 Cramer does not raise this question.
But then we have to consider the possibility that what Hegel is saying
here is his own position. This I take actually to be the case. Hegel formula-
tes in § 424 a position according to which consciousness of Gegenstand as
such is self-consciousness – and this is Hegel’s own position.93
If this is so, what can be Hegel’s point of claiming that consciousness
is self-consciousness, that being conscious of a Gegenstand is as such being
conscious of oneself within the Gegenstand? I think that the point is not after
all a very strange one. First of all, we may take a look at what Hegel has
said in the transition from Anthropology to Phenomenology, that is, in
characterizing the logical development from ’soul’ to ’consciousness’.
Whereas for (or ’in’) the soul the sensations or feelings (whether produced
by the five senses, or the system of normative or ’inner sensations’) are not
yet objectified so as to form an outer world for the subject, consciousness
or the ’I’ “separates from itself its determinations, the natural life of the
soul, as an independent object, and [...] knows of this as external to itself”
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94 "Die reine abstrakte Freiheit für sich en tläßt ihre Bestimmtheit, des Naturleben der
Seele, a ls ebenso frei, als selbstständiges Objekt, aus sich, und  vom diesem als ihm äußeren
ist es, das Ich  zunächst weiß, und so ist Bewußtse in.”
95 " [...]Ich weiß  von dem Gegenstande  als dem mein igen [...]”
96 See §§ 413-415.
97 See DeVries 1988, 120-121. In a case, where a subject takes its representation to be
an intuition, but is mistaken  (f.ex. hallucinates or simply ‘sees wrong’) it can be said
that the representa t ion fails  and is  ‘only a representat ion’ .  Also produ cts o f
daydreaming o r wishfu l think ing are ‘only representat ions’.
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(§ 413).94 That is, although for consciousness the given is represented
before it as an outer world, the sensations still are its sensations and the
world given to it in consciousness thus is in this sense its world. In this way
“I know of the Gegenstand as mine” (§ 424)95. 
There is however a deeper point involved, that concerns the logical
structure of the object-world of consciousness. Namely, the intentional
content of consciousness is always construed by a particular way of ‘taking
the world as’ and hence each ‘form’ of consciousness analyzed in the ‘Pheno-
menology’ is related to intentional correlates peculiar to itself. In other
words, Gegenständlichkeit for each form of consciousness implicitly reflects
the particular nature of the form of consciousness in question96, that is, the
mode of Vor-stellung peculiar to it. Hence: the Gegenstand “ist meine
Vorstellung”. At first sight it might seem surprizing that Hegel is here in
the ‘Phenomenology’ pointing already to representation (Vorstellung), that
is explicitly discussed only in the ‘Psychology’. But following the suggestion
which I have made according to which ‘Psychology’ deals with the subjecti-
ve processes involved in producing objectivity for consciousness, this is
understandable. The Gegenstand for consciousness is a representation,
produced by the activity of representing, out of the material given in
sensations. Now, although Hegel in the ’Theoretical spirit’-subsection of
Psychology discusses ’Intuition’ (Anschauung) and ’Representation’ in two
consecutive chapters, this does not mean that the activities of intuiting and
representing were independent from each other nor that ’intuitions’ and
’representations’ were two absolutely different kinds of products. Here I
find Willem DeVries’s interpretation according to which intuitions are a
sub-class of representations to be on the right track.97 Thus by a Gegens-
tand of consciousness, that is, by Vorstellung Hegel means whatever is
constructed in the general process of representation out of sensational mate-
rial, whether it be a present intuition or just a ’mere representation’ of
something that is not presently given in outer sensations (so that is merely
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98 Furthermore, the fact that H egel discusses thinking, o r ’understand ing’ only in the
end of ’Theoretical sp irit’ (§§ 465 -468) do es not mean that ’thinking’ were not
operative in the process of representing objects. Passive thinking and the general process of
representing are the same thing.
99 Findlay 1979, p. 14.
100 ‘In principle’ because McDowell in the end doesn ’t want to discuss the ontological
implications with which Hegel has no hesitations. As I see it, Mc Dowe ll’s talk of the
world as given in intuitions in the end leave it open whethe r he really means to say that
the world as such , irrespectively of ways of intuiting it has a conceptual structure.
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‘in the head’; see previous chapter). What ever is given for consciousness is
a representation in this general sense.98
It is not necessary to discuss all the issues involved in the production
of representations that Hegel analysis in the Psychology, but only point out
a general truth that seems to apply generally for the process of representing
as constituting objectivity for the subject. John Findlay has characterized
Hegel’s relation to Kant in the following way: “What Hegel did was to
identify Kant’s ego with the logical idea, the supreme source of the catego-
ries, and to hold that while it might be specified and individualized in the
psychological ego, it could also be specified in an externalized form in
nature.”99 Now, something like this certainly is true of Hegel’s ontology
and epistemology on a very general level. In comparison to Kant, for Hegel
the logical forms of thinking and experiencing are not merely subjective
but are realized both in experience and thinking and in the world as it is
independently of subjects. This is the picture of the conceptual having no
outer limit which McDowell  – at least in principle – symphatizes in
Hegel.100 
Yet, if we understand this meaning that empirical subjects are for
Hegel simply instantiations of the one absolute structure, we are still very
far from how Hegel really accounts for the epistemic openness of empirical
subjects to the world. Namely, for Hegel the representing activity responsi-
ble for there being a world for consciousness is not in any way reducible to
an activity of a ‘pure’ transcendental subjectivity, of a subjectivity that itself
would be totally independent from all empirical relations and deter-
minations. The activity through which a structured objectivity as the
intentional correlate of the subject (or consciousness) is produced, is
according to Hegel on the contrary an activity of a “concrete subjectivity (§
456) and as such affected by the particular practical interests and deter-
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101 Hegel speaks ab out the ‘concrete subject, I or individuality’ in the ‘Anthropology’
at least in § 398, § 400, § 402 Zusatz, § 405 and § 406. In all cases he is emphasizing the
concreteness of th e sub jects theoretical and practical orientatio n, that is, its
dependence on the totality of the subjects motivational set which is determined by life-
history, doxastic history, past and present human-relations etc.
102 An interesting monograph  emphas izing the herme neutical aspect in H egel’s
philosophy in Redding 1996.
103 “Auch d ie Assoziation der Vorste llungen ist d aher als Subsumption der einzelnen
unter eine allgemeine,  welche deren Zusammmenhang ausmacht ,  zu fassen.  Die
Intelligenz ist aber an ihr n icht nur allgemeine Form, sondern ihre Innerlichke it ist in
sich bestimmte, konkrete Subjektivität von eigenem Gehalt, der aus irgeneinem Interesse,
ansichseienden Begri ffe oder Idee stammt, insofern von solchem Inhalte antizipierend
gesprochen werden kann. Die Intelligenz ist die Macht über den Vorrat der ih r
angehör igen Bi lder  und Vorste l lungen und so  $$ )  f r e i e s  Verknüpfen  und
Subsumieren dieses Vorrats unter den ihr e igentümlichen  Inhalt. [...]”
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minations of the subject’s being in the world.101 We are according to Hegel
conscious of the world always in ways that are, if not completely deter-
mined, in any case motivated by our being and acting in the world as ‘conc-
rete subjectivities’. This emphasis on ‘cocreteness’ in the production of the
subjects intentional world-relation can clearly be seen as a pragmatic or
hermeneutical move in relation to Kant’s strict dualism between the trans-
cendental and the empirical subject.102
In § 456 Hegel analyzes the function of organizing objectivity for
consciousness as subsuming (or judging) individuals under universals in the
following way:
The association of representat ions is [...] to be grasped as a subsumption of singu-
lars under a universal which  constitutes thei r connection . Intelligence i s however
[...] not only a general form, for its inwardness is in itself determin ed, concrete subjec-
tivity, with its own content deriving from some interest, [...] concept or idea.
Intelligence is the power over the fund of images and representations belonging
to it and thus a free relating and subsumation of this fund under the content
peculiar to itself.103
Hegel talks here about the association or subsumption of singulars given in
intuition under universals as the activity of intelligence as “determined,
concrete subjectivity”. The “representations” which are being associated by
subsuming them under universals that are common to many representa-
tions are “images” (Bilder), by which Hegel means representations of
singulars with many features or properties. Since these singulars have many
different features, they are already judgementally articulated, but precisely
because of having many features, they provide a multitude of possibilities
for subsuming. The universal under which the singulars is subsumed or
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judged can in principle be any feature that the thing shares with other
things. In this sense intelligence is “a free relating and subsumation” of
singulars. In the Zusatz to § 456 Hegel talks of this associating of individu-
als as “paying attention” (aufmerken), and gives some examples of the
features that can function as the basis of subsumation:
The common feature is either some particular aspect of the ob ject elevated into
the form of universality , such as for example the red co lour of a rose; or the concrete
universal, the genus, for example in the case of a rose ‘the plant ’ [...]
Now, what is the feature of the individual to which attention is payed
obviously depends on the “content peculiar [to the intelligence, H.I.]” (§
456), that is, on what kind of concepts the subject in question happens to
possess. It may be that I do not have the concept of a rose, and perhaps I
do not even have the concept of a plant, yet what I see, has at least many
sensible features and some of them are features that are also had by other
objects which I see or have seen. The forms of consciousness analyzed in
the ‘Phenomenology’ are in this sense different types of consciousness:
different types of universals are available for them and thus subsuming
singulars under universals is different in the case of each type. Another
important point is that according to § 456 the subsumation is, or can be,
related to an “interest”. Hence, my attending to some feature of a given
individual is not without motivation, but is motivated by some interest.
Also here we may discern different types of consciousness depending on
the corresponding types of interest.
What ever is the interest of my ‘concrete subjectivity’ which directs my
attention to features that are ‘interesting’, it determines the logical structure
of my intentional correlates. I am actually conscious of the world as or-
ganized by my interest-related subsuming activity. That is, the space of my
actual correlates of intentions is more limited than that of my possible
correlates of intentions. It is in this sense that Gegenstände are our Vors-
tellungen and hence we are in being conscious of the world as organized by
our representative activity implicitly conscious of ‘ourselves’. Hence
“consciousness as such is self-consciousness”.
Now we may return to the last sentence of § 424 in the ‘self-
consciousness’-subsection. Why does Hegel say there that self-conscious-
ness in this picture is “without reality”? What is the problem that Hegel is
pointing at by saying that in fact in this structure “no difference between it
[i.e. the Gegenstand] and itself [i.e. consciousness] is present”? The prob-
lem is not – as Cramer maintains – that this structure were self-contradic-
tory in such a way that in fact in it no Gegenstand could be given as a
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Gegenstand and that the structure sketched in § 424 were hence simply an
unsuccessful theory of consciousness. Rather, the problem is, that cons-
ciousness as characterized in § 424 is still an immediate or singular cons-
ciousness, and as such does not yet contain any consciousness of the fact
that it is a particularly ‘coloured’ way of taking as. That is, the question of
whether an object could perhaps also be ‘taken’ in another way than it is
actually taken is not present for the singular or immediate consciousness as
self-consciousness because it does not contain knowledge of the fact that
the Gegenstand is a product of a particularly coloured representational
activity. This Hegel states explicitly in the Zusatz of § 424:
This [...] unity of I and object is however present in the immedia te self-conscious-
ness only in an abstract manner, and is cognized only by us who examine it, and
not by self-consciousness itself. 
Thus, the “unity of I and object”, that is, the fact that the object is for the
subject or ‘I’ given as a result of its own representative activity is in the case
of “immediate” self-consciousness only “present in” it “in an abstract
manner”, but not yet cognized by self-consciousness itself. Or, to put it
another way, on the immediate level consciousness is not yet self-conscious-
ness for itself, but only for us who analyze its structure. This is the meaning
of Hegel’s statement “it [i.e. self-consciousness] is without reality”. Hence
it could be said that something like the reflective structure that Cramer
understands Hegel to be formulating in § 424 (according to Cramer for no
other reason than to refute it) is precisely lacking at this stage. Only when
something like an explicit reflective awareness of the particularity of rep-
resenting the world is reached, will the ‘lack of reality’ of self-consciousness
be overcome. From now on I will call this immediate or singular (self-)
consciousness “without reality” self-consciousness1 to separate it from other
meanings of self-consciousness in PSS.
Now, both ‘sensuous consciousness’ and ‘desire’ are clearly immediate,
or singular modes of consciousness that have as their actual intentional
correlates only those kinds of contents that are peculiar to the individual
point of view. I will next go on reading the chapters on ‘sensuous conscious-
ness’ and ‘desire’ as forms, or more exactly as aspects of the singular self-
consciousness1. After that I will consider the difference of ‘Gegenstand’
and Objekt’ as reflecting the difference between the immediate conscious-
ness as self-consciousness1 and the mediated forms of consciousness as
self-consciousness.
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104 “Das Bewußtse in ist zunächst das unmitte lbare, seine Beziehung auf den Gegenstand
daher die einfache, unvermittelte Gewißheit desselben; der Gegenstand selbst ist daher
ebenso als unmittelbarer, als seiender und in sich reflektierter, weiter als unmittelb arer
einzelner bestimmt; – sinnliches Bewußtsein.
Das Bewußtsein a ls Verhäl tnis enthält nur die dem abstrakten Ich oder formellen
Denken an gehörigen K ategorien, die ihm B estimmungen  des Objekts sind (§
415). Das sinnliche Bew ußtsein weiß dahe r von diesem nur als  einem Seienden,
Etwas, existierenden Dinge, Einzelnen und so fort. Es erscheint als das reichste an
inhalt, ist ab er das ärmste an Gedanken. Jene reiche Erfüllung machen die
Gefühlsbestimmungen aus [...]”
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2.1. ‘Sensuous consciousness’ 
In § 418 Hegel describes the immediate form of ‘consciousness as such’,
that is ‘sensuous consciousness’ in the following way:
Consciousness is initially immediate, its relation to the Gegenstand therefore the
simple, immediate c ertainty of it; the Geg enstand  itself is therefore sim ilarly
determined as immediate [...] as immediately singular. [...] Sensuous conscious-
ness kn ows o f this [i .e. its Gegenstand] as having being, as something, as a n
existing  thing , as singu lar and so on. [...] This rich content [of sensuous cons-
ciousness] consist of determinations of feeling.104
Hegel here draws an abstract picture of what is given for a purely imme-
diate consciousness, that is, specifying the categorial structures of the
intentional correlate of a purely ‘first personal’ perspective. Unlike in the
soul, for consciousness the given is already given as a singular existing
being, as something. In § 419 Hegel follows the development from ‘somet-
hing’ (Etwas) to ‘thing’ (Ding) presented in his logic: “The sensuous as
something becomes another; the reflection of something to itself, thing,
has many properties [...]”. Now this clearly is a place where the logic is
being ‘applied’ in Realphilosophy. However, merely pointing to the categories
of logic does not yet say much about the specific phenomenological point
of those categories.
What is the point in this case then? According to § 125 of the Ency-
clopedia logic ‘something’ is immediately determined by some quality and
as such is an existing quality, whereas a ‘thing’ has many properties and as
such is not thoroughly determined by any one of them. In fact already on
the level of soul, sensations are ‘etwas’, that is, any sensation is a felt quality
and as such distinct from others sensations. This is also true in conscious-
ness, since in principle anything is given also for consciousness ‘as somet-
hing’, that is, as qualified. Yet, that anything for consciousness is given as
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105 In the Jena Phenomenology of Spiri t of 1807 Hegel gives a grain of salt as an example:
it is both ‘salty’ and ‘white’ and ‘cubical’ and hence it is not any of its qualities, but has
a number of them (see PS, §§ 113-120).
106 The Lockean distinction between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ qualities is not helpful
in describing the purely phenomenal point of view of sensuous consciousness, since
for example both shape (as a primary quality) and colour (as a secondary quality) are
equally given for sensuous consciousness. Hegel does not seem to pay any attention to
the primary/secondary-distinction in his treatments of the senses e ither. See § 358, §
401, § 448 Z.
107 Hegel’s example is “the rose is red” (§ 172). This example however already contains
judging X under the genus of rose which is what Hegel calls a ‘judgement of necessity’
(§ 177). A pure example o f a qualitat ive judgement w ould be  “X (or that) is red”. 
108 See Hespe 1991, p. 516.
49
something, i.e. as qualified, says only a very abstract truth. Namely, any
ordinary object has not only one but many qualities and can (usually) be
sensed with more than one sense. Thus they are already in a purely first
personal level ‘things with many properties’.105 This is the truth of sensual
objects that are the intentional correlate(s) of sensuous consciousness: they
provide a multitude of possible ways of ‘taking as’ and hence a number of
possible ways of classification. In principle I can order the whole material
world according to any sensual universals such as for example colour, the
quality of taste, smell etc., and hence in principle there is no limit to the
number of possible purely individual taxonomies, that is, of systems of
‘taking as’.106
It is now clear that already on this immediate point of view the given
for consciousness is judgementally articulated. More exactly, it is articulated
according to what Hegel in his logic calls ‘qualitative judgements’ (§§ 172-
173)107. Hence, the psychological activity of representing that is responsible of
the production of representations for sensuous consciousness has to be
defined (at least) as subsuming individuals under sensual universals, that is,
ordering the surrounding world according to sensual classifications. 
But what about the ‘wahrheitsfähigkeit’108 of qualitative judgements.
In one sense Hespe is right in saying that according to Hegel purely indivi-
dual judgements (or thoughts) cannot be ‘wahrheitsfähig’. That is, they do
not contain truth (Wahrheit) in the ontological sense. In § 172 Hegel points
out that it would be a mistake to think that qualitative judgements could
contain ‘truth’ (Wahrheit), because they as such do not concern the thing’s
essence. However, qualitative judgements can be ‘correct’ (richtig), that is,
they can be correspond or fail to correspond with what really is given. In
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the case of sensuous consciousness this is obviously true. At least if we
accept one further condition, namely that of ‘normal perceptive circumstan-
ce’, then clearly sensual judgements can be either correct or false: from a
distance I may mistakenly take a thing as having the colour X even if it by
closer inspection it would prove have the colour Y. Thus although the
‘takings as’ of sensuous consciousness cannot be true in the strong ontolo-
gical sense, they can be true, or as Hegel puts it, ‘correct’ in the everyday
correspondence-sense.109
But isn’t ‘sensuous consciousness’ only a very poor abstraction from
a real life-form with a singular or first-person perspective. Yes it is and also
intended to be since it is a description of only the purely ‘theoretical’ aspect
of singular intentionality or self-consciousness1. As such it does not yet
contain any motive for attending to this or that feature of the object or
objects, nor for taking these rather than those features of objects as univer-
sals for classifications . But as noted before, subsuming objects under
universals is according to Hegel in reality an activity of a “concrete subjecti-
vity” having motives or “interests” for its takings as.
I think that ‘desire’ is the answer here. Desiring animals certainly have
strong natural ‘interest’ for attending to some features of the world and not
to others. We do not have to assume, that animals in principle were not
able to attend to many kinds of features of the world, but only that they
have a strong inclination to attend to only those that are relevant for their
desires (and fears). Hence, the range of their possible correlates of intentions
is open even if they never would encounter anything that would turn their
attention from the very limited world of their presently actual intentional
correlates. My point is that animals have the world and things in the world
as the actual correlates of their intentions ‘carved up’ by their (more or less)
unconscious, interest-directed activity of representing. Still, they are as
sensuous beings in principle open to the multitude of features that any
object has, a multitude which in principle would ‘afford’ also other ways of
organizing it. In this sense the actual logical space of their intentions is
more limited than what is in principle possible for them. What they are
actually conscious of, is what interests them. If we take this clue seriously,
then its natural to read the chapter on ‘desire’ as a complement of ‘sen-
suous consciousness’ in the ‘Phenomenology’.
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2.2. ‘Desire’
As I have already claimed, there are no principled reasons not to read the
chapter on ‘desire’ in the ‘Self-consciousness’-subsection as closely connec-
ted to the discussion on animals in the philosophy of nature. Thus, I will
first make an excursion to the philosophy of nature and then return to the
‘Self-consciousness’-chapter already discussed in my chapter 2.
How does Hegel then characterize the intentionality of a desiring
animal? The first point to note there is that according to Hegel sensation
(Empfindung) as the differentia of animals as such does give an animal a
“theoretical relation to its other” (§ 351 Z)110, a relation which is lacking in
plant’s whose relation to the environment is “either indifferent of practi-
cal” (idem). Yet, Hegel in fact does very little in the way of developing the
theoretical aspect of the animal’s relation to its environment in the phi-
losophy of nature. Namely, whereas in PSS sensation or feeling as the
mode of givenness of ‘soul’ does not yet contain intentionality because it
precedes the Urteil of subject ivity and objectivity, in the philosophy of
nature Hegel talks of sensation or feeling as such as an intentional relation
to the outer world. Yet, in ‘Anthropology’ Hegel makes it clear that the
primary functions of the soul are common to humans and (other) animals.
The two short paragraphs on the animal’s ‘theoretical relation’ (§§ 357-358)
to the world deal only with the sensory system and leave undiscussed how
a structured world for the animal is constituted out of the products of it’s
senses. Still, nothing that Hegel says implies that animals were not fully
aware of their environment as distinct from their sensations of the environ-
ment – even if their point of view might be more limited than that of a
fully cultivated human being. There seems to be (at least) three possible
explanations for this state of affairs.
1) Humans and animals are for Hegel somehow very different and hence
what holds for the theoretical intentionality (i.e. ‘Consciousness as such’) of
humans does not hold for that of animals. Whereas humans need sensa-
tions plus the organizing activity of representing for having intentional
relations, animals need only sensations.
2) Hegel is simply sloppy and leaves out what he should have said in the
philosophy of nature in order to make understandable the theoretical
intentionality of animals.
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111 In fact, the  ‘inorganic  nature’ covers all those features of  the surround ing world
that are necessary for the animals survival and well-being, thus no t only food, but also
shelter etc. In this sense it is connected  to what H egel calls ‘formal assimilation’, the
example of which is building nests (§ 362). It seems plausible however to limit the
direct range of desire only to hunger/thirst-oriented intentionality. Even animal sexuality
is a more complex phenomenon than a mere desiring relation to Gegenstände (see §
369).
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3) The analysis of theoretical intentionality in ‘Consciousness as such’ – or
at least some aspects of it – holds for animals as well.
I suggest that the most fruitful answer is the third. If much of the
discussion of the soul is meant to hold for both humans and (other) ani-
mals, and since obviously in the chapter on desire Hegel goes on with the
discussion started already in the philosophy of nature, then it is quite
plausible to read at least the chapter on ‘sensuous consciousness’ also
dealing with a level of consciousness that is common to humans and
animals. The implications of this are not after all so very radical: animals
have a ‘sensuous consciousness’, that is, they are at least conscious of
things with sensuous properties.
But what about the practical aspect of animal-intentionality? First of
all, the relation of an animal, or “a desiring organism” (§ 363 Z), to its
environment is largely determined by its needs for survival. According to §
359 an animal’s “practical relation to nature” has its origin in the “feeling
on lack”. The animal feels that it needs something from the world outside
itself. It is hungry. It also has a “drive” to overcome this lack, that is, a
drive to be nourished. Nourishment hence is the immediate “end” (§ 360)
which the animal attempts to attain. The “need is determined” (idem), that
is, the need is determined by the particular physiological constitution of the
animal: different animals need different nutriments. The animal also has an
“instinct” (idem) with which it is able to attain the end – to find something
that nourishes it, fulfills its need. According to § 361 Z “every animal has
only a limited sphere as its inorganic nature [...] which it has to find from
its complex environment by its instinct”. By “inorganic nature” Hegel
means that part of nature that is not the individual animal’s own organism,
but which however is “its [...] nature [emphasis H.I.]” in the sense that it
and only it can nourish the particularly constituted organism of this
animal.111
How far does then the practical aspect of an animal’s relation to the
world determine the contents of its intentions as a whole according to
Hegel? At first sight to a very large extent. Namely, in the Zusatz to § 361
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113 “Dieses Einlassen mit dem Äußeren, die Erregung und der Prozeß selbst, hat aber
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just quoted Hegel seems to take the extreme position according to which
nothing other than features of the world relevant to the animal’s needs are
not even present for it.112 This radical exclusiveness of the realm of intentional
correlates of a desiring animal also seems to be stressed in § 365 where
Hegel says that the particular determinatedness of the needs of an animal,
which directs its “involvement” (einlassen) with the outer world, “actually
constitutes the object” for the animal.113 This looks like a very radically
version indeed of self-consciousness1. It would seem, that the conscious-
ness of an animal is ‘closed’ to such an extent that it is not conscious of
anything other than that which it needs, so that it has as its intentional
correlates only what it needs. 
However, this cannot be quite the case. Namely, already the reference
to the necessity for the animal to “find” the “inorganic nature” from “its
complex environment” suggests that the animal is intentionally related also
to features of the world that are not “its inorganic nature” (§ 361 Z). And
after all, Hegel has said that sensations as such give the animal also a ‘theoreti-
cal’ relation to the world. This seems to accord with common sense:
certainly an animal can discern what it desires from what it does not desire
and certainly it has the ability to actively look for food among things that it
knows not to be food for it. And certainly many kinds of sensuous qualities
of the environment are relevant in this search. Thus an animal has to be
conscious also of other things than those that are the object of its need.
But how can then the following two claims be understood as compati-
ble:
1) the need constitutes the object for the animal and thus nothing else than
what satisfies the animals needs is not present to the animal; and
2) through its sense the animal ‘sensates’ ‘theoretically’ also other features
of the world than those directly satisfying its needs, and so is ‘looking for’
nourishment from a world that for it contains also features or things that it
does not desire?
Is Hegel simply contradicting himself, or is there a possible way out
with the means that his conceptual apparatus provides? I propose that the
way out is to be found from a passage that I have already referred – that is,
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doesn’t affect this general po int.
115 The prec ise details of the taxonomies implicit in the practical orientation of
different animals can of course only be imagined. The point is only, that any animal
needs some taxonomy.
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from § 456 of the ‘Psychology’ where Hegel discusses the subsumption of
singulars under universals as an activity directed by the “interest” of a
“concrete subjectivity”. According to the Zusatz to § 456 subsumation of
singulars under universals happens when the subject attends to common
features of what is given for it. It is this attention that is directed by inte-
rest. Now, desire for the needs for survival certainly provides an animal
with a strong interest for paying attention to those features of the world
that are relevant for satisfying its desire. On the most general level, an
animal has an immediate interest for discerning the very general classes of
‘satisfying’ and ‘non-satisfying’ objects from each other. Also, most living
animals have natural enemies and all of them have other dangers they have
to be able to discern from the environment. 
Sensory systems vary from species to species and thus the qualitative
features of the world to which animals are sensitive also varies . Yet all
animals have some sensations and therefore are open to different sensa-
tional qualities – that is, they have a ‘theoretical’ relation to the world.114
What ever the necessary psychological processes might be, animals ob-
viously are able to associate certain sensational features to the classes of the
desirable and non-desirable.115 And what ever are then the sensational
features that are most practical for discerning the eatable, noneatable,
dangerous etc. things from each other in a complex natural environment,
those features most probably are the features to which an animals attention
is mostly directed. And if the sensory system of an animal is complex
enough, it is able to use different sensuous qualities as information that
serves its purposes: a scarecrow on a strawberry-field that only has the shape
of a hawk may keep fieldfare out of the field for a while but probably not
for a very long time. If the scarecrow is also made to move and perhaps
even sound like a hawk, then the strawberries are more likely to be left alone
by the fieldfare. This shows that fieldfare ‘know’ hawks as something to be
avoided and having certain sensuous properties, neither of which alone is
a hawk. Hence, something in the fieldfare’s conceptual system (or the
logical (sub-)space of its actual intentionality) roughly corresponds to what
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116 ‘Roughly’, since the logical (sub-)spaces of the actual intentionality of a cultivated
homo sapiens and that o f the fieldfare are of course very different and hence the
meaning of any thing or class of things for them are very different too. Yet, both
humans and fieldfare l ive in  one and the same  world or logical space an d are
someth ing  l ike  a  hawk be longs to  the furniture of the sub-spaces o f actua l
intent ionality of bo th of them. 
117 But here  the question arises: doesn’t this mean that the fieldfare spontaneously judge
that something w ith only the shape of a haw k but with out othe r characteristic s of a
hawk is not d angerous? That is : a purely passive relation to the space of reasons,
without the capability for entertaining spontaneous think ing is clearly impossible. If we
adopt Hegel’s position according to which the spo ntaneous thinking of human s
operates with arbitrary signs, perhaps we should nevertheless leave open the possibility
that some form or level of spontaneous thinking is possible also without arbitrary signs
(supposing that animals do not have arbitrary signs). How far would this then lead in
the way of tak ing animals as members in  the space of reasons...?
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we call a hawk.116 And this something has for the fieldfare both certain
practical properties (such as ‘to be avoided’) and theoretical, sensuous
properties (certain shape, colour, way of moving, sound etc.). This ob-
viously means that the practical aspect of intentionality and the theoretical
have to form one whole in order for the animal to be able to orientate in
the world.
We might ask, what do animals – such as fieldfare – lack then in
relation to humans. It is hard to resist saying that the world as the inten-
tional correlate for fieldfare – as for all animal-subjects – is conceptually,
judgementally and inferentially structured. How else would they find what
they need and how else would they learn from experience (for example not
to avoid something that merely has the shape of a hawk)? And does some-
one want to deny that animals can make mistakes in their tokens of subsu-
mation? Surely the fieldfare are mistaken if they take a scarecrow as a hawk
and surely they correct the mistake when they learn that it isn’t.117
But are fieldfare conscious of anything else than what is immediately
relevant for their practical, desiring being in the world, things like worms,
strawberries, hawks and their sensuous properties? This leads back to what
I earlier called the actual and possible intentional correlates of conscious-
ness. My suggestion is that the more strongly attention is directed by
immediate concerns or ‘interests’ the more closed is the space of actual
intentional correlates. The fieldfare are actually conscious of the world as it
is structured by their desire-directed activity of representing. This however
does not in principle rule out the possibility that a strong enough new
motivation would turn attention to features of the world that so far were
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not explicitly known, and that hence new ways of organizing the given
would arise. This is an important point to bear in mind, when we try to
understand how is it possible for the singular self-consciousness1 to trans-
cend its singularity and arise onto the levels of what I will later call self-
consciousness2 and self-consciousness3.
Paul Redding has illustratively characterized the intentional correlates
of a singular desiring subjectivity as “object[s] that [...] merely [...] fill a
logical space constituted by the [desiring] self”118. In this logical space “an
object will only count in terms of its capacity to satisfy [...] hunger”119.
What is interesting and important in Redding’s formulations is, that he
emphasizes that the world-relat ion even of a purely singular desiring
subject is a logical space and that hence at least in some sense even a purely
singular desiring subject already is a member of what McDowell and
Brandom call the space of concepts or reasons. I would only like to make
a further specification to Redding’s idea. Namely, what Redding has in
mind is “a purely practical intentional subject”120. My point is that the
‘pureness’ of the practicality is never absolute in the case of real subjects.
The simple existence of senses gives an openness to also features of the
world that are not immediately relevant for the satisfaction of needs. It is
only that a limited range of interest (such as the mere satisfaction of desire)
limits attention to correspondingly limited range of features of the world
and hence limits the sphere of actual intentional correlates of consciousness.
In this sense, desire – as any practical interest – does not construct a self-
sufficient singular logical space, but only limits a sphere from the overall
logical space of the world as a sphere to which the ‘interested’ subject
mostly relates to. Desire does not constitute a closed world of its own, but,
as it were, illuminates the one and only world from a certain angle and with
a certain colouring. This is also compatible with conceptualizing understan-
ding as a ‘logical instinct’ (§ 459). Understanding as a capability for grasping
the logical structure of the world is ‘instinctual’ in the sense that it is closely
connected to the practical needs and interest of the understanding subject.
It seems that it is after all only a quantitative difference in the range of
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122 “Das abstrakte Selbstbewußtsein ist die erste Negation des Bewußtseins, daher auch
behaftet m it einem  äußerliche n Obje kt, formell m it negatio n seiner; es ist  somit
zugleich die vorhergehende Stufe, Bewußtsein, und ist der Widerspruch seiner als
Selbstbewußtseins und seiner als Bewußtseins.Indem lezte res und die Nega tion
überhaupt im Ich=Ich an sich sc hon aufg ehoben ist, so ist es a ls diese Gewißheit
seiner selbst g egen da s Objekt der Trieb, das zu setzen, was es an sich ist, -d.i. dem
abstrakten Wissen von sich Inhalt und Objektivität geben und umgekehrt sich von
seiner Sinnlichkeit zu b efreien, die gegeb ene Objektivität aufzuh eben und m it sich
identisch  zu setzen; b eides ist ein und dasselbe; – die Ident i f i zie rung se ines
Bewußtseins und Selbstbewußtseins.”
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interest and hence in the range of their actual understanding of the one and
only world that separates animals from humans.121
*  *  *  *  *
Now its time to return to the reading of Hegel’s ‘self-consciousness’-
chapter that I started in chapter 2 of this work. In paragraph 425 Hegel
goes on to characterize more closely the form of self-consciousness still
“without reality”(which he now calls ‘abstract self-consciousness’) that was
the topic of § 424. This is hence what I have named self-consciousness1.
Abstract self-consciousness is the first negation of consciousness, and for that
reason it is burdened with an external Objekt, formally with its own negation.
Thus it is at the same time the antecedent stage, consciousn ess, and it is the
contradiction of itself as self-consciousness and as consciousness. Since the latter
[i.e. consciousness] and the negation in general is in I = I implicitly sublated, it is
as this certitude of itself against the object the drive to realize what it is implicitly,
– that is, to give content and objectivity to the abstract knowledge of itself, and
in the other direction  to free itself from its sensuousness, to sublate the given
objectivity and posit it as identical with itself. Both are one an d the same, the
identif ication  of its consciousness and self-consciousness.122
What is striking here is that whereas in § 424 the ‘otherness’ of the
Gegenstand seems to have vanished (because the Gegenstand is nothing
else than what it is taken to be), in § 425 Hegel talks suddenly of some kind
of tension between self-consciousness and “an external Objekt” with
which “it is burdened”. Because of this tension self-consciousness is a
‘drive’ (Trieb) to become “what it is implicitly, that is, to give [...] objectivity
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he rejects, he does it by explicitly naming whom he is talking about. This does not of
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to the abstract knowledge of itself” and on the other hand “to sublate the
given objectivity and posit it as identical with itself”. This drive has as its
goal “the identification of consciousness and self-consciousness”. But
where comes this need for an activity to realize the identity of conscious-
ness and self-consciousness? Wasn’t consciousness as such already self-
consciousness according to § 424? Is Cramer perhaps after all right in
saying that in § 424 Hegel outlines a theory which he simply rejects? Then
§ 425 would be a formulation of another theory. No. Again I want to
emphasize that if this would turn out to be the case, it would be highly
unusual in the context of PSS where the whole point is to analyze real
moments or levels of a real individual subjectivity and not to discuss this
and that rival theory only to reject them.123 § 425 is continuation to the
discussion of § 424 and only adds further features to the preliminary
discussion of consciousness as self-consciousness in § 424.
Before explicating what I think the point involved to be, its important
to discuss one more candidate for a reading of the relation of § 424 and
§425. That is: what if Hegel is in § 424 formulating the goal which self-
consciousness in § 425 begins to strive for as drive? This reading would be
understandable in connection to the very broad meaning that ‘drive’ for
Hegel has. Namely, the purely animal drive discussed in the philosophy of
nature is only one and as such a very limited form of drive. In the Encyclo-
pedia logic Hegel speaks of the drives towards “the good” and “the true”
(§ 225). And again in § 443Z of the ‘Psychology’ Hegel characterizes ‘theore-
tical spirit’ (or the activity of theoretical spirit) as “drive for knowledge”
(Trieb des Wissens). In general, Hegel seems to call any goal-directed activity
‘drive’. Now, it could be proposed that the I=I of § 424 points to the end
of the whole philosophy of spirit as absolute knowledge which obviously in
some sense is knowledge of something that is not anymore ‘other’ to the
knowing of it. Hence it would be the absolute as subject-substance that is
referred to in § 424 – and the general activity of spirit to achieve this end
that is discussed in § 425. However, this reading is also a failure: it could
not explain what is the defect pointed at in the last sentence of § 424.124
Surely the absolute as the fulfillment of all the developmental levels of the
2. SINGULAR CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE WORLD
59
Realphilosophie is not for Hegel anything “abstract” and “without reality”.
Thus Hegel has to be sketching in § 424 a form that in some sense really is
I=I, that is consciousness as such as self-consciousness, but in another
sense is still defective.
My suggestion was and is, that the defect of self-consciousness as
analyzed in § 424 is precisely that it is only self-consciousness1 – a form of
singular or immediate consciousness for which the world is limited by its
singular way of ‘taking as’, a way that is still limited or directed by the given
range of the practical interests of the singular concrete living subject,
without consciousness of the fact that it is a particularly limited way of
‘taking as’. 
In § 425 Hegel then goes on to note that in fact the world is also
something else than what the singular desiring subject takes it to be. The
singular subject is familiar with the world still only to a very limited extent
and in this sense it is still “burdened with an external Objekt”. It is as if the
possible correlates of intentions were dimly looming in the periphery of the
singular subject’s actual intentions. As cultivated humans we are all aware
of this feature of our world-relation in our lives: I always have certain
focused and as such restricted ways of taking the world and again and again
I learn that the world is in fact more complicated and contains more
features than the ones I have been attentive so far. The more limited is the
range of my practical interests and the more limited accordingly is my grasp
of the rich texture of the world, the more is there to learn from the world.
Even if I thought to be absolutely familiar with the structure of the world
around me, it may turn out that the world in fact contains something
‘other’ than I thought, something ‘external’ to my so far actual intentions.
A singular and immediate subjectivity is in this sense implicitly “burdened”
with a lot of features of the world that it is not familiar with in its actual
intentions.
There are two points to note. First, the features that are “external” to
my actual intentions have to be implicitly present as possible intentional
correlates. This is just to say, that they have to be something which I can in
principle become conscious of if they somehow manage to catch my
attention. Secondly, since it is my interests that focuses my attention, then in
order for those features to catch my attention they have to be somehow
‘interesting’ to me. They have to be something relevant to my concerns as
a ‘concrete subjectivity’. Yet, at first sight it seems that in talking about the
drives for “truth” (§ 225) and “knowledge” (§ 443 Z) Hegel were simply
taking for granted that there is some metaphysical power behind individual
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subjects driving them to make what was previously unknown known (let’s
say, a mystical List der Vernunft) and that no further account was needed in
the individual level. This is way too simple. The account of the broadening
of the singular perspective in the ‘Self-consciousness’-chapter is a very
pragmatic one and is easily understandable without any extravagant me-
taphysical postulates. This account is the general epistemological point of
the chapters on ‘Desire’ and ‘Recognitive self-consciousness’ in the ‘Self-
consciousness’-subsection.
Let’s go then to § 426 which is the first paragraph of the chapter on
‘Desire’. The text of the paragraph goes:
Self-consciousness in its immediacy is a singular and desire, – the contradiction of
its abstraction which ought to be objec tive, or its immediacy which has the form
of an exte rnal objec t and ought to be sub jective. For the certitude of oneself ,
which has issued  from the sublation o f mere consciousne ss, the object is null;
and for the relation of self-consciousness to the object its abstract ideality is
equally determined as null.125
What is here striking is that whereas in § 424 the object was lost and in §
425 it returned as that with which the self-consciousness was “burdened”,
here again for the self-consciousness as ‘desire’ the object is determined as
“null”. First we have to understand what is the relation of ‘drive’ and
‘desire’. Hegel is not very openhanded in helping his readers on this issue.
The only explicit discussion on this relation that I know is to be found in
the Zusatz to § 473 where Hegel separates ’desire’ and ’drive’ by saying that
whereas desire is something “singular”and yearns only to be fulfilled by
something singular, that is, it looks only for “momentary satisfaction”;
drive on the other hand is oriented to “a series of satisfactions”. By drive
Hegel means here however only the ‘practical drive’ towards practical ends
and does not discuss the theoretical drive. Anyhow, the point seems to be
that desire is simply more limited as to the generality or range of its ‘ought’
than the practical drive. To be precise, desire is a very primitive form of
practical drive and in § 473Z Hegel simply compares desire as a very
limited form of practical drive to a form that is more extensive as to the
range of satisfactions to which it is directed.
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126 “(Z.B. nützlich, gefärhrlich; Schwere, Säure, – dann Trieb usf.)” Hegel is not much
more genero us in the Science of Logic:  “The fol lowing may therefore serve as
examples of judgements of reflection: man is mortal, things are perishable, this thing
is useful, harmful; hardness, elasticity of bodies, happiness, etc. are predicates of this
peculiar kind.” (SL, 643)
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The whole chapter on desire (§§ 426-429) now discusses this singular
practical world-relation from the point of view of how for it its object is
nothing other than what the desiring subject takes it to be. Thus whereas in
‘sensuous consciousness’ the object had sensuous properties, here it has
practical properties for the subject. Here we may take a look at a clue Hegel
gives in the chapter on judgements in the Encyclopedia logic (§§ 166-180)
that I already referred to in relation to ‘sensuous consciousness’. There
Hegel divides the forms of judgements into four types: 1) ‘the qualitative
judgement’ which means judging something under a sensory quality or
property; 2) ‘the judgement of reflection’ which means judging something
under a relational property; 3) ‘the judgement of necessity’ which means
judging something under a genus; and 4) ‘the judgement of concept’, that
is, judging something as to whether it corresponds to its concept, i.e.
whether it is true (Wahr) in the ontological sense.
Whereas the qualitative judgement is the form proper to ‘sensuous
consciousness’, the judgement of reflection is now of special interest in
relation to desire. Hegel is very frugal in giving examples of judgements of
reflection – only in passing and in brackets he gives the following: “(For
example useful, dangerous; weight, acidity; then drive and so on.)” (§
174).126 At first sight it is hard to understand what is ‘drive’ doing here
among examples of reflective, i.e. relational, judgements. Does Hegel say
that drive is a relational property of something or is he perhaps saying that
drive is somehow a relational judgement? I suggest that he is saying the latter.
The puzzling presence of drive among examples of judgements of reflecti-
on receives a bit more light when we read § 473 in the chapter ‘Drives and
willfullness’ (‘Triebe und Willkür’) in ‘Psychology’. There Hegel states that
“[t]he practical ought is a real judgement.” By ‘practical ought’ Hegel refers
here to the content of a practical drive, that is, to what ever it is that the
drive is directed to, what it is to actualize. It is of course generally true that
judgement (as well as concept and syllogism) for Hegel is not only a form
of thinking but also a form of being. Thus all things are judgementally
structured and so in principle anything is ‘a real judgement’. However, by
combining the characterization of ‘drive’ as a reflective judgement and the
characterization of the ‘ought’ as the content of a practical drive as ‘a real
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127 “Das Selbstbewußtsein weiß sich daher an sich im Gegenstand, der in  dieser
Beziehung dem Triebe gemäß ist.”
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judgement’ we come closer to answering in what specific sense drive is a
judgement. My proposal is that drive in general is judging or ‘taking’
something as on object of pursuit. 
Desire then as the primitive, purely singular form of practical drive is
the form (or aspect) of consciousness for which Gegenstände have only
properties such as ‘satisfying me’, ‘not satisfying me’ etc. Hence its actual
intentional correlates are purely, as it were, desire-centered. However, since
any object certainly is also something else than simply desirable, since the
desiring consciousness only takes its objects as what they are in relation to
the particularities of desire, there is a tension between the desiring subject
and the object. The object is, as it were, reduced to only what it is from the
“singular”perspective of desire, and as such it is, as Hegel puts it in § 427
“in accordance with the drive”: “Thus self-consciousness implicitly knows
itself in a Gegenstand, which in this relation is in accordance with the
drive”.127
It is then precisely this purely egocentric practical ‘taking as’ of objects
which determines objects as null, since it leaves, or more exactly tries not to
leave any say to what the objects would be in addition to what they are
from the desiring point of view. This is the deficiency of self-conscious-
ness1, which however already in the practical desiring relation to objectivity
is on the verge of transcending itself and arising onto the levels of what I
will later call self-consciousness2 and self-consciousness3.
If we now combine the ‘theoretical’ aspect of singular intentionality
analyzed in ‘Sensuous consciousness’ and the ‘practical’ aspect of
intentionality analyzed in ‘Desire’, we have a full picture of a the world of
a purely singular “concrete subjectivity” that according to § 456 subsumes
individuals under universals according to its interests. Here the ‘interest’ is
that of ‘desire’. This concrete living form of animal subjectivity has as its
actual intentional correlate an object-world that is subsumed under univer-
sals that are relevant for its survival. Now, even if all that counts for this
individual animal subjectivity in objects is their desirability for its imme-
diate needs for survival, the animal certainly has to able to be responsive
already to a quite complicated conceptual, judgemental and inferential
structures between the ends determined by its drive or desire, means of
achieving the ends, sensuous properties of objects that satisfy the desire
and those that do not satisfy it.
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128 The idea is simply this: the relation of an organism to its environment is normative
in the sense that something is good and something bad in the environment for the
organism. Moreover, any animal is up to some extent responsive to goodness and
badness and to some extent able to learn from mistakes. Hence this normativity is for
the animal. If one’s ontology does not allow for this way of thinking, then the ontology
may be good for something, but as I see it, no good for conceptualizing animal life. It
is for the empirical sciences to shed light into the differences between animals species
(cont inued...)
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We may now ask whether this kind of particularly determined system
of taking the world can be in some sense constrained by the world itself.
Can a purely individual or solipsist way of taking objects given in cons-
ciousness or intuition as something be responsible to what the objects
’really’ are? This is the question I made in connection to Brandom’s picture
of the desiring animal taking something as something. The answer was that
for sure the world itself in the end decides whether something represented
by the animal as food really is food. Now, although Hegel does not very
explicitly develop these questions in connection to desire, it seems obvious
that the answer implied by his position is also affirmative. Any desire-
oriented world-relation implies criteria of correctness for the reflective
judgements made by ’desire’ (or ’drive’). The representative or judgemental
of activity of desire has to be, and is, answerable to the world itself as to its
correctness. But this simply shows that the ’space of reasons’ extends all
the way to the world. Thus in one sense, already this very primitive form of
subjective spirit ’has no other’: the world as conceived from the purely
individual perspective of the desiring animal really is how the world is from
this perspective. And it is the world itself that in this perspective normatively
constrains any tokens of judgements. This is what Hegel means by what I
call self-consciousness1: in being conscious of something as something a
desiring subject is conscious of the world as structured by its own way of
representing the world. This specific way of representing the world howe-
ver really is (in successful cases) the way that the world, as it were, ’allows’
itself to be conceived. And not only is this normative constraint by the
world to tokens of judgement on this primitive level something revealed to
’us’, it is something to or for the desiring subject itself: if a token of rep-
resenting (=taking as, judging) something given in sensations as game for
me fails and it turns out that what I represented as game for me in fact is a
beast for which I am game, this failure becomes evident in a very efficient
way when the beast eats me up. The normative constraint in a purely ’ani-
mal’ representational activity is something given to or ’felt’ by the animal.128
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in their ab ilities to understand their own good and bad  and their capabilities for
learning from mistakes. These differences can be then understood as differences in the
conceptual sub-spaces of the animal-species in question. (See also Redding 1996, 104-
110.)
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This means that although Hespe is literally right in saying that the
intentions of a purely singular subject cannot be ‘wahrheitsfähig’, they
however can be ‘correct’ (Richtig) or false in the ordinary correspondence-
sense. ‘Truth’ in the strong ontological sense for Hegel points to essences
of things, of which the purely singular subject is not yet conscious since it
is only conscious of what things are from its limited desiring perspective.
In order to be explicitly related to the ‘truth of things’ the singular perspec-
tive has to go through a radical relativization, that is, it has to mediated by
other perspectives. This is something discussed by Hegel in the chapter
‘Recognitive self-consciousness’. Before going into this theme (in my
chapter 4), I will however take up the question of the difference between
‘Gegenstände’ and ‘Objekte’ that I already referred to in my chapter 1.
129 In the Introduction to PS Hegel only uses the word ‘Gegenstand’ but since, as far
as I see, this word-usage does no systematical work in PS I use here  the word ‘object’.
130 “Es ist in ihm [i.e. Bewußtsein] eine s für ein anderes, oder es hat überhaupt die
Bestimmtheitdes Moments des Wissens an ihm; zugleich ist ihm dies Andere nicht nur
für es, sondern auch außer dieser Beziehung oder an sich ; das Moment d er Wahrheit .”
(PdG, p. 77)
131 See also Düsing 1986, p. 333.
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3. ‘Objekt’ versus ‘Gegenstand’
The relation of ‘objects’ and ‘Gegenstände’ has in fact a certain analogy to
how Hegel in the introduction to the Jena Phenomenology of Spir it (PS)
characterizes the doubled relation of consciousness (or the forms of cons-
ciousness) analyzed in PS to its Gegenstand. On the one hand the object129
is for consciousness “for it” and on the other hand something “in itself”.130
This twofoldedness of the object is essential for Hegel’s Darstellung in PS:
every incomplete form of consciousness will be sublated when it turns out
that what consciousness took as the Gegenstand ‘in itself’, was in fact only
what it is ‘for consciousness’. This drama recurs over and over again in
many different guises during the “road of despair” of PS. Is then somet-
hing like this perhaps also going on in PSS? No and yes. 
No, because the function of PSS is completely different than that of
PS. There are long and winding discussions about the function that Hegel
originally thought PS to have, about how Hegel’s original idea in fact is
realized in the book and about what really is the relation of PS to what
turned out to be Hegel’s encyclopedic system. The details can be ignored
here. At all events, whereas Hegel wrote (or at least originally intended to
write) PS as an introduction to his system that was to show all alternative
(everyday and philosophical) standpoints as imperfect on their own, but
however containing partial truths of the true standpoint – PSS is not
anything like an introduction to the system but is part of the system
itself.131 This difference also holds for what ever is to be said of the relation
of PS and the section ‘Phenomenology of Spirit; Consciousness’ in PSS.
Whereas in PS ‘consciousness’ or ‘natural consciousness’ analyzed in the
introduction of PS is a methodological tool (which Hegel uses in order lead
his readers to the standpoint of logic), the relation of which to real living
forms of consciousnesses is more or less indirect, in PSS Hegel analyzes
consciousness as a moment of real individual subjects. Thus nothing – or
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132 “Das theoret ische Verhalten b eginnt mit der Hem mung der Begierde, is t
uneigennützig, läßt die Dinge gew ähren und besteh en; mit dieser Stellung haben w ir
sogleich zwei, Objekt und Subjekt, und die Trennung be ider festgesetzt, ein Diesseits
und ein  Jenseits.”
133 See 2.1.
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as I will shortly say, almost nothing – like the procedure of showing the ‘in
itself’ of various ‘forms of consciousness’ to be only ‘for consciousness’ is
happening in PSS. This has the consequence that although attempts to try
to understand PSS by reading passages from PS may sometimes be helpful,
they can be also totally misleading.
Yes, because in fact something like a transition through the revelation
that ‘an sich’ is in fact only ‘for consciousness’ happens in the course of the
‘Phenomenology’ of PSS twice. I’m emphasizing the ‘something like’ since
even this one case is in many ways different from the transitions of PS.
Namely, unlike in PS, in PSS Hegel is not doing anything like showing the
inadequacy of different ‘forms of consciousness’ and leading his reader
through more and more developed ones to the level of the logic. Yet
Hegel’s usage of ‘Gegenstand’ and ‘Object’ points to a somewhat similar
distinction than that between the ‘for consciousness’ and ‘in itself’ in PS.
We may use as a clue here what Hegel says in Zusatz to § 246 of his phi-
losophy of nature. There Hegel discusses the theoretical attitude of natural
sciences as presupposing suppression of desiring relation to objects.132 Accor-
ding to Hegel it is this suppression of desire that actually establishes a firm
difference between subject and Objekt, and as such establishes ‘objectivity’.
The context of this remark is of course very different from the
‘Phenomenology’-section of PSS, but nevertheless it articulates something
that is implicitly present in Hegel’s usage of ‘Gegenstand’ and ‘Object’ in
the ‘Phenomenology’ of PSS. Although Hegel nowhere explicates the
difference, it is clear that ‘we’- that is Hegel and his readers – know that the
Gegenstand the singular consciousness has as its actual intentional correlate
is not yet ‘Objekt’ in the full sense of the word. However, for the cons-
ciousness itself under analysis there is not yet such distinction on the
singular level. This can be seen in both the ‘Consciousness as such’ and the
‘Self-consciousness’-subsections. 
I will first take a look at ‘Consciousness as such’. According to § 418
consciousness as ‘sensuous consciousness’ is a relation to a Gegenstand.133
Yet the logical determinations as the determinations of this Gegenstand are
for sensuous consciousness “determinations of the Objekt”. Here we are
aware that what sensuous consciousness is explicitly conscious of is really
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134 In his lectures on phenomeno logy from 1825 Hegel discusses different meanings of
‘Objektivität’, one of which is objective validity: “Die Objektivität hat aber auch
drittens den Sinn der Al lgemeinheit  des subjektiven des Bewußtseins. Ich bin einzeln,
es sind viele solche Einze ln und Objektivität ist dann die Allgemeinheit diesen Vielen.
Nach diesem sinn ist das was Gegenstand ist für mich als für diesen Besonderen, auch
Gegensta nd für die An deren.” (Petry III, s. 290) Here ‘Objektivität’ is taking a
Gegenstand as anyone takes it. Although Hegel does not say it here, we can add that in
this case co nsciousne ss is explicitly related to an ‘Objekt’  and not to a mere
‘Gegenstand’. See also § 41 Zusatz 2 in the Encyc lopedia logic. I am not claiming that
Hegel’s use of ‘Gegenstand’ and ‘Objekt’ would accord with m y interpretation
throughout the Encyclopedia but only that in ‘Phenomenology’ this difference seems
to carry the kind of systematical weight I’m suggesting. More work has to be done on
this topic.
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only a Gegenstand – that it is something constituted in the process of
representing of the singular, yet unmediated subjectivity – and thus we can
say that what we know to be an Objekt, is still for the sensuous conscious
a mere Gegenstand. It is first in ‘Perception’ and truly on the level of
‘Understanding’ where the given for consciousness truly has become
“Objekt” for the subject under consideration (§ 421). The level of Percepti-
on then is according to Hegel that of “our everyday consciousness and
more or less of the sciences” (§ 420). On this level consciousness is thus
related to objects not simply from its singular point of view, but (also)
from the point of view of what they are for others. Objekt is thus here to
be understood in connection with ‘objectivity’ as ‘objective validity’
(allgemeingültigkeit).134
This same structure is visible also in ‘Self-consciousness’. In § 424
where Hegel analyzes the singular consciousness as self-consciousness (i.e.
self-consciousness1) he uses ‘Gegenstand’ as the word for the intentional
correlate of this singular consciousness. Then in § 425 consciousness is
again “burdened” with something “external”. This something Hegel names
‘Objekt’. Thus ‘Objekt’ here is something more than the mere
‘Gegenstand’ (within which consciousness is implicitly related to itself) as
determined by its singular way of taking it. However consciousness is the
‘drive’ against the ‘Objekt’, that is, the drive to reduce the Object to a mere
Gegenstand. Here ‘drive’ obviously means something more general than
the mere desire for objects – it is a drive to overcome any resistance from
outside against the general desire-oriented intentionality. However, the
immediate form on consciousness as self-consciousness as ‘desire’ does not
yet contain anything that would make it explicitly aware of the lack of
objectivity of its Gegenstand. Although we know already in § 426 that the
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135 We could understand the difference between ‘Gegenstand’ and ‘Objekt’ in the
following way: what is given for consciousness is always for it Gegenstand. But because
we look at this relation from outside we know that it is Objekt. When th e subject is
able to see  its relation to  its Gegen stand as we do, it also kno ws it to be  Objekt. I n
becoming habituated to intend Gegenstände as something that are not only what they
are from a given point of view, or according to a given way of co nceptualizing, its
Gegenstände become Objekte also for it, and cease to be ‘mere Gegenstände’.
(However, since much of the conten t of our intention ality is nece ssarily more or less
idiosyncratically colored not all Gegenstände can become Objekte . See 5.)
136 § 429: “[...] eines freien Objekt s [...]”. § 430: “[...] als Ich absolut geg en mich
selbständiges anderes Objekt.”
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singular consciousness as self-consciousness is in fact living in a world that
is not reducible to the singular and as such particular desire-oriented way of
taking the world, in the point of view of singular consciousness as desire
the Objekt is still “determined as null”. This is of course a truth that is not
present for the desiring consciousness itself. It implicitly knows of itself
within a Gegenstand (§ 427). ‘Implicitly’ (“an sich”), first of all because on
this level consciousness does not yet know that it knows its world only as
determined by its singular point of view, and hence that it knows within it
‘of itself’. That is, because it does not know that its explicit other is a mere
Gegenstand and not yet an ‘objective Objekt’. Thus: “Das gegebene Ob-
jekt wird hierin ebenso subjektiv gesetzt” (§ 427). Secondly, because it is
not yet self-consciousness for itself, that is, it is not aware in any sense of
the implicitly reflective structure of its world-relation.135
Where does then the singular consciousness as self-consciousness
explicitly encounter something that makes it conscious of the discrepancy
of its Gegenstand and the objective Objekt? Not within its desire-oriented
activity in the midst of Gegenstände that satisfies its desire – and not even
in relation to otherness that does not satisfy it, since all these still receive
their meaning only in relation to the demands of desire. Something that is
not desirable, does not as such contain anything that would ‘awake’ the
desiring subject from its overall desire-orientation, it merely is for the
desiring subject nothing other than the ‘not desirable’. It is not until the
subject encounters something that as such resists the whole project of
desire-orientation, something that cannot be simply subsumed neither
under the universal of the desirable, nor under that of the not desirable
(nor under any other merely ‘reflective’ predicate). This strange other is
another subject or ‘I’ as “a free Objekt” (§ 429), an “absolutely indepen-
dent other Objekt against me” (§ 430).136 The other I that is first encounte-
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red as something which resists the general approach of desiring subject to
its environment, is thus an Objekt which, as it were, is interesting enough
to direct the ‘attention’ (until now directed by desire) to features that do
not fit into the logical structure of the singular subject’s so far actual
intentions. In the end, this “absolutely independent other object” will also
mediate the subjects explicit relation to the world as a whole. This happens
by first ascending onto the level of an intersubjectively mediated, but still
particular level of consciousness as self-consciousness (which I will call
self-consciousness2) and after that by ascending onto the universal level of
consciousness as “universal self-consciousness” (which I will call self-
consciousness3). These ascending steps are where recognition comes into the
picture.
137 On the theme of recognition in Hegel’s work see Siep 1979.
138 “Dies allgemeine Wiedererscheinen des Selbstbewußtseins, der Begriff, der sich in
seiner Objektivität als mit sich identische Subjektivität und darum allgemein weiß, ist
die Form des Bewußtse ins der Substanz jeder wesentlichen Geistigkeit, der Familie, des
Vaterlandes, des Staats, sowie aller Tugenden, der Liebe, Freundschaft, Tapferkeit, der
Ehre, des Ruhms.”
139  M.J. Petry emphasizes, I believe correctly, that Hegel’s references to social  history
in the ‘Recognition’-chapter are to be understood only as didac tic illustration of the
(cont inued...)
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4. Desire and recognition
The theme of recognition (Anerkennung) is certainly the locus classicus in
Hegel-reception. One has only to mention the names of Marx, Lukács,
Kojève, Sartre, Habermas etc. to remind of the huge importance this theme
has had in post-hegelian philosophy and social thinking.137 What has
however not received that much attention is that for Hegel recognition is
not only a social philosophical concept, but has also an epistemological
meaning. Yet, it would be inaccurate to say that this epistemological mea-
ning of recognition is separate from the social philosophical one. In the
Encyclopedia PSS recognition obviously plays a cental role for everything
Hegel will say later in his philosophy of objective spirit. Writers like Haber-
mas and Honneth seem to be dissatisfied for the fact that the concept of
recognition does not appear in the Encyclopedia philosophy of objective
spirit (nor in the more extensive Philosophy of Right) in those explicit
forms it did in Hegel’s philosophies of spirit in the Jena period. However,
since recognition obviously is the presupposition for what Hegel calls the
‘universal self-consciousness’, its function in the philosophy of spirit as a
whole should not be underestimated. Namely, ‘universal self-conscious-
ness’, which originates in recognition, is according to Hegel “the substance
of all essential spirituality, the family, the native country, the state, as well as
all virtues, – of love, friendship, courage, honour and fame” (§ 436).138 
Yet, it is certainly true that the chapter on recognition in PSS is rather
compact and its function in the book is far from self-evident. In general I
believe that in order to understand its importance we have to read it in a
broadly speaking epistemological sense. In fact, that Hegel in PSS explicitly
discusses recognition in connection to a rather limited sphere of examples
of social phenomena, may even hide from view what recognition is all
about.139 I will in the following read the chapter on ‘recognitive self-
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139 (...continued)
theme (see P etry III, pp. 377-379, note 69, 32).  As far as I can see, there is no
principled reason w hy Hegel  could not have as well i l lustrated the theme of
recognition with examples of early childhood experiences of a person . In his explicit
discussion of human chi ldhood and youth in  § 396 Z the the mes of desire and
recognition are clearly visible. In the 20'th century the theme of recognition has in fact
had strong resonances in developmental psychological theories (f.ex. of G.H.Mead,
Donald Winnicott,  Jessica Benjamin) (see Honn eth 1995, pp. 71-107 ). Here I wil l
however follow Hegel’s text as it stands.
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consciousness’ in relation to what I have so far said about the singular level
of intentionality of self-consciousness1. 
In general terms, in recognition intentionality goes through a process
of broadening, so that whereas the singular self-consciousness1 has as its
actual intentional correlates only Gegenstände that are known only from
the viewpoint of their function in the logical space limited by desire, after
recognition consciousness is consciousness of reality from the point of
view that has transcended singularity. On this cultivated level the actual
intentional correlates of consciousness are ‘taken as’ what they are from a
social (or ideally absolute) perspective. An example: for a singular desiring
animal objects are only that what is their meaning in relation to the satisfac-
tion of the animal’s desires; on the other hand for a social animal objects
are what they are for the survival of the whole community of which it is a
member. Yet there is no absolute necessity for a desiring animal not to
‘take’ its other also from a point of view that is irrelevant to its desire-
orientation, and also no absolute necessity for a social animal not to take its
other also from a point of view that is irrelevant for the community, but
since it is ‘interest’ that directs the explicit intentionality and limits the
logical space of actual intentionality, a new interest would be needed to
redirect the attention to previously uninteresting features of the world.
But what is then the interest that directs the attention of a singular
desiring subject to what the objects are for others – what motivates us to
actually see objects from a point of view of what they are for anyone, or at
least for our community? An obvious answer on the tip of the tongue is
“language”. After all, in learning language we learn conceptual schemes that
as such are ‘viewpoint-neutral’ – or at least not specific to any one singular
subject. However, simply referring to language is not a sufficient answer at
least in Hegel’s terms, first of all since language only articulates in ‘linguistic
form’ logical structures that in themselves are in no way merely linguistic,
secondly because language presupposes the subjective capacities for gras-
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140 “Es ist ein Selbstbewußtsein für ein anderes Selbstbewußtsein  zunächst unmittelbar
als ein Anderes für ein Anderes. Ich schaue in ihm als Ich m ich selbst an, aber auch
darin ein unmittelbar daseiendes, als Ich absolut gegen  mich selb ständiges anderes
Objekt. Das Aufheben der Einzelheit des Selbstbewußtseins w ar das erste Aufheben; es
ist damit nur als ein besonderes bestimmt. -Diese r Wiederspruch  gibt den Trieb , sich als
freies Selbst zu zeigen und für den  Anderen  als solches da zu sein, -den Prozes des
Anerkennens.”
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ping the logical structures of the world, and thirdly because, as Hegel puts
it, “nothing is brought about without an interest” (§ 475). There would be
no linguistic animals if language had no practical point – there has to be
some interest or motivation for using language in the first place, since
language itself is nothing like an ‘interest’. In contrast to the in the 20'th
century enormously popular way of reducing epistemological and ontologi-
cal questions to linguistic questions, Hegel construes a picture of the birth
of social intentionality that is both faithful to his strong epistemological
and ontological realism, and yet offers simple pragmatic or ‘naturalistic’
way to understand how there can be the kind of subjects that his realism
requires.
To show this, I will go on with the reading of Hegel’s text in the ‘Self-
consciousness’-subsection. Now, the singular desiring subject had as its
actual intentional correlates Gegenstände which did not contain anything
that would have turned attention to any features other than those relevant
for satisfying the desire. Hence self-consciousness1 “implicitly [knew] itself
in a Gegenstand which in this relation [was] in accordance with the drive”
(§ 427). But in § 429 there appears “a free Objekt” which does not anymo-
re ‘fit in’ the desire-oriented worldview. The confrontation with this free
Objekt Hegel goes on to elaborate in § 430 which is the first paragraph in
the chapter ‘Recognitive self-consciousness’. The text of § 430 goes:
One self-consciousness is for another self-consciousness, at first immedia tely as
one other for another. I intuit in him [in ihm] myse lf, but also in him [darin ] an
immediate determinate being, as an I absolutely independent Objekt against me.
The sublation of singularity was the first sublation, through which self -consc ious-
ness is only  determined as part icular. -This contradiction produces the drive to
display oneself as a free self and to b e as such fo r the oth er, -the pro cess of
recognition.140
According to the first sentence an “abstract” (§ 425) or “singular” (§ 426)
and “immediate” (§ 430) desiring self-consciousnesses is confronted with
another similar self-consciousness. The second sentence is more difficult.
What does Hegel mean by saying that I “intuit in him [both] myself” and
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141 Nutriment, a piece of meat that I desire; someone or -thing possessing nutriments
that I desire etc. 
142 Although the order of expo sition in the PSS do es not fol low any  real tempo ral
sequences, and also here the order of exposition is not in any simple sense an empirical
one, yet reading a temporal succession into the ‘Recognitive self-c onsciou sness’-
chapter is not totally out of place. This Hegel himself makes clear by using the struggle
and the relation of mastery and servitude as empirical illustration  of the structu re of
recognition. Developm ental psycholo gy would provide oth er illustrative material
where the lo gical structures clearly ‘develop themselves’  in  time. Edith Düsing
emphasizes the difference between the exhibitions of the structure of recognition in
t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  s e c t i o n s  o f  P S  a n d  P S S .  A cc o r d i n g  t o  h e r :  “ D i e
Gedankenentwicklung  de r  f rüheren  Phänomeno log i e  war  fund ie r t  in  der
Erfahrungsabfolge des Bewußtsein s [...]” whereas in  PSS Hegel’s expo sition follows
only “Bestimmungen der spekulativen Begriffslogik” and p roceeds according  to the
(cont inued...)
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also “an immediate determinate being, [which] as an I [is an] absolutely
independent Objekt”? 
First proposal: “I intuit in him myself” means that I intuit the other as
similar to myself, as another immediate I. But this does not work, since the
second part of the sentence would then say more or less the same thing.
The fact that the first and second part of the sentence are separated by
“but also” means that they do not say the same thing.
Second proposal: “I intuit in him myself” recapitulates the structure of
self-consciousness1 that Hegel took up in § 424. That is, I intuit (or am
conscious of) the other from the point of view of my ‘self-centered’ desire-
oriented way of ‘taking’ or subsuming things. The other is to me what he is
in the light of my limited actual intentions.141 “Intuiting” points here to the
general process of representing I have discussed earlier, the process which
as the particularly directed way of subsuming constitutes the actual correla-
tes of consciousness for the subject. Thus the other is my ‘intuition’(or
more generally ‘my representation’ (§ 424)) and therefore I implicitly intuit in
him myself. Or more exactly, I try to intuit in him implicitly myself, that is,
I try to reduce him into the logical space of my desire-oriented intentionali-
ty. This interpretation works well in the light of the previous paragraphs
and also makes understandable why this first part of the sentence is separa-
ted from the latter by “but also”.
Namely, the point of the second part of the second sentence (“but also
in him an immediate determinate being, as an I absolutely independent
Objekt against me”) is that the attempt to intuit the other according to my
desire-oriented conceptual system faces for the first time142 resistance from
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“begriffslogische Bestimmungen” of singularity, particularity and universality (Düsing
1986, p . 336). 
I agree with Düsing what comes to the differences of the overall structures of PS
and PSS. PSS does not generally follow any “Erfahrungsabfo lge” as PS does, and not
taking this into account can lead to serious confusion  in reading PSS. How ever the the
difference should not be exaggerated either. First of all because the relation of the
‘Erfahrungsabfolge’ of PS to real history is, to say the least, indirect, and there are long
discussions of the  function of Hegel’s logic also in ordering the exposition of PS. In
fact in the intro duction o f PS Hegel says explicitly that the whole series of ‘forms of
consciousnesses’  is  someth ing l ike an ‘Erf ahrungsabfolge ’  only ‘ for us’  the
phi losopher s  and  no t  to  the  methodo log i ca l  abs t rac t ion  tha t  Hege l  c al ls
‘consciousness’. The wh ole series of fo rms of con sciousness in P S is ordere d
according to criteria which do not exist for ‘consciousness’(See PdG, pp. 79-80 (PS, §
87): “In jener Ansicht aber zeigt sich de r neue Gegenstand als geworden, durch eine
Umkehrung d es Bewußtseins selbst. Diese B etrachtung der Sach e ist unsere Zutat,
wodurch  sich die Re ihe der Erf ahrungen  des Bewußtse ins zum wissenschaftlichen
Gange erhebt und welche nicht für das Bewußtsein ist, das wir betrachten. [...] E s
kommt dadurch in seine Bewegung ein Moment des Ansich- oder Fürunsseins,
welches nich t für das Bewußtsein, das in de r Erfahrung begriffen  ist, sich darstellt;
[...]” Hence, at least it is not self-evident that what Hegel means by ‘experience’ in PS
would be in the end anything else than applied logic.
On the other hand (whatever in the end is the truth about the relation  of logic
and phenomenological experience in PS) as I  said in 2.3 ., something very similar to the
transitions from one form of consciousness to another in PS seems to take place in the
PSS twice ,  name ly  f i r s t  i n  the  t rans i tion  f rom the  singu lar sub jec tiv i ty  to  a
‘particularistic’ level of subjectivity me diated by  an othe r subject (‘Co nsciousne ss as
such’ and ‘Self -consciousness’-subsections are then two aspects of this one transition)
and secondly in the transition from this particularistic level to a universal level (that i s,
to ‘Understanding’ and ‘Universal self-consciousness’). Although the chap ter on
recognition is in PSS much more compact than in PS, seeing something like an
experience of consciousness happening in the version of PSS is at least not much more
problematical than seeing it in the version of PS.
This reading does not contradict with the obvious fact that Hegel is in PSS
analyzing internally related moments  of real individual subjectivity (see § 380), since in
the case of a fully cultivated subject these developmenta l steps or levels are contained as
moments . As I see it, this does not imply modularism if we allow that cultivation as the
appearance of the higher levels changes also the lower ones as moments of the whole.
(I am grateful to Christoph H albig and Michael Quante for pressing me on th e
question of the relation of structural analysis and developmental account in PSS.
Clearly  more work on this issue is st ill needed.)
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the world. Whereas so far the intentional correlates of the desiring singular
subject have been mediated by the desire-oriented ‘taking’ to such an
extent that their otherness can be said to have been determined as ‘null’,
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143 “Er ist ein Kampf; denn ich kann mich im Anderen nicht als mich selbst wissen,
insofern das Andere ein unmittelbares anderes Dasein für mich ist; ich bin daher auf
die Aufhebung dieser seiner Unmittelbarkeit gerichtet. Ebensosehr kann ich nicht als
Unmittelbares anerkannt werden, sondern nur insofern ich an m ir selbst  die
Unmittelbarkeit  aufhebe und dadurch meiner Freiheit Dasein gebe. Aber diese
Unmittelbarkeit ist zugleich die Leiblichkeit des Selbstbewußtseins, in welcher es als in
seinem Z eichen und We rkzeug sein e igenes Selbstgefühl sowie sein Sein für andere und
seine es mit ihnen vermittlende Beziehung hat.”
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now self-consciousness is in a situation where it has an object that simply
is not graspable within the logical space of desire. It is in this sense that the
other self-consciousness is a “free Objekt” and not a mere Gegenstand.
Yet, because the actual intentionality of self-consciousness1 still is limited
by the logical space constituted by the desire-orientation, it tries to accom-
modate the other self-consciousness in the space of its mere Gegenstände.
This is the drive that Hegel mentioned in § 425. Hence there is a “contra-
diction” and the attempt to hold on to desire-orientation is a “drive” to
overcome the contradiction by mediating the other and remaining non-
mediated by the other self-consciousness – which on its behalf has a similar
drive. Thus two self-consciousnesses1 try to reduce the otherness or ‘free-
dom’ of each other and hence remain effortlessly or ‘abstractly free’ (§ 424)
from mediation by the other. This is an abstract form of ‘recognition’
which both try to obtain on this primitive level. However, already here
Hegel makes an allusion to “a drive to display” (zeigen), that points to the
inevitable necessity of mutual mediation for recognition. The content of
this drive is already more developed than that of the drive mentioned in §
425. The point will become clearer in the following paragraphs.
In § 431 Hegel goes on to elaborate the conflict presented in § 430. The
text goes:
There is a struggle; for I cannot know myself as myself in another insofar as the
other is an immediate other determinate being for me; I am therefore oriented to
the sublation of this its immediacy. Equally I cannot be recognized as immediate,
but only insofar as I sublate the immediacy in myself and give determinate being
for my freedom. Yet, this immediacy is at the same time the corporeity of self-
consciousness, within which it has as in its signs and tools its self-feeling as well as
its being for others, and its mediating relation with them.143
The first sentence containing two sub-sentences restates what Hegel has
already said in § 430: the singular intentionality of self-consciousness1 fails
when confronted with another self-consciousness which does not ‘fit’ the
logical space of desire. Whereas Gegenstände are Gegenstände precisely by
being mediated by the ego-centric representative activity of the singular
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144 Yet, it is not ‘frictionless’ in the sense of the coherentist picture of the “fric tionless
spinning in a void” (see McDowell 1996, p. 14) since the desiring way of ‘taking’ the
world as eatable, not-eatable, enemy etc. is firmly in contact w ith what objec ts really
are or turn  out to be (in th is case ‘eatable’). The logical space of desire extends all the
way to the world, even when it is not constrained from ‘outside’, that is, by other
subjects as Objekte that do not fit into it.
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and yet un-mediated subjectivity, the other self-consciousness is an “inde-
pendent Objekt” (§ 430) by not yielding to this mediation. The other self-
consciousness simply shows completely ‘other’ features than those that fit
the logical space of desire. Therefore the desiring subject cannot “intuit
itself” (§ 430) in it.
Of course the fact that the singular consciousness has been self-
consciousness so far in the way I have described earlier, is known only by
us, since consciousness is yet far too undeveloped as to be aware of the
‘ego-centric’ nature of its representations (see § 424 Z), that is, of the fact
that it intuits the world as its own ‘interest’ determines and in this sense is
implicitly ‘self-consciousness’. So also the incapability of the I to know
itself in the other, which Hegel explicates here, is an adequate formulation
only of what we know to be the case: the singular I does not “know itself”
(§ 424) (or “know myself” (§ 431)) in the other. Yet, even if the true nature
of the contradiction is not known by the singular self-consciousness the
contradiction as such is present for it.
The second and third sentence point to something that will become
more explicit only after an attempt to ‘totally mediate’ the other, to force it
to fit among objects that are graspable according to the conceptual structu-
res of desiring intentionality, has been considered. The primitive and ‘total’
way to mediate the other is to kill it/him. The desiring subject wants to eat
something and if its strong enough it kills whatever tries to stop it. Or
perhaps what the desiring subject wants to eat is the other subject. Also in
this case the desiring subject, if it is strong enough, kills the other – and
then eats it. The object has been absolutely mediated, the mediating subject
remained immediate, and the logical space of desire remains frictionless.144
This possibility Hegel briefly considers in § 432.
Now, a less primitive way to mediate the other within the space of
desire is to enslave him. From the point of view of satisfying desire, it has
the advantage of being more enduring. If I eat the other I will be hungry
again after a while, but if I manage to enslave the other, to force the other
to take care of my future satisfaction (i.e. to hunt for me etc.) then the
better for me. However, in this case I have to be able to pose a threat of
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145 “Der Kampf des Anerkennens g eht also au f Leben  und Tod ; jedes der beiden
Selbstbewußtsein bringt das Leben des anderen in Gefahr und begibt sich selbst darein,
aber nur als in Gefahr, denn eben so ist jedes auf die Erhaltung seines Lebens als des
Daseins seiner Freiheit gerichtet. Der Tod des einen, der den Widerspruch nach einer
Seite auflöst, durch die abstrakte, daher rohe Negation  der Unmittelbarkeit, ist so nach
der we sentlich en Sei te, dem  Dasein  des Anerkennens, welche s darin zugleich
aufgehoben wird, ein  neuer W iderspruch, und de r höhere als der erste.”
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death to the other, that is act in a way that only ‘signifies’ death of the
other. I have to be able to somehow “display” (zeigen) (§ 430) that I will
kill the other if he does not submit to me, and this ‘displaying’ or signifying
presupposes that I and the other are in a shared space of meaning. Only a
continued activity of ‘signifying’ the threat of death to my slave will prevent
his attempt to subsume me again in his logical space of singular desire. In
this symbolic activity I have however already sublated pure immediacy in
myself, i.e. mediated myself through the common space of communicative
meaning. Thus the “drive to display” mentioned in § 430 is a much more
developed activity than the simple drive to reduce the other to my singular
logical space: it involves symbolic interaction.
The text of § 432 goes:
The struggle for recognition is hence that of life and death; both of the self-
consciousnesses endangers the life of the other and of oneself. Yet, only endangers ,
for each is equally committed to the preservation of its life as the determinate
being of its freedom. The death of the other which solves the contradiction from
one side through  the abstract and therefore crude negation of im mediacy , is
from the essential side of the de terminate b eing of re cognition – that hereby is
also sublated – a new contradiction, and higher than  the first.145
Thus there is one the one hand a ‘drive’ to mediate the other, but on the
other hand a motivation to stay alive. If either one of the combatants die,
then the contradiction presented in § 430 has been solved from the point
of view of the one who won the fight. Now, if we presuppose that the
combatants are fully aware of the logical implications of the death of the
other, that is, of the fact that a dead other cannot produce ‘recognition’ in
the true Hegelian sense, which we as post-hegelian philosophers are all
more or less familiar with, then obviously the combatants know that the
death of the other does not produce true recognition. But because these
primitive combatants certainly have not read any Hegel or post-hegelian
philosophy, they are not aware of the fact that in the death of the other
true ‘recognition’ “is also sublated” (§ 432). This means, that if both of the
combatants happen to stay alive, it is not because both deliberately tried not
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146 Perhaps it presupposes a capacity for representing possible future states of affairs
and their log ical re lations to present  actions.
147 I emphasize again that these considerations should not however cover up the fact
that the imagery of fighting, surrendering, and enslaving serves only an  illustrative
purpose. If the structure of recogn ition would be illustrated with ea rly childhood
experiences of humans in societies, then a different set of considerations would be
appropriate. Even there it would be still important to distinguish the logical course of
the stages o f the recognitive p rocess from the natural motivations without which no
reciprocal recognition would ever really happen.
148 The presentation of ‘recognitive self-consciousness’ is so compact that Hegel goes
straight after d iscussing the fight to a situation of a lord and a servant (Knecht) even if
slavery would be more adequate characterization of the situation that is a result of
surrender in a fight. In his 1825 lectures on phenomenology Hegel in fact discusses the
(cont inued...)
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to kill the other and only to endanger the life of the other, but rather only
because the weaker surrendered when it was faced with the threat of death.
The ability for, not only knowing when one is in danger of dying, but
even finding the complicated way of staying alive by surrendering to the
other could be thought to be quite amazing since it presupposes capacities
of orienting in a fairly complicated space of logical possibilities and impli-
cations.146 It also presupposes the capacity of “displaying” somehow that
one has surrendered. Thus, even if the understanding of the subjects under
consideration here is certainly not developed enough to understand all the
intricacies and implications of the structure explicated by Hegel, it is
developed enough to enable surrendering and the state that follows the-
reafter. But this is what Hegel says: understanding is ‘instinctual’ and all
that is presupposed from the subjects under consideration here is a developed
enough instinctual understanding. 
My point is only, that the process Hegel is describing should not be
understood as presupposing some kind of inner teleology that makes the
primitive subjectivities to yearn for the fulfilled state of mutual recognition
in developed societies. There is no mystical ‘logical force’ independent of
the natural interests of desiring subjects behind the development of subjec-
tivity from the singular desiring level to an intersubjectively mediated level.
‘Natural’ motives and interests and instinctual understanding are enough to
drive the development that in the end will produce fully socialized
subjectivities and hence unfold the true logical structure of mutual recogni-
tion.147 
But back to the text. The state of mastery and servitude (Herrschaft und
Knechtschaf t)148 which follows (in § 433) when the struggle of the desire-
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difference between being a slave (Sklave) and being a servant (Petry III, p. 343). In the
maintext of the 1830 Encyclopedia Hegel talks only of ‘servitude’ and the word ‘slave’
appears only in Bouman’s Zusatz to § 435. Because the material out of which Bouman
constructed the Zusätze derives from different semesters, this does not tell much. In
any case, the looseness of H egel’s discussion of the situation after the fight is justified
by the fact that it is meant to  be only illustration of a more general point.
149 “Dies Verhältn is ist einerseits, da das M ittel der H errschaft, der Knecht, in seinem
Leben gleichfalls erhalten werden muß, Gemeinsamkeit des Bedürfnisses und die Sorge
für dessen Befriedigung. An die Stelle der rohen Zerstörung des unmittelbaren
Objekt s  t r i t t  die Erwerbung,  Erh altung und Formie rung desselb en  a l s  des
Vermittlenden, w orin die beiden Extreme der Selbständigkeit und Unselbständigkeit
sich zusammenschl ießen ;  –  d ie  Form der  Al lgemeinheit in Befriedigung des
Bedürfnisses ist ein daurndes Mittel und eine die Zukunft berücksichtigende und
(cont inued...)
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oriented subjects has ended to the surrender of one of the parties, is a state
involving communication, and hence some level of mutual communicative
understanding. What is important now, is the fact that this state will culti-
vate the actual intentionality of both parties. Both, the master and the
servant have an interest for attending to the world from the point of view
of what objects in the world are – not merely in relation to one’s singular
interests but – in relation to the interests of the other. When this mode of
intentionality becomes habitual, the intentions of the subjects have as their
correlates objects that are subsumed under universals such as ‘satisfying
him’ etc.
4.1.Socially mediated consciousness of the world: s e l f -c on s c iou sn e s s 2
I will first consider the developmental moments involved in the position of
the master and then those involved in the position of the servant. The text
of § 434 goes:
This relation [of the master and the servant, H.I.] is on the one hand – since the
servant as the means of mastery has also to be kept alive – community  of needs
and concern fo r its satisfaction. The crude destruction of the immediate Objekt
is replaced b y the takin g possession of, preservation and formation of it as the
mediating factor within which the two extremes of independence and dependen-
ce unite themselves. The form of universality in the satisfying of needs is a
perpetuating means and a provision which takes future into ac count and secures
it.149
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First we have to consider what Hegel means by the “immediate Objekt”
which previously was ‘crudely destructed’ and which now is ‘taken posses-
sion of, conserved and formed’. 
A proposal: it is the natural products with which the desiring self-
consciousness1 immediately satisfied its desire by simply eating them
without further ado and which now are being cultivated (as agriculture,
holding domestic animals, production of clothing etc.). This change in
attitude towards the surrounding nature is somehow motivated by, or at
least connected to, the “community of needs” of the master and the
servant. Yet, I think this reading is too farfetched. If there is some advanta-
ge in not eating immediately but cultivating and saving for future, why
would it demand the complex situation of mastery and servitude for the
subject to realize this? In fact Hegel talks in the philosophy of nature of the
animal activity of “formal assimilation” of nature, such as building nests (§
362), and thus points to the well known fact that even animals do cultivate,
form and store up natural products for future satisfaction.
The solution: as we have already seen, by an “immediate Objekt”
Hegel means the unyielding other self-consciousness1 within which self-
consciousness1 tried to “intuit itself” (§ 430) but which resisted this me-
diation. The “crude destruction” is the killing of the other as “abstract,
therefore crude negation of immediacy” (§ 432) which is the simple soluti-
on to the contradiction described in § 430. The situation of mastery and
servitude (which takes place if the combatants have a developed enough
instinct of understanding to be able to this complex solution of the contra-
diction) is now a situation where the one who surrendered is taken posses-
sion of, conserved and formed by the one who did not surrender. Whereas
nutriments can to some extent be preserved without keeping them alive,
the preservation of the servant as a servant, or as Hegel writes “as the means
of mastery”, necessitates keeping it/him alive. The very simple preconditi-
on for being and remaining a master is keeping the servant alive by not
‘using him up’.
Yet, this new situation means not only that the master has to be expli-
citly conscious of the servant as an object in more complicated ways than it
was of the natural Gegenstände of its singular desire, it also has to be
explicitly conscious of the rest of the world in a much broader sense than on
the level of singular desire. Namely, the conditions of survival of the
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(cont inued...)
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servant concern its relation to the rest of the world. The servant (similarly
than the master) is a living organism that has something in the world as its
“inorganic nature” (§ 361 Z) and hence the master has to be able to be
explicitly conscious also of the logical space determined by the servants
needs. In doing this, the master recognizes the validity of the point of view of
the servant for its (i.e. the master’s) own orientation. In § 433 Hegel in fact
states that in the relation of the mastery and servitude the servant has to
“give up being recognized”. Yet, this giving up is obviously not the comp-
lete truth of the relation of the master and the servant. The position of the
master in relation to the servant necessitates implicit recognition of the
validity of the consciousness (or point of view) of the servant.
Anyway, the ‘interest’ that directs the attention of the master and thus
its representing activity as a whole is now much more complex than on the
singular level of self-consciousness1. Not only one’s own need, but also the
needs of the servant, and the complex interrelation of them, that is, a
“community of needs” are now decisive for the master as a ‘concrete
subjectivity’ in the overall constitution of its intentionality. If the master is
not attendant to the features of the world that ensure both its own survival
and that of the servants, i.e. if the satisfaction of need as its goal does not
have “[t]he form of universality” it does not take the “future [of the
master-servant-relation, H.I.] into account and secure it”.
In taking the world from the more general point of view of the nee-
ding community the master has transcended the level of self-conscious-
ness1 and is on the way of developing into ‘universal self-consciousness’,
that is, consciousness that intends the world as what it is from the point of
view of ‘whoever’. Of course more developmental steps are yet needed to
attain true universality, but many of them have already been described as
taken by Hegel’s illustrative device called ‘the master’.
Let us now consider the development from the point of view of the
‘servant’. Compared to the account of mastery and servitude in the Jena
Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel is in PSS exceedingly brief especially in descri-
bing the situation of the servant. In the maintext, the lessons of the servant
are condensed into one sentence. (Bouman’s Zusätze contain a bit more.)
This sentence in § 435 goes:
[...] the servant[...] works off its singular and egoistic will, sublates the inner
immediacy of desire and makes this externalization and the fear of the lord th e
beginning of wisdom, – the transition to universal self-consciousness.150
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Eigenwillen ab, hebt die innere Unmittelbarkeit der Begierde auf und macht in dieser
Entäußerung und der Furcht des Herrn den Anfang der Weisheit, -den Übergang zum
allgemein Selbstbewußtsein.”
151 “Das Erzittern der Einzelheit des Willens, das Gefühl der Nichtigkeit der
Selbstsucht, die Gewohnheit des Ge horsams ist ein notw endiges M oment in der
Bildung  jedes Menschen.”
152 In § 473 Hege l talks of the most immediate level of will which is “as to its content
first only a natural will, immediately identical wit h a det ermin ation [o f] drive and
inclination”. Hegel’s theory of will cannot be discussed here, but its worth noting that
the ‘will’ Hegel mentions in § 435 does not have to be understood as anything else or
more developed than the singular desire (which is a form of practical drive). For a
discussion of Hegel’s theory of the will in connection to conte mporary m odels of
autonomy and free will see Quante 1997.
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The point of this sentence is relatively clear, especially when read in con-
nection to the Zusatz of § 435 where Hegel characterizes the “the quaking
of the singularity of will, the feeling of the nullity of self-seeking, the habit
of obedience” as a “necessary moment in the education of any man”.151 In
general terms, the servant’s orientation in the world is not any more moti-
vated by its purely singular desire, or its “singular and egoistic will”.152 The
immediacy of desire is sublated and replaced (as the ‘interest’ directing
intentionality) by an ‘externalized’ mode. That is, not only the goals of the
servant’s actions are ‘external’ to the servant because the explicit goal is
now the satisfaction of the master. Also the servants motivational make-up
is changed and thus the ‘interest’ directing its attention is ‘external’ to itself.
In becoming habitual, the direction of attention to features of the world
that would not be interesting from the point of view of satisfying one’s
own singular desire, but are so from the point of view of satisfying the
master, changes the space of actual intentional correlates of the servant. It
is now open to a much richer realm of features of reality than a subjectivity
merely satisfying its own desires. In the Zusatz Hegel uses the expression
“nullity of self-seeking”. This can be contrasted to the situation of the
desiring subjectivity for which objects were mere Gegenstände reduced to
their meaning for the satisafaction of the desire, and hence their indepen-
dence was determined as “null”.
Thus whereas self-consciousness1 only had Gegenstände that are what
they are for consciousness only in relation to the satisfaction of singular
desire, both the master and the servant now have as their intentional
correlates something that is not merely determined in relation to their
desire. Yet, the servant is further in the way of opening to the world,
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153 Admittedly Hegel does not develop the theme of ‘natural motivations’ for reaching
the stage of universality in PSS. Yet, nothing prevents us from completing the account
of PSS in this respect with a plausible theory of the emergence of universalistic
institutions. Siep 1979 and Honneth 1995 develop this theme in connection to H egel’s
texts from the Jena-period.
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because its desire-orientation on the whole has been reduced to ‘null’. As
Hegel pointed out already in the beginning of the philosophy of nature (§
246Z), it is the suppression of desire that first establishes a firm objectivity
for the subject.
The general epistemological point of recognition in the relation of the
master and the servant then is the mediation of consciousness or
intentionality through another perspective. This socially mediated cons-
ciousness as self-consciousness can be called self-consciousness2 to separate it
from the purely singular self-consciousness1. Nevertheless, even the servant
has not yet reached true universality of consciousness, since its world-
relation is still determined by “the singular, contingent will” (§ 435 Z) of
the master.
It is only when the social relation and the consciousness of the world
as a whole is not anymore determined by any one desire-oriented point of
view, that the space of intentionality opens to world as it is from any point
of view. On the level of ‘universal self-consciousness’ how the world is to
be taken is ideally independent from any singular points of view and any
merely singular interest-directed ways of ordering it. Looked from the side
of the servant this presupposes that servant is freed not only from “its own
singularity” but also from “the singularity of the master” (§ 435 Z). Corres-
pondingly this requires that the master “subordinates its egoistic will under
the law of the will in and for itself”. It is then this universal level of cons-
ciousness as self-consciousness (which I call self-consciousness3) which
according to Hegel forms “the substance of all essential spirituality, the
family, the native country, the state, as well as all virtues, – of love,
friendship, courage, honour and fame” (§ 436).153
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5. Universal consciousness of the world:
s e l f- c o n s c io u s n e s s 3
As I have claimed, the developments of the ‘Consciousness as such’- and
‘Sel-consciousness’-subsections should be read as two aspects of one
development from the singular level to the universal. In the universal level,
this is reflected by the fact that both in ‘Understanding’ and in ‘Universal
self-consciousness’ there is something ‘lawful’ in the correlates of inten-
tions. Understanding does not anymore have as its correlates merely
objects ordered under sensuous universals as ‘sensuous consciousness’ had,
nor is the world for it a “mixture” of singularity and universality (§ 421) as
it is on the level of perception. For understanding the world is “a realm of
law” (§ 422), which I take to mean that on this level consciousness is able
to grasp its world as organized under universal logical determinations or
structures. In being explicitly conscious of the world as lawful, in attending
to the lawful features of the world consciousness is hence actually inten-
ding the world as it is from what ever point of view.
Something similar is the case in ‘universal self-consciousness’. If
‘understanding’ depicts the theoretical aspect of ‘universal’ intentionality,
‘universal self-consciousness’ deals with its practical aspect. To put it
roughly, in the forms of spirituality and virtues quoted above what is
important is that the judgements as to the practical value of actions and
states of affairs are made from a universal view-point. Insofar as the sub-
ject is conscious of actions and events from the point of view of their
universal value, acceptability or rightness, it is universal self-consciousness.
It is consciousness as self-consciousness in the same way than self-cons-
ciousness1 and self-consciousness2 are consciousnesses as self-conscious-
ness: its intentional correlates of consciousness are for it what they are as
represented by its representative activity. It is only that the representative
activity of consciousness as self-consciousness3 does not anymore have any
particularistic ‘colouring’. It actually takes objects as they are universally,
from any point of view.
But is anything like this a real possibility for humans? We could
imagine a purely universal consciousness that always attends to the world
from a purely universal point of view. The practical aspect of a purely
universal consciousness (as self-consciousness) would be someone who
actually pays attention to actions and events only form the point of view of
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their universal practical acceptability (goodness, rightness etc). The theore-
tical aspect would be someone who is conscious of the theoretical features
of the world only as they are from a universal point of view. Does Hegel say
that somehow after renouncing or sublating the particular determinations
of consciousness the master and servant transform into consciousnesses
which have nothing left of particularity?154 Do they transform into gods?
No. Even if certainly one point of universal self-consciousness – i.e. self-
consciousness3 – is to account for the fact that we can become habituated
in taking the world from a universal point of view, this does not mean that
nothing of particularity would be left. The point is only that on a cultivated
level of consciousness, also this attitude is present. Self-consciousness3 is
hence only one moment of a fully developed consciousness as self-cons-
ciousness.
In the case of real concrete subjectivities the different levels of self-
consciousness1, 2 and 3 can have different relative strength. If we look this
from the practical side, it is a matter of upbringing and habituation whether
someones attention is mostly directed to the desirability of objects for
himself, for others or the community, or from a universal point of view.
The point of Hegel’s philosophy of objective spirit is to show how all of
these levels of intentionality can in principle be reconciliated. In an ideal
society I can, depending on the issue and situation, intend the world or
something in the world as what it is for me, to us, or in general. Looked at
from the theoretical side, a merely universal consciousness of the theoretical
aspects of the world – which is the topic in ‘Understanding’ – is no more
a real possibility, than a purely universal practical consciousness is. As I
said, I take it that the lawfulness to which Hegel points in ‘Understanding’,
means generally that what in things is ‘necessary’, and hence the, according
to Hegel, necessary determinations that are discusses in his logic. Even if
I’m deeply versed in Hegelian philosophy and habituated in my everyday
dealings in attending to what in things is ‘logical’, and hence in taking
things from – what I as a Hegelian take to be – a purely universal point of
view, I still have to be sensitive also to the qualitative richness of the world,
to more or less contingent events and actions around me and also able to
subsume things around me under the genus-concepts that happen to be
used in my society. The world simply is much too complicated to be taken
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from a purely universal point of view which only catches the necessary
features of it. 
Or take a philosopher of mind who thinks that the universal,
viewpoint-neutral truth of humans is that they are nothing else than im-
mensely complicated mechanisms strictly functioning according to causal
laws. This person, let’s call him the mechano-friek, is an even more sorrow-
ful case than someone who tries to do only with Hegel’s logic in his takings
of the world. Namely, his allegedly universal mechanistic way of ‘taking the
world’ offers very little for really organizing the world of his experience. He
can try to take what others take as a red thing as something like ‘the kind of
thing that causes 170 Hz vibrations in my C-fibres’. Or he can try take the
actions of his wife, which others take as attempts to arouse his husbands
attention to the misery of their marriage, as effects of a reduced level of
hormone X in her cerebellum (or what ever). You can imagine the rest, but
the point is that a lot more is needed for organizing the content of inten-
tions than merely some allegedly universal lawful features of objects (and
actions) in the world.155
Another, but related, question is, does Hegel’s conception of universal
self-consciousness leave room for anything like the social negotiation-
procedure that according to Brandom is the whole point of mutual recog-
nition. This question I will consider in the end of the next chapter.
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6. Consciousness of oneself as object and subject among
others: s e l f- c o n s c io u s n e s s 4
So far I haven’t said anything about an explicitly reflective consciousness,
that is, of consciousness of oneself as either an object among other objects,
or as a subject among other subjects? Yet, this is what usually is meant by
self-consciousness. I will call this more familiar sense of self-consciousness
from now on self-consciousness4. Quite a lot has been written on Hegel’s
possible views on this issue but mostly by relying on the Jena Phenomenology
of Spirit. Yet, since the function of PS is not to develop anything like a
theory of self-consciousness of empirical subjects, the fact that anything
decisive has not been attained is not a surprise. The obvious place to look
for Hegel’s theory of self-consciousness in the familiar philosophical sense
is his philosophy of subjective spirit. Perhaps the reason for the fact that
there are not yet many attempts to clarify Hegel’s theory of self-conscious-
ness4 in PSS is that there is not yet any overall consensus on even the
structure of Hegel’s argumentation in PSS. The ‘Phenomenology’-section
of PSS which contains the subsection with the title ‘Self-consciousness’
seems especially difficult for interpretation. However, according to my
reading what Hegel calls ‘self-consciousness’ in the ‘Self-consciousness’-
subsection is not (at least primarily) even meant to be an analysis of self-
consciousness4 but rather accounts of different developmental levels of
consciousness or intentionality in general. But if this is so, does Hegel then
in PSS formulate at all anything like a theory of self-consciousness4? And if
he does, is it liable to the problems of the reflection-theories pointed out
by Frank and Henrich? The answer to the first question is yes and no.
No in the sense that there is no one phenomenon or structure that in
Hegel’s account could be identified as self-consciousness4 and no one
reflective act which would establish self-consciousness4.Yes, because many
different levels and aspects of theoretical and practical self-relation or self-
hood are being discussed in PSS. 
I will divide these aspects into the non-intentional and the intentional.
In fact the non-intentional levels are in Hegel’s terminology not yet cons-
ciousness and therefore strictly speaking they should not be called self-
consciousness. The word Hegel uses in the ‘Anthropology’ is self-feeling
(Selbstgefühl). I will in the following discuss this non-intentional level only in
relation to the intentional ones. The intentional levels of self-relation I will
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divide into A) consciousness of oneself as an object among other objects,
B) consciousness of oneself as a subject among other subjects,  and C)
consciousness of oneself as a person with personal features.
A) Now, what does it require to be conscious of oneself as a material
object in the world and in the midst of other objects? We may approach
this question by considering the being in the world of a desiring animal.
Does its consciousness involve something like this kind of self-conscious-
ness in Hegel’s account? I seems that Hegel’s answer is negative. Certainly
the ability to discern one’s own body from the rest of the material world is
part of the outfit of a desiring animal since its own body is not among the
Gegenstände of its desire. Hegel discusses the issues involved in the bodily
synthesis of sensations in the ‘Anthropology.’ This distinction is however
still a very primitive one since it only separates the lived body from everyt-
hing else and does not necessarily imply the ability to grasp ones own body
as an ordinary material thing among other material things in space. 
Now, it would seem that this theme poses a problem for my interpre-
tation of the overall structure of PSS. Namely, I have claimed that in ‘Psycho-
logy’ Hegel analyses the activity of constituting intentional content for
consciousness. This implies that whatever Hegel says of the spatial deter-
minations of the constitution of this content in the ‘Psychology’ should be
found in the form of spatial determinations of objects for consciousness in
the ‘Phenomenology’. Yet at least at first sight this seems not to be the
case. Namely, Hegel says explicitly in § 418 that objects are not (at least) for
‘sensuous consciousness’ spatially organized and that the spatial organizati-
on belongs properly on the level of ‘intuition’, that is, to ‘Psychology’.156
However, I think that this should really be interpreted as meaning only that
the world is not yet spatially organized for the level of the singular cons-
ciousness analyzed in ‘sensuous consciousness’ (and ‘desire’). Although
Hegel does not say it explicitly, I take it to be obvious that ‘Perception’ and
‘Understanding’ in the ‘Phenomenology’ do imply spatiality.
What does Hegel then say about the spatial organization of objectivity
for the subject in ‘Psychology’? First of all, for Hegel space and time are
not ‘only forms of intuition’ as they are for Kant: “The truth is that things
are themselves spatial and temporal” (§ 448 Z). Hegel refers here to his
philosophy of nature where he analyzes spatiality and temporality as real
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forms of world (see §§ 254-259). Hence what he says about spatiality and
temporality in § 448 in the ‘Psychology’ is an account only of how the
subject becomes conscious of the world as spatially and temporally structu-
red. I will now pass over the question of temporality and discuss only that
of spatiality in the ‘Psychology’. 
No explicit treatment of becoming consciousness of oneself as an
object or a thing among other things in space can be found from § 448
where Hegel discusses spatiality, but his discussion seems to have implica-
tions also regarding this question. Clearly what Hegel means by space here
is ‘objective space’, that is, the spatial determinations of objects from no
special point of view inside space. In this respect Hegel’s discussion of
space and time in PSS differs considerably from PS where he discussed
only the egocentric spatial determination of ‘here’ in the chapter on ‘Sense-
certainty’.157 The text of § 448 in PSS goes:
One moment in  the diremption o f this immediate finding is the  abstract identical
direction of spirit in both feeling and all the rest of i ts further determinations,
attention without which nothing is for it; – the active recollection, the momen t of
appropriation, however still as a formal self-determination of intelligence. The
other moment is that intelligence posits the determinations of feeling against this
its inwardness as a being, but as a negative, as the abstract otherness of  itself.
Intelligence therefore determines the content of sensation as being self-external,
projects it in space  and t ime, which are the forms within which intelligence is
intuitive. According to  consc iousness the material is simply its Gegenstand , but
from spirit it receives the rational determination of being other to itself  (cf. § 247,
254).158
We should first consider what is the function of attention in respect of
spatiality of object for the subject. I have already discussed attention in
connection to the subsumation of singulars under universals. There we saw
that it is the ‘interests’ of intelligence as the ‘concrete subjectivity’ that
6. CONSCIOUSNESS OF ONESELF
159 DeVries 1988, p. 112.
160 Idem.
161 DeVries himself notes that his reading seems to be explicitly against Heg el’s
statements in the Zusatz of § 448 (idem).
90
directs attention to certain features of objects and hence determines under
what universal the subject orders the given object. Does attention then
have also a function in the spatial ordering of the world for the subject.
Willem DeVries notes this possibility in his comments to § 448: “attention
is apparently conceived of as the mental activity through which experience
receives its spatiotemporal form”159. Yet, he thinks that this is only an
appearance and not really Hegel’s view: “This view would seem to make
the constitution of the spatiotemporal world of our experience something
we do by paying attention either to our feelings or sensations or to the
objects of experience, and this seems patently false.”160
I will not try to analyze in detail DeVries’s reasons for this judgement,
but only note that I do not see any compelling ones.161 As I see it, attention
really can be understood as a necessary function in the process of constitu-
ting a spatially ordered world for the subject. Especially in the Zusatz to §
448 Hegel emphasizes that attention involves taking the object as somet-
hing that “is not only for me, but has also an independent being”. Alt-
hough Hegel does not in this connection explicitly talk about the ‘concre-
teness’ of the subjectivity or intelligence, I believe that it is something
implicitly present also here. Here again Hegel’s view differs considerably
from that of Kant. Whereas for Kant spatiality is produced by the transcen-
dental subjectivity that is independent from the empirical one, for Hegel
the spatial organization of the world for the subject is necessarily connected
to the fact that the subject is an empirical or ‘concrete’  subject already
somewhere in space and has to understand the viewpoint-neutral ordering
of space from that place. Here Hegel’s ontological realism frees his from
the problems that haunt Kant’s subjective idealism. For Hegel there is
nothing subjective in the fact that objects exist somewhere in space and
hence also not in the fact that any individual subject does so totally inde-
pendently of whether it has any grasp of objective space and his location in
it. Thus there is no transcendental subject ‘situating’ things (and hence also
the empirical ego) in space and that way producing the spatial ordering of
the world for the subject.
I propose that a plausible reading is that the subject grasps objective
space by paying attention to the relative locations of objects given in its
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experience and by recollecting these relative locations learns their locations
not only as, or where, they are “for me” from a given momentary point of
view but where they are from any point of view. Since the subject is a
concrete living being, it moves around in space and therefore is able to
change its point of view in space. Through this simple process of learning
places in the world the subject grasps objects in the world as having
“independent being” somewhere in space that is independent from any
momentary the point of view of the subject. There are certainly difficult
philosophical problems involved here and Hegel does not develop this
theme in its whole extent but still the function of attention in the process
of spatial ordering of the world for the subject seems to be quite easy to
understand. As well as in the case of subsuming singulars under universals,
also here the process at least necessarily does not have to be a very cons-
cious one. It is part of the ordinary being in the world of the concrete
subject where learning mostly happens, as it were, automatically. In beco-
ming habitual, the locating of objects determines the intentional correlates
of consciousness as spatially indexed.
In the ordinary course of the socializing process in developed societies
the means for understanding space and one’s own location in space are of
course partly already existing: we have maps to show where things are and
where I am as one thing. So the process of the becoming of spatial or-
ganization of objects for a given subject does not rest solely on the shoul-
ders of every new subject. But disregarding this point a deeper issue is, is
there something in the intersubjective relation as such that somehow
develops the ability to know oneself as an object among objects in space. If
there is, then the place in PSS to look for something like it would obviously
be the encounter of subjects in the ‘Recognitive self-consciousness’-chap-
ter. Although nothing very explicit on this issue can be found there, per-
haps much could be read in it by considering what is implied by Hegel’s
text. Again I think that whatever might be the position implied by Hegel’s
explicit formulations, the subjective processes or abilities necessary for the
becoming of spatial organization of the world for subjects have to read
from the ‘Psychology’. If subjects are, as they are, capable of understanding
themselves as spatially located in some position in the singular or momen-
tary point of view of another subject, this capability has to be anyway part of
the natural makeup of subjects and this capability most probably is not
isolated from the general capability of grasping relative locations in space.
Hence, if the claim that Hegel’s theory of self-consciousness is liable to the
problems of reflection points to his view of consciousness of oneself as an
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object in space among other subjects and as such also as an object for
other subjects, then I do not think Hegel is in trouble. There is nothing to
suggest that Hegel thinks that the capabilities needed for becoming cons-
cious of oneself as an object for other subjects did not exist before, and
independently of, the intersubjective encounter.
What comes to the fact that Hegel emphasizes the lack of spatial
organization of objectivity for ‘sensuous consciousness’, I do not think that
he still thought that there were no spatial organization of objectivity for the
higher levels of consciousness. If for example ‘perception’ is, as Hegel says,
the level of our everyday consciousness and sciences, then surely this
presupposes that the world on this level is already spatially organized. And
this has to mean that on this level subjects are able to grasp themselves as
objects in space located among other objects. For reasons that undoubtedly
need more clarification, Hegel does not think that the actual intentional
correlates of the singular subject of sensuous consciousness have an objec-
tive spatial organization.162 Yet this does not mean that they was in princi-
ple devoid of the psychological capacities needed for objective spatial
organization of the world for it.
B) Now what about self-consciousness4 as consciousness of oneself as
a subject among other subjects? What is it to be conscious of the fact than
one is a subject? I will pass over the question of the practical aspect of this,
that is, of the question of being conscious of being a subject of one’s
actions. The theoretical issue can be formulated as the question of what it
is to be conscious of being conscious? Consciousness in Hegel’s account is
more than simply having sensations. Consciousness is intentional and
hence it is having sensations as sensations of something gegenständlich.
Does having consciousness in this sense imply also of being consciousness
of consciousness? This is more or less the question that staged Cramer’s
reading of § 424. My claim was that this is actually not the question that is
being discussed in § 424. 
Yet, certainly something like being conscious of being conscious is
implied by Hegel’s concept of consciousness. Namely, because being
conscious is having conceptually structured intentional correlates, it implies
the possibility of being mistaken about what it is that one is conscious of.
What is given for the conscious subject is given as something, as having
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certain properties and other features which can function as the basis of
subsuming it under universals. I see something and it seems red to me and
thus I subsume it under the universal or of redness, or in other words take
it to belong to the class of red things. It also appears to have certain other
features that to my experience are instantiated by, lets say, buses of the
Jyväskylä traffic company. Thus I not only subsume it under the sensuous
universal of redness but also under the genus-concept of bus. But then this
something that I took to be a bus – because it seems and sounds like a bus
to me – comes closer and I realize that it is in fact a truck. Perhaps it is not
even red although in the given lighting-conditions it seemed red from a
distance. Thus I had as the content of my intention a bus – strictly spea-
king I was conscious of this something as a bus – but yet it turned out that
the intentional content of my consciousness did not correspond with what
the thing in reality is.163 What ever are the features that one is habituated in
attending to in objects and what ever are the genus-concepts that one has
for objects, and how ever limited generally is the store of concepts of a
given subject, consciousness as involving, as McDowell puts it, “passive
operation of conceptual capacities”164 is liable to mistakes and contains also
the capability of correcting mistakes when the world itself shows that one
were mistaken. Or in Hegel’s terms, being conscious implies the conceptual
activity of representation which is an activity, although unconscious, of the
concrete subjectivity and as such liable to mistakes. One type of mistake is
of course being mistaken about the relative locations of objects in space,
one of them being oneself. In this sense the spatial determinations of
representations are responsible to the world in the same way than all the
rest of them. It is in this normativity-involving sense that being conscious
involves the capability to distinguish consciousness of something (as
something) from that thing itself. In this sense even animals seem to be
conscious of being conscious since they can learn that what (or where) they
took something to be is not what (or where) it is.
But this is not yet being conscious of oneself as consciousness or
subject among other consciousnesses or subjects. I have claimed that
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something like this kind of explicitly reflective self-consciousness is lacking
in the mode of consciousness as self-consciousness that Hegel discusses in
§ 424 – precisely because it is a singular mode of consciousness not yet
mediated by others consciousnesses. Is it then in recognition that somet-
hing like consciousness of oneself as consciousness among other
consciousnesses arises? This is Frank’s and Henrich’s claim and I do not
think that it is totally mistaken. However I think that the discussion on
whether Hegel is a reflection-theorist and whether he is liable to the prob-
lems involved in reflection-theories remains quite abstract if we do not pay
attention first to the fact that self-consciousness4 is only one of the mea-
nings of ‘self-consciousness’ in PSS, and secondly to the normative issues
involved in the view on self-consciousness4 that seems to be implied by
Hegel’s text. The first point I have tried to show in the previous chapters
of this work. The question of self-consciousness4 I have then divided to
the question of being consciousness of oneself as an object in space among
other objects, and to the question of being conscious of oneself as a sub-
ject or consciousness.
Now, if consciousness of the world as such implies consciousness of
consciousness because of the possibility of error and the capability to learn
that one has made an error – that is, because of the essentially normative
character of consciousness – what does normativity have to do with being
conscious of oneself as one consciousness among other consciousnesses?
I would put it this way. Consciousness as such is normatively enforced
by the world. But being conscious of the world as a social animal is norma-
tively enforced not only by the world but also by other consciousnesses.
These two levels or ‘directions’ of normativity could be called vertical and
horizontal normativity respectively. An example: a singular animal ‘takes’
something to be food for it, and whether it is food for it is decided by the
world – this is vertical normativity. On the other hand a subject living
among other subjects may similarly take something as food for itself and
hence subsume a given thing under the universal ‘food for me’. But there
is another subject similarly taking the same thing as food for itself. There is
a fight the point of which is, is the thing ‘food for subject A’ or ‘food for
subject B’. If the other subject dies, the contradiction has been “crudely”
(see § 432, 434) solved.165 Another solution is that one of the parties, say A,
surrenders and assents to taking the thing as ‘food for B’. Or then there is
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a happier solution where both A and B take the thing to be ‘food for us’. If
A surrenders and takes the thing to be ‘food for B’, it has recognized the
validity of B’s representation of the thing. If both take the thing to be ‘food
for us’, they have mutually recognized the validity of each others representa-
tions of the thing.
The point of this example can be generalized to hold for socially
mediated consciousness in general. In being conscious of the world as
social beings, our intentional correlates are mediated through other
consciousnesses, that is, we take at least a great deal of singulars we en-
counter in our everyday dealings not only as what they are ‘for me’ but
what they are ‘for us’ or ‘for anybody’ and this way our consciousness is
under horizontal normative control. Because the process of representation
responsible for producing actual intentional content is mostly unconscious
and habitual, it may be that I am not actually conscious at all of what a
given object would be purely for myself irrespectively from the socially
accepted and enforced way of taking it as. But insofar as I am, I am cons-
cious of my own consciousness as distinct from that of others. This is to
say, that being conscious of one’s own consciousness as one consciousness
among other consciousnesses is being conscious of the particularity of
one’s own way of ‘taking objects as’. Insofar as I am conscious of the
difference between my own ‘takings as’ and those of others and recognize
the validity or claim of those other takings, I submit myself to the horizon-
tal social normativity. Yet, what ever are the socially shared and negotiated
ways of taking the world, they are in principle controlled by the vertical
normativity of the world itself. To use Quine’s metaphors, the world has an
almost infinite number of joints at which it can be carved. Still, the fact that
it has joints means that it imposes normative control over ways of carving
it.
We may now answer the question of whether something like cons-
ciousness of ones own consciousness among and as distinct from other
consciousnesses arises in the process which Hegel depicts in ‘Recognitive
self-consciousness’. Obviously in the conflict between consciousnesses,
both of which have their particular way of ‘taking’ objects, the difference of
the consciousnesses is implicitly thematized for the combatants. In princi-
ple this difference in the ways of taking as can evaporate to a very large
extent as the servant becomes habituated in taking everything from the
point of view of the master. Yet, since the intentional correlates of cons-
ciousness to some extent are necessarily dependent on singular point of view,
the difference cannot totally vanish. A trivial example: Even if I and my
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master both take something to be food, danger, shelter (or what ever) for
the master and I am so habituated in attending to the world only as what it
is for my master, that I am not actually even conscious of what it would be
for me, I am still conscious of that something, for example, as being to the
left from me but to the right from the master. At least in this trivial sense
the qualitative difference of consciousnesses is always present for social
subjects, and at least in this sense they are always conscious of being one
consciousness among others. Yet, this situation does not as such imply any
social horizontal normativity for deciding the correctness of my representa-
tions, it is the vertical normativity imposed on me by the world itself that
restricts my representations of the relative location of objects from my
spatial point of view and that of my master (or whoever I am facing).
In a less trivial sense the subjects depicted in the chapter ‘Recognitive
self-consciousness’ become conscious of being consciousnesses among
other consciousnesses insofar as there are discrepancies between the ways
of ‘taking as’ between the subjects and insofar as they are conscious of
these discrepancies. In being conscious of the fact that what I take an
object as is not what another (or others) takes it as, I am conscious of my
consciousness as a particular way of taking the object. In the relation of the
master and the slave it is the consciousness of the master that provides the
criteria for correct takings, and hence the particularities of the master’s
consciousness are the source of the horizontal normativity constraining the
consciousness of the servant. If the servant is not totally socialized to the
master’s point of view, that is, if the master has not absolutely succeeded in
his attempts to “form” (formieren )166 his servant, the servant is conscious of
the difference of his consciousness from that of his master’s and in this
sense conscious of oneself as consciousness against another consciousness.
In the previous chapter I depicted ‘universal self-consciousness’, i.e.
self-consciousness3, as a level of consciousness where the intentional
correlates of consciousness have only features that are available only for a
purely universal point of view. In § 438 which is the first paragraph of the
‘Reason’-chapter, Hegel characterizes this level in the following way:
[...] The universality of reason has [...] as well the meaning of an Objekt that as
such is merely given in c onsciou sness, yet itself now universal, pervading and
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encompassing the I, as [it has the meaning] of the pure I, a pure form that
includes and encompasses the Objekt within itself.167
Thus, now there is a purely universal Objekt given for a purely universal
consciousness or ‘I’. Here Hegel recapitulates what has been reached on
the one hand in ‘Understanding’ and on the other hand in ‘Universal self-
consciousness’, that is the theoretical and practical aspects of self-cons-
ciousness3. Both the theoretical and the practical moments of intentionality
are now purely universal. In § 423, which is the last paragraph in ‘Understan-
ding’, Hegel characterizes the relation of the universal theoretical subject to
it Objekt as a “Differenz der keiner ist”and in § 437 which is the last
paragraph in ‘Universal self-consciousness’ he characterizes the relation of
the practical subject to the world as an “Unterschied, der keiner ist”. The
point of these identical (since as far as I see, ‘Differenz’ and ‘Unterschied’
are here simply synonyms) expressions is that on the universal level, there
is a numerical difference between consciousness and the world (as on all
levels), but since consciousness does not have any more any particular
limitations, there is no more any qualitative difference between the world
as a Gegenstand of consciousness and the world as Objekt, that is, between
what is given for consciousness and what that given is in itself.
Three general points are worth making here:
a) ‘Understanding’ and ‘Universal self-consciousness’ are both follo-
wed by ‘Reason’ and hence the developments of ‘Consciousness as such’
and ‘Self-consciousness’ are aspects of one and the same development, as
I stated in chapter 1.
b) ‘Reason’ in ‘Phenomenology’ is still ‘only consciousness’ and not
activity. It is a level of intentionality on which what is given is produced by
the psychological processes analyzed in ‘Psychology’. Thus reason as activity
produces, or organizes content for reason as consciousness.
Now, the picture of a universal subjectivity facing a universal Object
seems to efface all traces of particularity and at first sight may lead one
wondering whether Hegel is talking here at all of real empirical subjects. If
he is, have the many subjects by some miraculous processes become mere
instantiations of one absolute subjectivity effortlessly facing the world as it
is in itself from no particular point of view? This would make the level of
self-consciousness3 very different than what Brandom takes to be the point
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168 See also §368 Zusatz. Many of the articles in Horstmann/Petry (ed.) 1986 deal with
Hegel’s relation to the discussions on classification of nature.
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of universal recognition. Is there any room left for the processes of con-
ceptual negotiation that Brandom depicts? I think there is.
c) Namely, reason as the synthesis of the theoretical and practical
aspects of universal consciousness as self-consciousness, i.e. of self-cons-
ciousness3, is only a moment of concrete consciousness since singularity
and particularity discussed in the earlier chapters of ‘Consciousness as
such’- and ‘Self-consciousness’-subsections are in some form necessary
moments of any real consciousness that has achieved universality (as its
third moment), even if their relative significance or ‘power’ in directing and
organizing the subjects theoretical and practical intentions may vary from
subject to subject (and from culture to culture).
It may be that pure universality is a real possibility in some issues.
Hegel certainly seems to have thought that it is possible in the kind of
analysis of the most generals structures of reality and thinking that he
practices in his logic. (Most philosophers nowadays of course doubt even
this.) 
Yet, its very clear that as soon as we leave the sphere of logic and
enter on the field of the kind of philosophy that he practices in his Real-
philosophie, things get much fuzzier. Hegel was simply too well versed –
more so than probably any philosopher today could be – in the natural and
human sciences of his day to have been under the illusion that there would
be one definite way to organize all the results, findings and viewpoints of
sciences by philosophical treatment, that is, that there would be the definite
way of ‘taking the world’ even on this relatively high level of generality of
the sciences. One simple example: Hegel never thought that anything like
a definite taxonomy of natural formations would be possible. In § 368 of
his philosophy of nature he discusses extensively of the natural scientific
work on classification of animals of antique and his own time and very
explicitly notes, as he puts it, “the impotence of the Concept in nature” to
organize the animal forms into definite genera and species. The natural
sciences of his day were well developed enough for Hegel to note that
“even the genera [of animals] are completely subject to the changes of the
external, universal life of nature”.168 But not are genera only subject to
natural changes, they are also at least to some extent negotiable. In § 459 in
‘Psychology’ Hegel discusses language and notes that the signification
system of a developed language requires the relative easiness of forming
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169 “Das allgemeine Selbstbewußtsein ist das affirmativ e Wissen  seiner selbst in  anderen
Selbst, deren jedes als  freie Einzelheit absolute Selbständigkeit hat, aber, vermöge der
Negation seiner Unmittelbarkeit oder Begierde, sich nicht vom anderen unterscheidet,
allgemeines [Selbstbewußtsein] und objektiv ist  und sie reelle Allgemeinheit als
Gegenseitigkeit so hat, als es im freien anderen sich anerkannt w eiß und dies weiß ,
insofern es das andere anerkenn t und es f rei weiß .”
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new signs as, for example, developments in “chemistry and mineralogy”
produces new genera, that is, when the classifications of sciences are
“altered in accordance with the difference of view with regard to the genus
and other supposed specific property”. It is only “a stationary civilization,
like the Chinese”that can do with a hieroglyphic written language since the
ways of ‘taking the world’ in a stationary civilization are stagnant, not under
negotiation, and hence the relative difficulty of forming new written signs
does not matter. No new signs are needed since no new concepts arise. 
I believe that what holds for natural sciences and their philosophical
treatment, holds also for human sciences and the philosophical treatment
of man in Hegel’s system. Here I only point to M.J.Petry’s note, which I
referred already in my introduction, of the fact that the philosophy of
subjective spirit is too full of findings and phenomena of the human
sciences and common sense, and also went through considerable re-orde-
rings, for anyone to think that Hegel ever believed that an absolutely
definite logical account of the structures of subjective spirit would be
possible. I do not think that there’s anything in principle against the grain
of Hegel’s own thought to suggest even that much of Hegel’s presentation
in PSS is coloured by his own interests and more or less idiosyncratic
habits of ordering his material.
When we then move further on to the theoretical and practical level
of everyday life, it’s clear that our ways of taking or ‘carving up’ the world
are socially constrained and, to the extent that we live in open enough
social environments, under social negotiation processes. For these proces-
ses really to take place, mutual recognition of consciousnesses is however
necessary. In § 436 Hegel formulates the level of universal self-conscious-
ness as a level of mutual recognition in the following way:
Universal self-consciousness is the affirmative knowing of one’s self in an other self.
Each self has as a free individuality absolute independen ce, but on accoun t of the
negation of its immediacy or desire does no t differentiate  itself from the other.
Each is thus universal [self-consciousness] and objective and possesses real
universa lity as reciprocity, so far as it know s itself recognized by its free o ther,
and knows th is insofar  as it recognizes the other and knows it to  be free .[...]169
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This is now what forms “the substance of all essential spirituality, the
family, the native country, the state, as well as all virtues, – of love,
friendship, courage, honour and fame” (§ 436). If we emphasize only the
universality of consciousnesses on the level of universal self-consciousness,
that is, only the extent to which consciousnesses on this level actually intend
the world in qualitatively identical manner in all areas of life, we cannot
understand how Hegel can then  say anything about the essentially
particularity-involving phenomena of spirit and virtues. Neither can we
understand what all this has to do with freedom and mutual recognition.
The proper place for Hegel’s discussion of the above mentioned forms of
‘essential spirituality’ and virtues is of course the philosophy of objective
spirit, the discussion of which is far beyond the scope of this work. Here I
can only suggest a very general point. The point of mutual recognition as
characterized by Hegel in § 436 is that social phenomena such as virtues
necessitate that subjects are in principle open to each others judgements as
to the correctness, validity, virtuousness etc. of each others intentions.
Thus the contents of practical intentions are constrained by the
intersubjective horizontal normativity which however is open to negotiati-
on to the extent that subjects mutually recognize each other as in principle
universal and free judges. In the context of the philosophy of objective spirit
this means that even if contents of intentions are to some extent ‘unifor-
med’ by Sittlichkeit, yet in many, or most, areas of life difference of views is
inevitable and there intentions have to be negotiated by subjects mutually
recognizing each other as concerned parties and in principle competent
and responsible judges of each other’s intentions. On the theoretical side of
intentionality negotiations are also inevitable because of the simple fact that
the world allows it to be taken in a multitude of ways. All these ways are
responsible to the world and hence constrained by vertical normativity. But
first of all since it is necessary for social animals to have shared ways of
understanding the world, and secondly since some of the ways serve the
shared interests of communities better than others, we are constrained also
by the social horizontal normativity in our theoretical undertakings. Insofar
as mutual recognition of the validity and freedom of each others cons-
ciousness prevails, the question of what ways of carving the world best
serve the shared interests of the community of concrete subjectivities, is
open to negotiation.
C) Finally, the question of self-consciousness4 as knowledge, beliefs
or views of ones personal features. By this I mean self-consciousness as
having contents that are of the type ‘what kind of person I am’. This is the
6. CONSCIOUSNESS OF ONESELF
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appeared. According to advance information it discusses recognition in the context of
the Philosophy of Right. 
171 “Aber das Se lbstge fühl, das ihm in der Befriedigung wird  [...]”
172 For a more thorough account of ‘self-feeling’ see Siep 1990.
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aspect or meaning of self-consciousness that Honneth is interested in
Hegel’s earlier writings. For Honneth recognition in Hegel’s writings from
the Jena period points to (more or less) the same phenomena than what
G.H. Mead means by the constitution of the object-I, or as Mead says of
the self (in contrast to I as subject) in social interaction. It is through re-
ceiving adequate and fair recognition from relevant others for ones needs
for care and love as a singular being, for ones autonomy, and for the worth
of ones traits and abilities, that one is able to have satisfying answers to the
question ‘what kind of person I am’. I need recognition from others for
construing a satisfying image of myself as a person.
Does PSS contain anything of relevance for discussions of self-
consciousness4 in this sense? Not much, since the proper place for Hegel’s
discussion of these issues is the philosophy of objective spirit.170 Yet enough,
since the point of the ‘Phenomenology’ is only to analyze levels or aspects
of intentionality on a general level and something like the mode of
intentionality that self-consciousness4 in this sense requires is accounted for
there. Although I do not have the opportunity to develop this theme
adequately here, I suggest that it is the concept of ‘self-feeling’ (Selbstgefühl)
that is the place to look for self-consciousness4 in this sense in PSS. In the
‘Anthropology’ Hegel dedicates a whole chapter to the theme of self-
feeling. What I want to emphasize is that ‘self-feeling’ clearly contains a
normative dimension. This can be seen in the ‘Self-consciousness’-subsecti-
on explicitly in two passages. First in § 429, which was the last paragraph
on ‘desire’ Hegel says that the desiring consciousness has or “receives” its
self-feeling in “satisfaction”.171 Self-feeling as analyzed in the ‘Anthropolo-
gy’ contains more than what Hegel discusses here172, but what Hegel here
points to is that the self-feeling of the concrete subjectivity is goal-directed
and receives its fulfilment in the attainment of the goal. In the case of the
singular desiring consciousness the goal is the satisfaction of desire and
thus satisfying self-feeling is achieved in the satisfaction of desires. What is
interesting is that in the second paragraph on ‘recognitive self-conscious-
ness’, § 431, which I quoted in my chapter 4 Hegel writes the following: 
[...] I cannot be recognized as immediate, but only insofar as I sublate the
immediacy in  myself  and give determinate being for my freedom. Yet, this
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immediacy is at the same time the corporeity of self-consciousness,  within
which it has as in i ts signs and  tools its self-feeling as well as its being for others,
and its mediating relation with them.
The point in this passage as regards to self-feeling is that self-consciousness
cannot be recognized by others if it does not give up the pure immediacy
of its being. It has to ‘externalize’ itself in an acting and signifying body
which is understandable to others. It is in or through this externalized and
mediated body as the “signs and tools” of self-consciousness, that self-
consciousness has both its “being for others”, its “self-feelings” and the
“mediating relation between them”. This passage certainly deserves a more
thorough analysis than I am able to produce now, but I think it contains in
a nutshell the structure of intentionality without which nothing like the
constitution of the object-I or ‘self’ through recognition of which Mead
and Honneth speak, would not exist. Our being for others and our ‘self-
feeling’ constitute an interrelated structure where the achievement of the
goal of self-feeling is mediated through others. This is to say that the
satisfaction of the self-feeling of a social subject is dependent on recogniti-
on by others and is hence essentially intersubjective. What is important
here is the emphasis on feeling. Namely, if the self-relation that is mediated
by the recognition of others would be only self-consciousness, it would
remain “distant from the concrete subjectivity” (§ 401), that is, it would not
affect the motivational factors of subjectivity. But since it is feeling, it affects
the motivational make-up of the subject, as it were, from the inside. Hegel
does not, as far as I see, say anything explicit in the ‘Phenomenology’ about
our knowledge, beliefs or views of ourselves as persons. So if we want, we
are free to ‘read in’ Hegel’s text the best possible theory of self-conscious-
ness4 in this sense that is not contradictory with other elements of his text.
I would say that self-consciousness4 as self-knowledge is on the social level
intersubjectively mediated more or less the same way than all knowledge is.
First of all the concepts that we use in attributing personality-features to
ourselves are socially construed. Secondly whether my attribution of some
feature to myself is correct is always also for the relevant others to judge. It
is however because I myself am most intimately touched by the attributions
of features to myself, that self-consciousness4 in this sense is always also a
matter of self-feeling.
173 Habermas 1999, p. 149.
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Conclusion
Now its time to try to sort out what is true and what is false in the views
on Hegel’s conception of self-consciousness and intersubjectivity of the
writers I referred to in my introduction. On the whole I have tried to show
that what Hegel means by ‘self-consciousness’ at least in the last version of
the Encyclopedia PSS, is mostly not what is usually meant by ‘self-cons-
ciousness’. That is, self-consciousness1, 2 and 3 are simply consciousness of
the world as structured by the representative activity peculiar to each form
or level of consciousness. Still, this does not mean that the more familiar
meaning of self-consciousness as an explicit reflective relation to oneself
were completely absent in PSS. Although Hegel does not waste a lot of
paper in PSS to analyze self-consciousness4, it figures at least implicitly in
the text in many forms, as I tried to show in the previous chapter. Neither
does Hegel’s concentration on self-consciousness1, 2 and 3 in any way mean
that intersubjectivity would not play an important role in PSS. It is certainly
not true as Habermas writes, that in the Encyclopedia
the intersubjectivist structure of reciprocal recogn ition is no longer relevant for
the mentalistic account of self and self-reflection, given that in the Logic Hegel
unfolds the concept in accordance with the model of the ‘ego’, or of pure self-
consc iousness.173
What ever is the relation of the logic to the philosophy of subjective spirit,
something like a “pure self-consciousness” is an extreme abstraction of the
way Hegel analyses self-consciousness in PSS. Furthermore, the mediation
of consciousnesses in recognition of and by other consciousnesses is not
only relevant, but essential in the unfolding of the full structure of cons-
ciousness – even if Hegel thinks that consciousness does not exclusively
consist of moments that are grounded in intersubjective recognition. It is
only if we overemphasize the role of ‘universal self-consciousness’, i.e. self-
consciousness3, in the overall constitution of consciousness and for some
reason want to ignore the moments of self-consciousness1, 2 and 4, that we
get something like a “pure self-consciousness” as a picture of what cons-
ciousness and self-consciousness in PSS are. 
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For Habermas PSS as a whole is only a “presentation of the absolute
idea”174 unfolding itself in empirical subjects. Here I think Habermas is not
sensitive enough to the fact that even if the world as a whole, and subjecti-
vity as part of the constitution of the world, are according to Hegel to be
grasped as an interconnected whole that in its most general features follow
the logical structure of logic, this in now way removes the necessity for
accounting for the concrete life of individual subjects. This I think beco-
mes very clear when one reads PSS with enough sensitivity to what is really
going on in it.
Hösle’s claim according to which Hegel cannot conceptually discern
subject-subject-relations from subject-object-relations is, to say the least,
unfair if we only pay attention to the complexity of the process of the
intersubjective encounter in the ‘Phenomenology’ and to what is its functi-
on for the overall constitution of full subjectivity in PSS. According to
Hösle Hegel depicts the whole process of recognition in PSS only as a
means for achieving the level of universal self-consciousness or reason.175
Now, it is of course true that without being mediated through other
consciousnesses nothing like universality would be available for the sub-
jects in Hegel’s picture. But thinking that the intersubjective relations of
recognition would somehow vanish when universality (in some issues and
in principle) is achieved is like thinking that all the functions analyzed by
Hegel under the name ‘soul’ would vanish when the subject achieves
consciousness. We do not lose our souls when we become conscious. And
neither do we cease to be dependent on all the complex intersubjective
relations that form the fabric of our everyday life and ourselves, when we
become capable of universality (in some issues and in principle). I cannot
see anything in Hegel’s text suggesting that he would have thought other-
wise.
What about Frank’s critique of Hegel as a reflection-theorist? I hope
that I have at least managed to show that a lot of work has first to be done
to understand what consciousness is in Hegel’s picture, before we can appro-
ach the question of whether something like the impasses of the reflection-
model are involved in Hegel’s theory of self-consciousness. Consciousness
is essentially conceptual as to its content and hence involves also normati-
vity. Since consciousness as a whole is on the social level mediated through
other consciousnesses, also self-consciousness4 is – because I am myself
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177 There is a long discussion in developmental psychology about the differentiating-
capabilities of hum an infan ts, starting from Piaget who held that a newborn is yet
without any kind of capabilities for constructing worldly objects out of it’s sensations
and also for differentiating itself from the world. This view has subsequently received
strong criticism. Many o f the articles in Bermudez/Marcel/Eilan (ed.) (1995) touch
this issue. For example George Butterworth refers to empirical studie s that show
infants to be capab le at a very early stage of their lives of very complex intersubjective
interaction, requiring the capability to understand oneself as an object of another
subjects intentions (see Butterworth 1995). Hegel was certainly open enough for
empirical sciences to have been inte rested in empirical study on this field. And as far
as I see, nothing in PSS would contradict saying that the capabil ities needed for
grasping oneself as an object are simply innate.
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one possible intentional correlate among all other possible intentional
correlates of my consciousness. Yet, it is not self-evident what is meant by
the ‘I’ or ‘myself’ as the correlate of self-consciousness. Depending on
whether it is one material object in space among other objects in space,
oneself as a subject among other subject, or oneself as a person with
certain personality-features, we get very different pictures of what might be
the specific problem that a reflection-theory involves. On all these levels,
Hegel text at least by no way implies that the capabilities for grasping
oneself as an object were as such absent before the reflection. It is not true
that for Hegel “das Selbst nicht prä-reflective, also nicht vor der Reflexion
in fremden Subjekten mit sich bekannt wird”176. What ever kind of fami-
liarity with itself is a prerequisite for achieving a socially mediated cons-
ciousness of oneself, it seems to be part of the natural constitution of the
instinctive understanding of the subject before the reflection.177
If my exposition of § 424 has proved plausible, then I need not say
more about Cramer’s reading of it. However, as I showed in the last chap-
ter of this work, something like a consciousness of consciousness is a
constituent of consciousness as such, but this has to be understood in
connection with the normative constitution of consciousness. To be able
to know when one has been mistaken in one’s taking of an object, implies
that one is able to discern consciousness of a thing from the thing itself. In
this sense, even animals have ‘consciousness of consciousness’. Yet, this is
not what Hegel discusses in § 424.
The merit of Hespe’s interpretation is to point out that self-cons-
ciousness for Hegel is something else than merely a reflection to self. Yet,
his way of characterizing self-consciousness as a ‘transcendental condition’
for consciousness as such, which moreover presupposes intersubjectivity,
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178 McDowell 1996, p. 27. See also Halbig 1999, p. 108.
179 Halbig 1999, p. 113. In this context Halb ig discusses the two meanings of truth in
Hegel, ‘Wahrheit’ and ‘Richtigkeit’ (see ibidem, pp. 111-116). This differentiation does
not however affect the general po int about the principal ‘homogeneity’ of thought and
reality.
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is misleading as a reading of Hegel. Consciousness as intentionality by no
way presupposes intersubjectivity in Hegel’s account, although the cons-
ciousness of a social animal is socially mediated. The possible Frankian (or
Henrichian) critique which I proposed, according to which the subject
according to Hespe’s picture could never achieve anything like a reflection
to itself through other subjects – because there is no intentionality what so
ever without or before intersubjectivity – does not apply to Hegel, since
intentionality as such is in Hegel’s account more primitive than intersubjec-
tive mediation.
What about McDowell’s and Brandom’s reading of Hegel? Accor-
ding to McDowell the world as given in our intuitions is conceptually
structured and therefore our ‘takings’ of the world are responsible to the
way the world really is given in our intuitions. McDowell seems to be an
identity-theorist on the question of truth. That is, for McDowell true (or
correct) thoughts or beliefs about the world do not somehow merely
‘represent’ states of affairs of the world. Thoughts are not representations
of states of affairs of the world, but instantiate the same logical structures
that the world itself instantiates. This is important for McDowell’s attempt
to bridge the alleged gap between thought and reality. Namely, if the world
and thoughts were somehow radically heterogeneous (if either thoughts
were conceptual and the world not, or the world were conceptual but
thoughts only representations in some ‘other’ medium) then the danger of
relapsing to the dualist positions McDowell wants to avoid would threaten
to return. According to McDowell’s picture:
there is no ontological gap between the sort of thing one can mean, or generally
the sort of thing one can  think, and the sort of thing that can be the case. When
one thin ks truly, wh at one th inks is what is the ca se. [...] [T]here is no gap
between thought, as such, and the world.178
Christoph Halbig has defended a reading according to which Hegel agrees
here with McDowell. According to Halbig , also for Hegel reality and
thoughts are, or can be, instantiations of the same, that is, instantiations of
the same logical structures. For Hegel – so Halbig – “[d]ie Wirklichkeit
instantiiert dieselbe begriffliche Struktur wie das erkennende Subjekt”.179
McDowell is thus right to see Hegel agreeing with him at least on a general
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181 Neither probably does McDowell. He opposes Kant’s picture of the ‘thing itself’
behind  concep tually structured ways of taking the w orld, but nevertheless see ms to
want to evade the question whether it really is the world itself that is conceptually
structured , or whe ther it is only the world as given in our intuition. It is inevitably the
ontological question  that has to answe red if one wants to  exorcize thought-world-
dualisms.
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level. Robert Brandom has however emphasized that McDowell’s picture
of the epistemic openness of subjects to the world has to be supplemented
by taking into account the intersubjective determination of the space of
reasons. And in fact according to Brandom this was originally Hegel’s idea.
As I proposed in my introduction however, Brandom seems to be
undecided about the connection of this socialized picture of the space of
reasons to the strong ontological claims that Hegel obviously also makes.
Are the following claims compatible or are they not?:
1. The space of reasons, that is, the space of inferential relations
which determine the content of concepts, is a social achievement
and is socially administered by subjects recognizing each others as
competent administers.
2. The spirit (that is, more or less, the space of reasons) has no other;
there is nothing outside it.
For Brandom they are “of course [...] jointly incompatible”180. But why? As
far as I see, they can only be incompatible under the presupposition that a
socially construed space of concepts in the end cannot be identical with the
structure of the world. Thus Brandom in the end seems to relapse to the
dualist picture McDowell wanted to exorcize in the first place. But is this
really Hegel’s problem? I suspect that Brandom in the end does not want
to buy Hegel’s ontological realism according to which the world, really, in
itself, as such, independently of human made ways of carving it, etc., has a
logical structure.181 Is it then perhaps that whereas Brandom does not want
to buy the claim number 2., Hegel in the end does not take seriously
enough the implications of the claim number 1.? That would be to say that
perhaps Hegel does not in the end leave enough room for social construc-
tion since claim 2. seems to point to something like a fixed and unnego-
tiable structure that covers both the world and thinking. According to this
picture, all there is left to do for the members in the space of reasons is to
find the logical structure of the world and organize their thinking according
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to it. After that has been done there is no more room for the negotiation
procedures Brandom is talking about.182 
But as I have tried to show, Hegel accounts for a variety of ways of
taking the world, all of which are responsible to the world. The richness of
the structure of the world allows for a multitude of ways of intending it,
ranging from a purely singular desiring consciousness, through socially
mediated but still particular consciousnesses, to a universal level of cons-
ciousness. On all these levels, consciousness (or “spirit”) in a sense “has no
other”, since the logical constitution of the intentional correlates on all
these levels really are instantiations of something belonging to the overall
logical structure of the world. The world, to borrow Quine’s metaphors
again, can be ‘carved up’ in many different ways according to the needs and
interests of concrete subjectivities. That much in the systems of carving the
world are under-determined by the general structure of the world, and
hence socially negotiable, does not affect the fact that however we rep-
resent the world, the contents of our representations have to be instan-
tiations of same logical structures that are instantiated also in the world –
that is, if they are meant to be representations of the world as it is. More-
over, we have to remember that the subjects representing the world accor-
ding to their interest are themselves part of the world, and hence their
interests are dependent on how that part of the world that they themselves
are is constituted. There is no escape from the world.
Finally, someone who wants to know whether there is ‘enough or
not enough intersubjectivity’ in Hegel’s picture of the individual subjectivi-
ty and its relation to the world, I would give a tentative answer: about the
right amount.
Appendix: contents of the Encyclopedia Philosophy of Subjective spirit (1830) 
 
The subjective spirit/Der subjektive Geist 
A. Anthropology. The soul./Anthropologie. Die Seele § 388 
 a. The natural soul./Die natürliche Seele. § 391 
  α. Natural qualities./Natürliche Qualiteten. § 392 
  β. Natural alterations./Natürliche Veränderungen. § 396 
  γ. Sensation./Empfindung. § 399 
 b. The feeling soul./Die fühlende Seele. § 403 
α. Feeling soul in it’s immediacy./Die fühlende Seele in ihrer Unmittelbarkeit. § 405 
  β. Self-feeling./Selbstgefühl. § 407 
  γ. Habit./Die Gewohnheit. § 409 
 c. The actual soul./Die wirkliche Seele. § 411 
B. Phenomenology of spirit. The consciousness./Die Phänomenologie des Geistes. Das Bewußtsein. § 413 
 a. Consciousness as such./Das Bewußtsein als solches. § 418 
  α. Sensuous consciousness./Das sinnliche Bewußtsein. § 418 
  β. Perception./Das Wahrnehmen. § 420 
  γ. Understanding./ Der Verstand. § 422 
 b. Self-consciousness./Das Selbstbewußtsein. § 424 
  α. Desire./Die Begierde. § 426 
 β. Recognitive self-consciousness./Das anerkennende Selbstbewußtsein. § 430 
 γ. Universal self-consciousness./Das allgemeine  Selbstbewußtsein. § 436 
 c. Reason./Die Vernunft. § 438 
C. Psychology. The spirit./Psychologie. Der Geist. § 440 
 a. Theoretical spirit./Der theoretische Geist. § 445 
  α. Intuition./Anschauung. § 446 
  β. Representation./Die Vorstellung. § 451 
   1. Recollection./Die Erinnerung. § 452 
   2. Imagination./Die Einbildungskraft. § 455 
   3. Memory./Das Gedächtnis. § 461 
  γ. Thinking./Das Denken. § 465 
 b. Practical spirit./Der praktische Geist. § 469 
  α. Practical feeling./Das praktische Gefühl. § 471 
  β. Drives and willfullness./Die Triebe und Die Willkür. § 479 
  γ. Happiness./Die Glückseligkeit. § 479 
 c. Free spirit./Der freie Geist. § 481 
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